Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
Contra Costa County Super. Ct. Nos. J06-00487 & J06-00488
McGuiness, P.J.
Petitioner Diego C. seeks review of juvenile court orders terminating reunification services and scheduling a hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 for his children, Nala C. and Diego C., Jr. Petitioner contends there is insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that the Contra Costa County Children & Family Services Bureau (Bureau) provided reasonable reunification services. We deny the petition.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified.
For the sake of clarity and convenience, we refer to Diego, Sr., as petitioner and Diego, Jr., as Diego.
Factual and Procedural History
On March 8, 2006, the Bureau detained Diego and Nala (also referred to as Tallya C.) along with their half-siblings, Taji G. and Mathias G. Petitioner is the presumed father of Diego and Nala, and he is the stepfather of Taji and Mathias. At the time of their detention, Diego was two years seven months old, and Nala was 18 months old.
On April 17, 2006, the Bureau filed amended petitions alleging Diego and Nala came within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under section 300 based on the following allegations: petitioner had sexually molested Nala and her half-sister, Taji; petitioner had physically assaulted and injured the children’s mother on more than one occasion; the mother failed to protect the children and their half-siblings from petitioner’s sexual abuse; and petitioner and the mother had used inappropriate physical discipline on the children. The petitions described the sexual molestation as partial penile penetration of Taji and genital to genital contact with Nala. The Bureau alleged that Nala came within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under section 300, subdivisions (b) (failure to protect), (d) (sexual abuse), and (j) (abuse of sibling). The Bureau alleged that Diego came within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under section 300, subdivisions (b) (failure to protect) and (j) (abuse of sibling).
At the jurisdiction hearing on August 10, 2006, the juvenile court sustained allegations under section 300, subdivisions (b) and (j) that petitioner had sexually molested his stepdaughter, Taji, that he had physically assaulted the mother, and that he had used inappropriate physical discipline on Taji. The court dismissed the allegation under section 300, subdivision (d), that petitioner had molested Nala.
As of the date of the disposition report, six months after the children were detained, petitioner continued to adamantly deny that he sexually abused Taji or any of his children. The parents also denied engaging in domestic violence. Although the Bureau noted there was a “significant legal foundation” for denying services altogether in light of the court’s findings of severe sexual abuse, the Bureau nonetheless recommended offering reunification services to petitioner. The Bureau explained that because of the children’s attachment to petitioner and the mother’s history of allowing inappropriate contact between petitioner and the children, an argument could be made that services would benefit the children. Accordingly, the Bureau recommended offering services to petitioner, albeit with “significant reluctance.” The juvenile court ordered reunification services for the parents. The record does not include a copy of petitioner’s initial case plan.
Section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6) provides that reunification services need not be provided to a parent when the court finds by clear and convincing evidence “[t]hat the child has been adjudicated a dependent . . . as a result of severe sexual abuse” and that it would not benefit the child to offer reunification services to the parent. Severe sexual abuse is defined to include penetration or manipulation of the genitals of a child or a child’s sibling or half-sibling by any animate or inanimate object for the sexual gratification of the parent. (Ibid.)
At a six-month review hearing in December 2006, the juvenile court made a finding that “[r]easonable services had been provided or offered, designed to aid the parents to overcome the problems which led to the initial removal and continued custody of the child[ren].” The record contains no indication that petitioner objected to the services provided to him or that he desired different services in the future. The court ordered that family reunification services continue and set the matter for a 12-month review in May 2007.
In the report prepared for the 12-month review hearing, the social worker stated that she first met with petitioner on February 21, 2007. At the time of their first meeting, petitioner had been visiting with Diego and Nala once a week, but the social worker reduced the number of visits to twice a month. She wrote that she told petitioner in February 2007 that she did not believe he could reunify with the children even if he complied with his reunification plan due to the nature and severity of the sexual abuse he had committed. Petitioner admitted “he had done what he was accused of,” and said that he wanted to change. The social worker described petitioner as “very amicable, reasonable and appropriate,” and wrote that petitioner had been working with a psychotherapist, Jerome Braun. Petitioner’s case plan reflected that he was in therapy to address his sexually abusive behavior and that he was required to attend a certified domestic violence prevention program.
Initially, the social worker assigned to the case was Christopher Johnson. A different social worker, Dajenya Kafele, took over the case in early 2007.
The Bureau recommended terminating petitioner’s reunification services and setting a section 366.26 hearing because “the amount of services needed well exceeds the legally allowable amount of time that these services can be granted by the Bureau.” The social worker wrote “[t]here is no indication that six more months will make a substantial difference in either parent’s readiness to safely reunify with their children.”
Over the next three months, the contested 12-month review was continued repeatedly. Ultimately, the court set a contested review hearing for October 3 and 4, 2007.
The Bureau prepared an 18-month review report for the October 2007 hearing. In the report, the social worker wrote that petitioner had started a domestic violence treatment program in late October 2006 but had stopped attending in December 2006. He had resumed the program in March 2007. His domestic violence counselor rated his participation as “very good.” Petitioner continued to attend weekly individual and group therapy for sexual offenders with psychotherapist Jerome Braun. The social worker attached a progress report from Braun, who recommended, among other things, that petitioner not be allowed to babysit under any circumstances, have no unsupervised access to young children, and have no authority or supervisory role over young children. Despite these admonitions by the psychotherapist, the social worker commended petitioner for his “diligent efforts” and said he deserved a “great deal of credit for his courage and level of motivation.” The social worker commented that it is “unusual that someone who has perpetrated the rape of a child will admit his actions, let alone enter treatment and try to change.” Nevertheless, the Bureau continued to recommend terminating reunification services and setting a section 366.26 hearing, reasoning that petitioner’s actions “indicate a pathology that is not easily or quickly resolved.” Petitioner’s psychotherapist could not say when or even if petitioner would be able to be reunified with his children. By the date of the Bureau’s report, over 18 months had elapsed since the children were removed from petitioner’s care.
At the combined 12- and 18-month review hearing on October 3 and 4, 2007, the social worker testified that she encouraged petitioner to utilize the services offered to him, notwithstanding her belief that petitioner would be unable to reunify with his children within the time frame mandated by statute. She explained that the services were adequate but that the statutory reunification period was too short to allow petitioner to recover to an extent that would allow his children to be safe in his care. She had been impressed with petitioner, however, so she had searched the internet to see if any research suggested petitioner could recover in a shorter time period.
The social worker testified that the Bureau had attempted to refer petitioner to a sex offender treatment program on a number occasions before September 2006. However, the previous social worker was unsuccessful because petitioner would not speak with the social worker. The previous social worker ultimately gave the referral to petitioner’s attorney, and petitioner began counseling with Dr. Haverty in September 2006. The sessions had gone better than expected and petitioner began to admit sexually abusing his stepdaughter. Petitioner was subsequently referred to a Spanish-speaking psychotherapist, Jerome Braun, who first saw petitioner in February 2007.
At the conclusion of the 12- and 18-month review hearing, the juvenile court found that the Bureau had offered reasonable services to petitioner and that “[t]he treatment provided is relevant and tailored to [petitioner] under the circumstances, both the domestic violence and sex offender treatment.” The court further found no exceptional circumstances warranting an extension of services, noting that “even if I were to extend services one month or six months, there is no evidence before me that [petitioner] would be ready to get the kids back at that point in time.” Relying on the psychotherapist’s letters to the social worker, the court found a substantial risk of detriment if the children were to be returned to petitioner’s care. The court terminated reunification services and set the matter for a section 366.26 hearing to be held on January 31, 2008. Petitioner timely sought writ review of the court’s orders under rule 8.450 of the California Rules of Court.
Discussion
Petitioner contends the juvenile court’s finding that the Bureau provided reasonable services is not supported by substantial evidence. We disagree.
A finding of reasonable reunification services is reviewed for substantial evidence. (Angela S. v. Superior Court (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 758, 762.) “In juvenile cases, as in other areas of the law, the power of an appellate court asked to assess the sufficiency of the evidence begins and ends with a determination as to whether or not there is any substantial evidence, whether or not contradicted, which will support the conclusion of the trier of fact.” (In re Katrina C. (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 540, 547.) All conflicts must be resolved in favor of the respondent and all legitimate inferences must be indulged in support of the juvenile court’s findings. (Ibid.) The party challenging the finding bears the burden of showing there is insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding. (In re Geoffrey G. (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 412, 420.)
When a child is removed from a parent’s custody, a social services agency is generally required to develop and implement a family reunification plan with the objective of providing services or counseling “ ‘as will lead to the resumption of a normal family relationship.’ [Citations.]” (In re Christina L. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 404, 414; see also § 361.5, subd. (a).) At the twelve-month review hearing, the juvenile court must determine whether reasonable services have been offered to the parent that were designed to aid the parent in overcoming the problems that led to the initial removal and continued custody of the child. (§ 366.21, subd. (f).) The case plan offered to a parent must be based on an assessment of the circumstances that required child welfare services intervention. (§ 16501.1, subd. (f)(1).) “The effort must be made to provide suitable services, in spite of the difficulties of doing so or the prospects of success. [Citation.]” (In re Dino E. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1768, 1777.) “The adequacy of reunification plans and the reasonableness of [the agency’s] efforts are judged according to the circumstances of each case. [Citation.]” (Robin V. v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1158, 1164.) “The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances.” (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547.)
Here, in essence, petitioner argues that the reunification plan was inadequate because there was no guarantee he would reunify with his children if he substantially complied with the plan. He contends the social worker prevented him from reunifying with his children because she believed he could not reunify within 18 months, she failed to “intensify” his treatment regime, she did not identify a treatment program that would succeed within the mandated time period, she reduced his visitation to two times per month, and she prejudged petitioner’s progress.
Petitioner’s focus on the social worker and her opinions does not establish that the services provided to him were unreasonable. He presented no evidence that the social worker’s opinions adversely affected either the services offered to him or his compliance with those services. He failed to provide any evidence that intensifying his treatment program or adding additional components to the plan would have resulted in a different outcome. He did not offer any evidence that more frequent visitation with his children would have resulted in a successful reunification by the 18-month review date. Furthermore, there is no indication he ever objected to any of the elements of his plan or sought to have anything added to the plan, even though he knew that his social worker believed reunification was not possible within the statutory timeframe.
Petitioner’s reliance on In re Kristin W. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 234, is misplaced. In Kristin W., the children were removed from their father’s home because of their habitual tardiness or absence from school, their poor personal hygiene, and the father’s inability to clean the home. (Id. at p. 241.) The juvenile court did not order a specific reunification plan at the disposition hearing. (Id. at pp. 241, 254-255.) Instead, the father agreed to a voluntary service agreement that was not tailored to his specific needs. Although the father complained at the six-month review that he did not know what he was supposed to be doing, the juvenile court failed to intervene. (Id. at p. 255.) By the time the father received a more specific plan with additional requirements, he only had three months remaining in which to comply with the plan. (Ibid.) The appellate court held that the social services agency had failed to provide reasonable reunification services and that an additional six months of services was warranted. (Id. at p. 256.)
In contrast to the father in Kristin W., petitioner had a reunification plan that was specifically tailored to address his history of sexually molesting his children and physically assaulting the children’s mother. The plan included a domestic violence treatment program as well as weekly individual and group therapy sessions intended to treat sexual offenders. Petitioner was afforded ample time to comply with the plan, although he delayed starting counseling services as a result of his refusal to speak with the social worker initially assigned to his case. He eventually began taking advantage of counseling services but did not admit to molesting Taji until the end of 2006, well after the children were removed from his care.
The evidence shows the case plan was tailored to address the problems that led to the dependency. The services were reasonable under the circumstances, and the fact that additional services might have been provided does not render the plan inadequate. The law does not require the Bureau to provide services that guarantee family reunification, particularly when, as here, a child is removed from a parent as a result of severe sexual abuse. We conclude substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that the Bureau provided reasonable services to petitioner.
In addition, because we conclude that reasonable services were offered, we reject petitioner’s contention that the juvenile court should have extended the reunification period and ordered additional services. “Absent extraordinary circumstances, the 18-month review hearing constitutes a critical juncture at which ‘the court must return children to their parents and thereby achieve the goal of family preservation or terminate services and proceed to devising a permanent plan for the children.’ [Citations.]” (Katie V. v. Superior Court (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 586, 596, italics added.) There were no extraordinary circumstances here that would justify extending petitioner’s reunification services. Indeed, the juvenile court specifically found that “there’s no evidence it’s in the children’s best interests to give [petitioner] extra time. Absolutely none.” Although his psychotherapist reported that petitioner had made progress in his treatment, the psychotherapist did not say when or even if petitioner would be able to reunify with the children. Under the circumstances, the juvenile court did not err in terminating reunification services.
Disposition
The petition for extraordinary relief is denied on the merits. (§ 366.26, subd. (l)(1)(C); Kowis v. Howard (1992) 3 Cal.4th 888, 893-895.) Our decision is final immediately as to this court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.264(b)(3).)
We concur: Pollak, J., Siggins, J.