Our review of a circuit court's determination of summary judgment is limited to whether the circuit court correctly concluded that no genuine issue of material fact had been raised and, if none was raised, whether judgment as a matter of law was correctly entered. Diefendorf v. City of Peoria, 308 Ill.App.3d 465, 467-68 (1999). We apply a de novo standard of review where a case has been decided by a lower court through summary judgment.
Our function on review of summary judgment is limited to determining whether the trial court correctly concluded that no genuine issue of material fact had been raised and, if none was raised, whether judgment as a matter of law was correctly entered. Diefendorf v. City of Peoria, 308 Ill. App. 3d 465, 467-68 (1999). The construction of a contract is a question of law for the trial court and, thus, suitable for summary judgment.
None of these areas designated for bike use included alleys. See Diefendorf v. City of Peoria, 308 Ill.App.3d 465, 470, 242 Ill.Dec. 34, 720 N.E.2d 655 (1999). ¶ 19 Section 10–9–4 of the Evanston Municipal Code has language nearly identical to section 11–1502 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11–1502 (West 2010)) and defines “bicycle” in an almost identical manner (625 ILCS 5/1–106 (West 2010)).
Our function on review of summary judgments is limited to determining whether the circuit court correctly concluded that no genuine issue of material fact had been raised and, if none was raised, whether judgment as a matter of law was correctly entered. Diefendorf v. City of Peoria, 308 Ill. App. 3d 465, 467-68, 720 N.E.2d 655, 657 (1999). In determining whether a genuine issue of material facts exists, we must construe the evidence strictly against the movant and liberally in favor of the opponent.