Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
Alameda County Super. Ct. No. C-807239
Jenkins, J.
Following a bench trial, the trial court filed a Statement of Decision (SOD) and entered judgment quieting title in favor of plaintiff, cross-defendant and respondent Conchita Dieden with respect to her property on Monterey Avenue in Berkeley (Berkeley property). Defendant, cross-complainant and appellant Stanley F. Schmidt (Schmidt) appeals the trial court’s judgment that he owns no lien or interest in Dieden’s property. We reverse.
The plaintiff in the action was Conchita’s former husband, Benjamin Dieden, now deceased. Benjamin and Conchita married in 1968, divorced in 1986, and lived together until Benjamin’s death in January 1999. Where necessary, we shall refer to the Diedens by first name. Where we refer to “Dieden,” we mean respondent Conchita Dieden.
Background
Litigation between these parties dates back to 1981. The operative complaint in this case was filed by Benjamin Dieden on December 23, 1998. Benjamin sought a judgment of quiet title in the Berkeley property against Schmidt. Benjamin died on January 13, 1999.
Schmidt filed an answer to the complaint on May 26, 1999. As an affirmative defense to Benjamin’s claim seeking to quiet title to the Berkeley property, Schmidt alleged he was a judgment creditor of Benjamin Dieden. Schmidt attached to his answer a copy of an abstract of judgment (1993 abstract) recorded on March 9, 1993, in Alameda County. The 1993 abstract names Benjamin Dieden as debtor. Also, the 1993 abstract lists that judgment was entered on April 6, 1982, renewed on February 26, 1992, and sets the total amount of judgment as last renewed at $56,290.70.
The original judgment in Alameda County case number 548148-8 was entered on April 6, 1982. In that case, the Diedens sued Schmidt for equitable reinstatement and injunctive relief after Schmidt foreclosed on the Diedens when they defaulted on a land sale contract. The trial court awarded summary judgment in favor of Schmidt and awarded Schmidt costs in the sum of $91 and attorney fees under the land sale contract in the sum of $15,045. Judgment in favor of Schmidt was affirmed on appeal in August 1985. (Dieden v. Schmidt (A018207, filed August 16, 1985).) On February 27, 1986, Schmidt recorded an abstract of judgment (1986 abstract) naming both Conchita and Benjamin as judgment debtors and listing a total judgment of $28,434. On February 26, 1992, Schmidt filed an application for and renewal of judgment against Benjamin only in the total amount of $56,290.70. Without objection from Benjamin, the renewal of judgment was endorsed filed on April 2, 1992.
On November 7, 2000, Schmidt filed a second amended cross-complaint for declaratory relief and foreclosure of lien. Schmidt named the Diedens and First Nationwide Mortgage Corporation (Nationwide) as cross-defendants. In his cross-complaint, Schmidt alleges as follows: On or about February 27, 1986 he recorded an abstract of judgment in the amount of $28,434 against Conchita and Benjamin Dieden at a time when they held the Berkeley property as tenants in common; in July 1991, Nationwide recorded a deed of trust against the property as security for a loan in the principal amount of $115,000 to the Diedens; Schmidt’s April 2, 1992 renewal of judgment against Benjamin maintained the priority of the judgment lien against the Berkeley property over Nationwide’s deed of trust; and, after Benjamin’s death, any interest in the Berkeley property held by Conchita remains subject to Schmidt’s judgment lien. In his prayer for relief, Schmidt requested a judicial determination that notwithstanding Benjamin’s death and various conveyances of the Berkeley property between the Diedens, it remained burdened by his judgment lien; that the lien be foreclosed; and that the Berkeley property be sold to pay the lien.
In July 2001, Nationwide and Schmidt filed competing motions for summary judgment. Schmidt also moved for an award of attorney fees incurred to enforce his judgment. In August 2001, the trial court granted Nationwide’s and denied Schmidt’s motion for summary judgment as well as his motion for attorney fees. Schmidt appealed the trial court’s award of summary judgment in favor of Nationwide, as well as its order denying his motion for attorney fees.
Division Four of our Court heard the appeal in Dieden v. Schmidt (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 645. The court stated that the trial court awarded Nationwide summary judgment on the grounds Schmidt’s judgment lien terminated upon Benjamin’s death as a matter of law. The court deemed this error and reversed the judgment of the trial court. The court applied the enforcement of judgments law, together with the law of joint tenancy and tenancy in common, to the conveyances of the Berkeley property between the Diedens, and concluded: “Schmidt’s lien did not expire upon Benjamin Dieden’s death; it remained valid and enforceable against a one-half interest in the property.” (Id. at p. 653.)
Additionally, the court considered Nationwide’s alternate grounds for summary judgment—that “it was the senior lienholder because Schmidt’s first [1986] abstract of judgment was void for failure to comply with the statutory requirements for abstracts.” (Dieden v. Schmidt, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 653.) Nationwide asserted that “Schmidt did not list the Social Security numbers and driver’s license numbers of the Diedens in his first abstract of judgment, as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 674.” (Id. at p. 654.) However, the court stated section 674 only requires the judgment debtor to provide social security and driver’s license numbers if they are known to him, and noted that Nationwide “did not submit undisputed evidence [] Schmidt knew that information.” The court added: “Schmidt marked a box on the abstract that indicated he did not know Conchita Dieden’s Social Security number or driver’s license number. He failed to mark a similar box next to Benjamin’s name, but arguably that omission was a mere clerical error. (Citation.) Most likely an evidentiary hearing will be required to resolve this issue.” (Id. at pp. 654-655.)
Code of Civil Procedure, section 674 (section 674) provides in pertinent part:
The Register of Actions shows that dismissal with prejudice was entered with respect to Nationwide on September 28, 2001.
Upon remand from Division Four’s decision in Dieden v. Schmidt, supra, Schmidt moved for an award of attorney fees, and the trial court awarded him costs and fees in the amount of $102,505.13. Division Four affirmed the trial court’s award of attorney fees in Dieden v. Schmidt (A106668, filed December 15, 2005; 2005 Cal.App. Unpub Lexis 11521).
A bench trial on the validity and enforceability of Schmidt’s lien was subsequently held over June 11 and 12, 2007. Schmidt and Dieden each testified at trial. Specifically, Schmidt testified that when he prepared the 1986 abstract he did not know Benjamin’s social security number or driver’s license number but “inadvertently” omitted to check the appropriate boxes to that effect. Most of the evidence, however, was presented to the court in the form of documents, including those related to various bankruptcies filed at different times by Benjamin and Conchita. The trial court filed its SOD on November 28, 2007. The SOD rejects the validity of Schmidt’s lien on multiple independent grounds.
The bankruptcy proceedings are discussed post where necessary.
The trial court issued a notice of tentative decision in favor of Dieden on September 10, 2007. Schmidt submitted lengthy objections to the tentative decision and requested a SOD be issued. The trial court then designated Dieden to prepare a proposed SOD addressing Schmidt’s objections. Schmidt objected at length to the Proposed SOD. The trial court adopted the proposed SOD without modification.
The SOD’s first ground for rejecting the validity of Schmidt’s lien relates to the compound effect of Conchita’s previous bankruptcy filings. The SOD states that because Conchita filed a chapter 11 bankruptcy in February 1985 when she and Benjamin held the Berkeley property as joint tenants with the right of survivorship, the joint tenancy became property of the bankruptcy estate protected by the automatic stay. Moreover, the SOD continues, because Conchita’s chapter 11 case was not dismissed until July 30, 1985, Benjamin’s attempt to sever the joint tenancy by recording a deed on June 13, 1985 violated the automatic stay and was therefore void. The SOD further states that Conchita’s filing of the chapter 11 bankruptcy petition did not sever the joint tenancy.
Additionally, the SOD notes that when Conchita filed a chapter 7 petition for bankruptcy in January 1986 she still held the Berkeley property in joint tenancy with right of survivorship. The joint tenancy then became part of the chapter 7 bankruptcy estate. The SOD concludes that because Schmidt’s abstract of judgment was filed and recorded on February 27, 1986 while Conchita’s chapter 7 bankruptcy case was still pending, the recording was void and of no legal effect.
The SOD states that Conchita’s liability on the Schmidt judgment was discharged in 1986, because she filed a second chapter 7 bankruptcy petition on March 28, 1986 and received a discharge of her debts on August 12, 1986. The SOD states Benjamin’s liability on the Schmidt judgment was also discharged because he filed a chapter 7 bankruptcy petition on March 11, 1993 and received a discharge on March 9, 1995.
Finally, the SOD also concluded that Schmidt failed to comply with Code of Civil Procedure section 674 with respect to the 1986 and 1993 abstracts of judgment. The SOD states: “An abstract of judgment must contain the social security number or driver’s license number [of] both of the judgment debtors if they are known to the judgment creditor. If such numbers are not known to the judgment creditor, that fact shall be indicated on the abstract of judgment. Failure to do so nullifies the abstract. [¶] Since Schmidt failed to comply with C.C.P. [§ 674], no lien was created by either the 1986 abstract of judgment or the 1993 abstract of judgment. By the time the abstract was property completed and recorded in 2007, Schmidt’s judgment was already discharged by both Conchita and Benjamin Dieden’s bankruptcy discharge.”
Discussion
A. Standard of Review
“When an appellate court reviews a statement of decision issued by a trial court, . . . [¶] [t]he trial court’s findings on questions of fact are reviewed under the substantial evidence standard. (Citation.) That standard for review has been described by our Supreme Court as follows: ‘Where findings of fact are challenged on a civil appeal, we are bound by the “elementary, but often overlooked principle of law, that . . . the power of an appellate court begins and ends with a determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted,” to support the findings below. (Citation.) We must therefore view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving it the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in its favor in accordance with the standard of review so long adhered to by this court.’ (Citation.) [¶] Evidence is ‘substantial’ for purposes of this standard of review if it is ‘of “ponderable legal significance,” “reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value” [Citations.]’ (Citation.)” (Brewer v. Murphy (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 928, 935-936.)
“A trial court’s conclusions of law,” however, “are subject to independent review by an appellate court. (Citation.) In other words, an appellate court decides a question of law without deference to how it was answered below. (Citation.)” (Brewer v. Murphy, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at p. 936.)
B. Analysis
Schmidt challenges the trial court’s conclusion that both the 1986 and 1993 abstracts are void and unenforceable. Specifically, Schmidt contends the issue of the validity of the 1993 abstract is precluded by principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel because Benjamin litigated the same issue in his 1993 bankruptcy. Also, Schmidt contends the trial court erred by concluding that the 1986 abstract is void because it violated the automatic stay triggered by Conchita’s January 1986 bankruptcy filing, and he asserts the trial court erred by concluding that the 1986 abstract is void for failure to comply with the requirements of section 674.
Furthermore, Schmidt contends that even if the trial court correctly concluded the automatic stay triggered by Cochita’s bankruptcy filing invalidated the 1986 abstract, the 1993 abstract created an independent and fully enforceable lien on the property. Moreover, he continues, the trial court’s finding that the 1993 abstract did not comport with the requirements of section 674 is not supported by substantial evidence. As explained more fully below, we agree with Schmidt’s contentions regarding the force and effect of the 1993 abstract. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s judgment of quiet title on that basis. Because our disposition rests on the validity and enforceability of the 1993 abstract, the various contentions concerning the validity and enforceability of the 1986 abstract are thereby rendered moot, and therefore we need not address them.
1. Recording of the 1993 abstract created a valid and enforceable judgment lien
Schmidt filed a renewal of judgment on April 2, 1992, naming Benjamin as the sole judgment debtor and stating that the total renewed judgment, including interest, was $56.290.70. The trial court found that Benjamin was served by mail with the notice of renewal of judgment. Benjamin did not object to the application for renewal of judgment. (See Goldman v. Simpson (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 255, 260 [“To obtain a renewal of the judgment, the judgment creditor must file an application for renewal with the clerk of the court that entered the judgment before the expiration of the 10-year period of enforceability (citations)[,] . . . serve notice of the renewal on the debtor, (citation), and the debtor then has 30 days after service to make a motion to vacate or modify the renewal (citations).”].)
Following renewal of judgment, Schmidt recorded the abstract of judgment on March 9, 1993 against Benjamin only. “[A]n abstract of judgment attaches to all interests (whether present or future, vested or contingent, legal or equitable) owned by the judgment debtor in real property in the county in which the abstract is recorded and creates a judgment lien on that property which continues until it expires ten years later or is satisfied or released. (Citations.)” (Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Charlton (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1066, 1069.) Accordingly, the 1993 abstract created a judgment lien attaching to all interests Benjamin held in the Berkeley property on March 9, 1993 — the date the 1993 abstract was recorded. Thus, we must examine the various conveyances of the Berkeley property made by Benjamin and Conchita in 1991 and 1992 to determine what interest, if any, Benjamin held in the Berkeley property on March 9, 1993, when Schmidt’s judgment lien attached.
On February 7, 2002, Schmidt renewed the judgment for a second time, naming Benjamin as the sole judgment debtor and stating the total renewed judgment was $112,171.39, and also recorded a certified copy of the application for renewal of judgment. By recording the renewal of judgment, Schmidt extended the duration of the judgment lien created by the 1993 abstract for a further 10 years. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 683.180, subd. (a).) In its SOD, the trial court found with respect to the 2002 application for renewal of judgment that “neither Benjamin Dieden, who was deceased nor Conchita Dieden were served with the application.” The trial court, however, drew no conclusion of law based on this factual finding. In any event, we conclude the trial court’s factual finding with respect to the 2002 application for renewal of judgment is not supported by substantial evidence because the record contains a proof of service showing Conchita was personally served a copy of the application on March 6, 2002.
On July 30, 1991, Benjamin and Conchita recorded a deed granting each other an undivided one-half interest in the Berkeley property. Then Benjamin conveyed his interest in the Berkeley property to Conchita by a quitclaim deed recorded on June 12, 1992. At that point, therefore, Conchita was the sole owner of the property. Subsequently, Conchita conveyed one-half of her whole interest in the Berkeley property back to Benjamin by quitclaim deed recorded on August 19, 1992. However, the August 1992 quitclaim deed did not expressly declare an estate in joint tenancy. Thus, after Conchita recorded the August 1992 quitclaim deed, she and Benjamin held the Berkeley property as tenants in common. (Wilson v. S.L. Rey, Inc. (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 234, 242 [deed may not be construed as conveying title in joint tenancy unless it expressly so provides]; Civ. Code, § 686.) Accordingly, when Schmidt recorded the abstract of judgment on March 9, 1993, a judgment lien attached to Benjamin’s interest in the Berkeley property as a tenant in common.
Furthermore, the Diedens subsequent creation of a joint tenancy in the Berkeley property by a grant deed recorded on December 29, 1994, did not affect the enforceability of Schmidt’s judgment lien. As Division Four of this Court stated: “[Schmidt’s] judgment lien attached to Benjamin Dieden’s interest as a tenant in common, before the creation of any right of survivorship [by joint tenancy]. Until the lien was satisfied or extinguished, it was enforceable against Benjamin’s interest in the Berkeley property regardless of who held that interest. Under Code of Civil Procedure section 697.390, subdivision (a), a subsequent conveyance or encumbrance of an interest in real property subject to a judgment lien does not affect the lien.” (Dieden v. Schmidt, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 651.) The court further noted that “under section 695.070, the judgment lien may be enforced against the property in the same manner and to the same extent as if there had been no transfer, even after the death of the judgment debtor. (Citations).” (Ibid.) Accordingly, the court concluded that “when Benjamin and Conchita Dieden transferred their tenant in common interests to one another in 1994 and created a joint tenancy, she took her interest in the property subject to the judgment lien. (Citation.)” (Id. at pp. 651-652.)
In sum, we conclude that Schmidt’s 1993 abstract created a judgment lien that attached to Benjamin’s one-half interest in the Berkeley property when it was recorded on March 9, 1993. We further conclude that Conchita took her interest in the Berkeley property subject to Schmidt’s judgment lien when she and Benjamin transferred their tenant in common interests to one another in 1994 and created a joint tenancy.
In its SOD, the trial court concluded that Benjamin’s liability on the Schmidt judgment was discharged when he received a discharge in bankruptcy on March 9, 1995. We disagree. Benjamin filed his chapter 7 bankruptcy petition on March 11, 1993, after Schmidt recorded the abstract on March 9, 1993. During the course of the chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings, Benjamin sought to avoid Schmidt’s lien by motion filed pursuant to title 11 United States Code section 522 (f). The bankruptcy court’s denial of Benjamin’s motion to avoid Schmidt’s lien was affirmed by the district court. If a debtor fails to obtain an order in the bankruptcy proceeding avoiding a lien perfected prior to the bankruptcy, the discharge “does not affect a judgment to the extent that it supports” the prior lien and “[a]s to such liens the judgment remains valid and enforceable after discharge.” (Songer v. Cooney (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 387, 391.)
2. The 1993 abstract was not defective under Section 674
Dieden contends the above analysis counts for naught because the 1993 abstract did not comply with the requirements of section 674, and is therefore defective and unenforceable. The trial court reached this conclusion in its SOD and stated as follows: “With respect to the 1986 and 1993 Abstract of Judgments, Schmidt failed to comply with C.C.P. §674. Section 674 sets forth content requirements for abstracts of judgment. An abstract of judgment must contain the social security number or driver’s license number or both of the judgment debtors if they are known to the judgment creditor. If such numbers are not known to the judgment creditor, that fact shall be indicated on the abstract of judgment. Failure to do so nullifies the abstract.”
The trial court’s conclusion of law, that the 1993 abstract failed to comply with section 674 because it neither provided social security and driver’s license information nor indicated such information was unknown to the judgment creditor, is not supported by substantial evidence. We have examined the 1993 abstract and it fully complies with section 674 in that regard. (§ 674, subd. (a)(6) [abstract of judgment must contain “[t]he last four digits of the social security number and driver’s license number of the judgment debtor if they are known to the judgment creditor. If either or both of those sets of numbers are not known to the judgment creditor, that fact shall be indicated on the abstract of judgment].) The 1993 abstract shows that Schmidt checked the two boxes indicating that both Benjamin’s social security number and driver’s license number were unknown to him.
Nevertheless, Dieden contends the 1993 abstract fails to comply with section 674 for the additional reason that it does not indicate “[w]hether a stay of enforcement has been ordered by the court and, if so, the date the stay ends.” (§ 674, subd. (a)(7).) In this regard, Dieden asserts that “Box 8 was . . . left blank in the 1993 Abstract of Judgment.” On that basis, Dieden speculates that “[t]he trial judge could have concluded that the failure to comply with the mandated requirements of C.C.P. section 674(a) caused the abstracts of judgment[] to be unenforceable.” We reject this contention for several reasons.
The Abstract of Judgment form allows the clerk of court to check box 8a if a stay of enforcement has not been ordered by the court, or to check box 8b if a stay of enforcement has been ordered by the court and to indicate the date such stay expires.
To sustain Dieden’s contention we would have to infer that the trial court found the 1993 abstract did not comply with section 674 because Box 8 was not checked. Generally, “all intendments and presumptions are indulged in favor” of the trial court’s judgment. (In re Marriage of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1133 (Arceneaux).) Specifically, “[u]nder the doctrine of implied findings, the reviewing court must infer, following a bench trial, that the trial court impliedly made every factual finding necessary to support its decision.” (Fladeboe v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 42, 48.) However, a party may avoid such implied findings by following the two-step process provided by Code of Civil Procedure sections 632 and 634. (Arceneaux, supra, 51 Cal.3d at pp. 1133-1134.) “[F]irst, a party must request a statement of decision as to specific issues to obtain an explanation of the trial court’s tentative decision (§ 632); second, if the court issues such a statement, a party claiming deficiencies therein must bring such defects to the trial court’s attention to avoid implied findings on appeal favorable to the judgment (§ 634).” (Id. at p. 1134.)
Schmidt followed these procedures to the letter. As already noted (see ante, fn. 5), Schmidt requested a SOD after the trial court issued a tentative decision. The trial court ordered Dieden to prepare a proposed SOD. The proposed SOD concluded the 1993 abstract was defective for failure to either include information regarding the debtor’s social security and driver’s license numbers or to indicate the information is unknown. The proposed SOD made no finding with respect to whether the 1993 abstract was invalid for failing to indicate if a stay of enforcement was in effect. Schmidt specifically objected to the proposed SOD’s conclusion that the 1993 abstract was defective for failure to comply with section 674 on the grounds he “clearly checked the boxes indicating that he did not know Benjamin’s social security or driver’s license numbers.” Thereafter, the trial court adopted and filed the proposed SOD without modification and without addressing Schmidt’s specific objection that the 1993 abstract fully complied with section 674 regarding social security and driver’s license information. Under these circumstances, we decline to infer that the trial court found the 1993 abstract did not comply with section 674 because Box 8 was not checked. (Arceneaux, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 1134.)
Furthermore, we also reject Dieden’s contention that the 1993 abstract failed to comply with section 674 because Box 8 was not checked on the grounds that she did not raise this contention below. Having failed to present this theory in the trial court, Dieden may not raise it now. (See, e.g., Kolani v. Gluska (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 402, 412 [failure to raise issue or argument in the trial court results in forfeiture on appeal]; see also Munro v. Regents of University of California (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 977, 988-989 [party may not change theory of a cause of action on appeal and raise issue not presented in opposition to summary judgment].)
Moreover, even if we exercised our discretion to reach such a forfeited contention (see Richmond v. Dart Industries, Inc. (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 869, 874), we would conclude it lacks merit. Box 8 appears in the part of the Judicial Council Abstract of Judgment form completed by the clerk of court. The clerk of court’s failure to check either box 8a or box 8b constitutes “ mere clerical error.” (Dieden v. Schmidt, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 655.) “A clerical error, as opposed to a noncorrectable judicial error, is one that is made inadvertently. (Citation.) Moreover, clerical errors are correctable at any time. (Citations.)” (Commonwealth Land Title Co. v. Kornbluth (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 518, 531 (Commonwealth Land) [omission of date of entry of judgment from one of five abstracts of judgment “obviously an inadvertent clerical error”]; see also Hibberd v. Smith (1875) 50 Cal. 511, 517-518 [clerk’s omission of the Christian name of the judgment debtor did not prevent the judgment of a lien on the real estate of the judgment debtor].)
Dieden relies on Keele v. Reich (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 1129, 1132 (Keele) to suggest clerical error cannot be found because the requirements of section 674 are mandatory. The court in Commonwealth Land, supra, observed that Keele “involved a situation where the debtor’s social security number was marked ‘unknown’ on the abstract of judgment even though the judgment creditor had knowledge of the number.” (Commonwealth Land, supra, 175 Cal.App.3d at p. 531, fn. 6.) The Commonwealth Land court concluded Keele did not control on its facts because “unlike the judgment creditor in Keele, Commonwealth did not purposefully withhold information required on the abstract; the omission was obviously an inadvertent clerical error. Therefore, contrary to the [appellant’s] assertion, the Keele case does not render void the abstract of judgment.” (Ibid.)
Moreover, unlike information regarding a judgment debtor’s social security and driver’s license numbers, information about whether or not a stay of judgment is in effect is unrelated to section 674’s key concern with “the problem of identifying a judgment debtor in an abstract as opposed to a property owner who has the same or similar name as that of the judgment debtor.” (Keele, supra, 169 Cal.App.3d at p. 1132.)
We distinguish Keele in the same manner as the Commonwealth Land court. Unlike the judgment creditor in Keele, Schmidt did not purposefully withhold information required on the abstract. On the contrary, he provided all the information required of the judgment creditor. Therefore, the Keele case does not render void the 1993 abstract.
“When clerical errors in the judgment or order are corrected by the court under its inherent power, the order of correction may, if necessary, be made nunc pro tunc as of the time of the original entry, and this is true regardless of lapse of time. (Citations.) Further, an appellate court may direct the trial court to make an order nunc pro tunc. (Citation)” (Commonwealth Land, supra, 175 Cal.App.3d at p. 531.) Accordingly, we direct the trial court to correct the 1993 abstract of judgment and the most recent 2007 abstract of judgment in favor of Schmidt by checking box 8.
3. Remaining Issues
In sum, after de novo review of the trial court’s SOD, we conclude the trial court erred by declaring the 1993 abstract void and unenforceable. Schmidt asserts that the matter should not be remanded for further proceedings. Instead, he asks that we determine the priority of his lien with respect to other parties, determine the effect of the filing of a declaration of homestead, direct the trial court to issue an order for the sale of one-half interest in the Berkeley property, and enter a judgment of foreclosure and order of sale in his favor in the amount of $391,937.53 as of February 1, 2008. However, these interrelated factual and legal issues are best determined by the trial court in the first instance upon remand. (Cf. On-Line Power, Inc. v. Mazur (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1079, 1086-1087 [on remand parties should address issue of Labor Code’s applicability “giving the trial court a chance to decide the question in light of the parties’ evidence and arguments”].)
Schmidt also asserts that sanctions should be imposed on Dieden and her counsel for “misrepresenting” that the 1993 abstract did not comply with section 674. However, it was the trial court that determined the 1993 abstract did not comply with section 674, not Dieden. Schmidt’s request for sanctions is denied.
Disposition
The trial court’s judgment of quiet title in favor of Dieden is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Dieden shall bear costs on appeal.
We concur: McGuiness, P. J., Siggins, J.
“(a) Except as otherwise provided in Section 4506 of the Family Code, an abstract of a judgment or decree requiring the payment of money shall be certified by the clerk of the court where the judgment or decree was entered and shall contain all of the following:
(1) The title of the court where the judgment or decree is entered and cause and number of the action.
(2) The date of entry of the judgment or decree and of any renewals of the judgment or decree and where entered in the records of the court.
(3) The name and last known address of the judgment debtor and the address at which the summons was either personally served or mailed to the judgment debtor or the judgment debtor's attorney of record.
(4) The name and address of the judgment creditor.
(5) The amount of the judgment or decree as entered or as last renewed.
(6) The last four digits of the social security number and driver’s license number of the judgment debtor if they are known to the judgment creditor. If either or both of those sets of numbers are not known to the judgment creditor, that fact shall be indicated on the abstract of judgment.
(7) Whether a stay of enforcement has been ordered by the court and, if so, the date the stay ends.
(8) The date of issuance of the abstract.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 674, subd. (a).)