Opinion
December 5, 1988
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Wager, J.).
Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, the motion is granted in its entirety, the complaint is dismissed insofar as it is asserted against the appellants, and the action as against the remaining defendant is severed.
The plaintiff's employment with the appellant Del Laboratories, Inc. pursuant to a verbal agreement for an indefinite term was, prima facie, a hiring at will (see, Sabetay v Sterling Drug, 69 N.Y.2d 329, 333). As this court has noted: "An action to recover damages for the breach of an employment contract may be maintained, notwithstanding the indefinite term, where the existence of a limitation by express agreement is demonstrated by such circumstances as (1) the employee was induced to leave his prior employment by the assurance that his new employer would not discharge him without cause, (2) that assurance is incorporated into the employment application, and (3) the employment is subject to the provisions of a personnel handbook or manual which provides that dismissal will be for just and sufficient cause only" (Diskin v Consolidated Edison Co., 135 A.D.2d 775, 777, lv denied 72 N.Y.2d 802; see, Weiner v McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458).
In this case, there are no triable questions of fact precluding the granting of the appellants' motion dismissing the plaintiff's breach of contract claim as a matter of law (see, Sabetay v Sterling Drug, 69 N.Y.2d 329, supra). The plaintiff's deposition testimony reveals that the only inducements for leaving her previous job were the increase in salary and that the work was more interesting. Moreover, the personnel policy memorandum relied on by the plaintiff, while enumerating 12 reasons for an employee's dismissal, does not limit the appellants' right to discharge to just and sufficient cause only. Thus, the plaintiff's employment could have been terminated at will and, accordingly, her cause of action to recover damages for wrongful discharge should have been dismissed (see, Murphy v American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293).
The two remaining causes of action sounding in breach of contract, namely, the claim for breach of covenant of good faith and conspiracy to interfere with the plaintiff's employment contract, should similarly have been dismissed as a matter of law. It is well established that an obligation of good faith will not be implied in an at-will employment relationship since it would be incongruous to hold that an inference may be drawn that an employer impliedly agreed to a provision which would be destructive of his unfettered right to discharge an employee (see, Murphy v American Home Prods. Corp., supra, at 304-305; Sabetay v Sterling Drug, 69 N.Y.2d 329, supra). With respect to the cause of action to recover damages for conspiracy to interfere with the plaintiff's employment contract, allegations of conspiracy may only serve to support an otherwise actionable tort (see, Alexander Alexander v Fritzen, 68 N.Y.2d 968, 969; Falle v Metalios, 132 A.D.2d 518, 520). Moreover, "[t]he keystone of the tort of interference with contractual relations is the existence of a contract" (Papell v Calogero, 114 A.D.2d 403, mod on other grounds 68 N.Y.2d 705; see, Guard-Life Corp. v Parker Hardware Mfg. Corp., 50 N.Y.2d 183).
With regard to her claim of unlawful dismissal based upon age discrimination, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition to the appellants' evidentiary proof that she was not dismissed because of her age (see, Hill v Westchester Aeronautical Corp., 112 A.D.2d 977, 978). Lawrence, J.P., Eiber, Spatt and Balletta, JJ., concur.