In these instances, the Court has held that the insurance company cannot later raise issues that were or should have been raised in the underlying litigation. Morrill v. Gallagher, . . . 122 N.W.2d 687 ([Mich.] 1963); Dickenson [Dickinson] v. Homerich, . . . 227 N.W. 696 ([Mich.] 1929). These cases are closely akin to the principle behind collateral estoppel.

Having elected to rely on the exclusion provisions of the contract of insurance appellant was not, and is not, entitled to assert other grounds as a defense to its liability in garnishment. In Dickinson v. Homerich, 248 Mich. 634, which involved garnishment proceedings instituted for the collection of a default judgment, the garnishee defendant, which had issued an auto insurance policy to the principal defendant, refused to defend the case brought against the latter on the ground that the policy had lapsed. Apparently such was not the actual fact and the insurer undertook to defend the garnishment action on a number of other grounds. With reference thereto this Court said in its opinion (p 637):

[12] It is undisputed that the injured third party suing under the policy stands in the shoes of the insured. Baxter v. Central West Cas. Co., 186 Wn. 459, 58 P.2d 835; Eakle v. Hayes, supra; Goergen v. Manufacturers Cas. Ins. Co., 117 Conn. 89, 166 A. 757; Dickinson v. Homerich, 248 Mich. 634, 227 N.W. 696. Respondent is thus foreclosed from asserting the breach against both the insured and the appellant. Reversed and a new trial ordered.

denied, State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Dewalt, 306 U.S. 644, 59 S.Ct. 583, 83 L.Ed. 1043; Michel v. American Fire Casualty Co., 5 Cir., 82 F.2d 583; Pennsylvania Casualty Co. v. Phoenix, 10 Cir., 139 F.2d 823; Employers' Liability Assur. Corporation, Limited, of London, England v. Bodron, 5 Cir., 65 F.2d 539, 540; Lawley v. Whiteis, D.C., 24 F. Supp. 698; Morehouse v. Employers' Liability Assur. Corporation, 119 Conn. 416, 177 A. 568; Poole v. Travelers Ins. Co., 130 Fla. 806, 179 So. 138; Hodges v. Ocean Accident Guarantee Corporation, 66 Ga. App. 431, 18 S.E.2d 28, certiorari denied, 316 U.S. 693, 62 S.Ct. 1299, 86 L.Ed. 1763, rehearing denied, 317 U.S. 705, 63 S.Ct. 25, 87 L.Ed. 563; Wold, for Use of Wegener, v. Glens Falls Indemnity Co., 269 Ill. App.? 407; Brandon v. St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co., 132 Kan. 68, 294 P. 881, 83 A.L.R. 673; Blanton v. Kansas City Cotton Mills Co., 103 Kan. 118, 172 P. 987, L.R.A. 1918E, 541; Connolly v. Bolster, 187 Mass. 266, 72 N.E. 981; Dickinson v. Homerich, 248 Mich. 634, 227 N.W. 696; Commercial Casualty Ins. Co. v. Skinner, 190 Miss. 533, 1 So.2d 225, 226; Taverno v. American Auto Ins. Co., 232 Mo. App. 820, 112 S.W.2d 941; Lajoie v. Central West Casualty Co., 228 Mo. App. 701, 71 S.W.2d 803; Drumm v. Fort Dearborn Casualty Underwriters, Mo. App., 5 S.W.2d 648; Wehrhahn v. Fort Dearborn Casualty Underwriters, 221 Mo. App. 230, 1 S.W.2d 242; Pickering v. Hartsock, 221 Mo. App. 868, 287 S.W. 819; Ferguson v. Manufacturers' Casualty Ins. Co., 129 Pa. Super. 276, 195 A. 661; Moses v. Ferrel, 97 Pa. Super. 13; Gray v. Houck, 167 Tenn. 233, 68 S.W.2d 117; Hinton v. Carmody, 186 Wn. 242, 60 P.2d 1108; Landaker v. Anderson, 145 Wn. 660, 261 P. 388; Fenton v. Poston, 114 Wn. 217, 195 P. 31; Booker T. Washington Burial Ins. Co. v. Roberts, supra. That there might be other remedies than under the statute, is of no consequence since equity jurisdiction thereunder having been conferred by statute is not dependent on, or affected by the absence of, an adequate remedy at law.

The insurance company had the duty to disclose the existence of the policy and in that disclosure claim their defenses. Having in bad faith denied the existence of the policy, the insurance company was estopped from asserting or relying upon any limitation in the policy affecting the time within which suit should be brought. Dickinson v. Homerich, 248 Mich. 634. 3 Comp. Laws 1929, § 14857 (Stat.

" In Dickinson v. Homerich, 248 Mich. 634, we said: "Having thus based its nonliability solely upon the ground that the policy had lapsed, the circuit judge was right in holding that other defenses were waived by the insurance company.

Niles v. Farmers Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 119 Mich. 252; Patrons' Mut. Fire Ins. Co. of Michigan v. Pagenkoff, 213 Mich. 157. Appellee contends that this claimed defense and subrogation against the mortgagor because of false representations as to incumbrances was waived by the insurance company when it disclaimed liability solely on the ground of lack of insurable interest in Vanderwarker. Dickinson v. Homerich, 248 Mich. 634; Cohen v. London Guarantee Accident Co., Ltd., of London, England, 247 Mich. 226; Martinek v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 247 Mich. 188. Although the trial judge held that the insurance company denied liability solely on this ground, there was no testimony to this effect. There may have been other statements made that do not appear in the record as presented to us.

This, appellant asserts, was a waiver of any such defense and estopped appellant from basing a claim of nonliability on the insured's failure to give the notice of suit, forward copy of process, etc. That there may be waiver or estoppel under such circumstances has been held in numerous decisions of this court. Towle v. The Ionia, E. B. F. M. Fire Ins. Co., 91 Mich. 219; Smith v. German Ins. Co., 107 Mich. 270 (30 L.R.A. 368); Douville v. Farmers' Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 113 Mich. 158; Harvard Co. v. Himmelein, 226 Mich. 691; Dickinson v. Homerich, 248 Mich. 634. There is a direct conflict in the testimony on this phase of the instant case. The verdict of the jury must have resulted from a finding that the testimony prevailed in favor of appellant.

In these instances, the Court has held that the insurance company cannot later raise issues that were or should have been raised in the underlying litigation. Morrill v Gallagher, 370 Mich. 578; 122 N.W.2d 687 (1963); Dickenson v Homerich, 248 Mich. 634; 227 N.W. 696 (1929). These cases are closely akin to the principle behind collateral estoppel. . . .

In these instances, the Court has held that the insurance company cannot later raise issues that were or should have been raised in the underlying action. Morrill v Gallagher, 370 Mich. 578; 122 N.W.2d 687 (1963); Dickenson v Homerich, 248 Mich. 634; 227 N.W. 696 (1929). These cases are closely akin to the principle behind collateral estoppel and are clearly distinguishable from the instant case since none of Lexington's defenses involves issues that should have been tried in plaintiff's underlying wrongful eviction action.