The trial court did not err in refusing to give defendant's requested instruction on the equal access defense. An instruction given by the trial court was substantially similar to the pattern instruction approved and held to adequately cover the equal access issue in Dickerson v. State, 200 Ga. App. 366, 367 (1) ( 408 S.E.2d 137). Judgment affirmed.
The charge adequately informed the jury that evidence showing that a person or persons, other than the owner or driver of the car, had equal access to contraband found in the car may or will, depending on the evidence, overcome the presumption that the contraband was exclusively possessed by the owner or driver. Dickerson v. State, 200 Ga. App. 366, 367 ( 408 S.E.2d 137) (1991); see Jones v. State, 200 Ga. App. 519, 520-521 ( 408 S.E.2d 823) (1991). Failure to give the specific charge requested was not error.
It is instead direct evidence of the circumstances of the transactions on trial. See Dickerson v. State, 200 Ga. App. 366, 368 (2) ( 408 S.E.2d 137) (1991); Chezem v. State, 199 Ga. App. 869, 871 (3) ( 406 S.E.2d 522) (1991); Nolton v. State, 196 Ga. App. 690 (1) ( 396 S.E.2d 605) (1990). "`The state is entitled to present evidence of the entire res gestae of the crime.
" Requested Charge No. 14 (b) provided: "In order to constitute a willing choice to be terminated, the Petitioner's conduct must amount to a conscious, knowing and deliberate decision to engage in conduct what AT THAT VERY MOMENT she knew was unlawful and yet chose to proceed anyway." Both charges reference as their authority Haggins v. ERS, 255 Ga. 352 ( 338 S.E.2d 1) (1986); ERS v. Almgren, 235 Ga. 368 ( 219 S.E.2d 749) (1975), and Boyd v. ERS, 200 Ga. App. 345 ( 408 S.E.2d 137) (1991). Where an employee participates or brings about her own dismissal by engaging in conduct that she should have known or knew would result in her termination, then such conduct is the equivalent of termination by a willing choice.