On October 6, 2005, the Court affirmed his conviction. Dickerson v. State, 363 Ark. 437, 214 S.W.3d 811 (Ark. 2005) (Resp't Ex. A [docket entry #12-2]). On January 3, 2006, Petitioner filed a Rule 37 petition for post-conviction relief in Sebastian County Circuit Court. He argued that: (1) he received ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel; (2) the prosecution was allowed to use a coerced confession and evidence that was seized pursuant to an unlawful arrest; and (3) he was denied his right to a mental competency examination.

Further, Friar asserts that he is more vulnerable to suggestion due to his low IQ of 65. A statement made while in custody is presumed involuntary, and the burden is on the State to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a custodial statement was given voluntarily and was knowingly and intelligently made. Dickerson v. State, 363 Ark. 437, 214 S.W.3d 811 (2005). In determining whether a waiver of Miranda rights is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent, we look to see if the statement was the product of free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception. Williamson v. State, 2013 Ark. 347, 429 S.W.3d 250.

The circuit court reached its ruling under the analysis of the relevant factors, and the ruling was not against the preponderance of the evidence. The circuit court made some credibility determinations that were properly its to make, and we defer to the superior position of the circuit court to evaluate the credibility of witnesses who testify at a suppression hearing. Dickerson v. State, 363 Ark. 437, 214 S.W.3d 811 (2005). The circuit court is not required to believe the testimony of any witness, especially that of the accused, since he or she is the person most interested in the outcome of the proceedings.

Where the defense, by adopting a particular defense strategy, has opened the door for the prosecution to respond to evidence or statements by defense counsel, then statements such as the ones here — those that comment on the lack of evidence and are clearly directed towards rebutting the defensive strategy — do not necessarily constitute impermissible references to the defendant's failure to testify. See Jefferson v. State, 372 Ark. 307, 276 S.W.3d 214 (2008); Tate v. State, 367 Ark. 576, 242 S.W.3d 254 (2006); Dickerson v. State, 363 Ark. 437, 214 S.W.3d 811 (2005). In this case, the evidence of motivation could have been presented in cross-examination or through witnesses other than the defendant, and the comments were not in fact veiled references to the defendant's failure to testify.

As we have previously observed, under step three of the Batson procedure, the ultimate burden of persuasion that there is a purposeful intent rests with and never shifts from the party opposing the strikes. SeeDickerson v. State, 363 Ark. 437, 214 S.W.3d 811 (2005). While Williams argued further after the prosecution's race-neutral explanation, the circuit court denied the motion, therein concluding that Williams had not proven purposeful discrimination.

Waiver of the objection precludes appellate review of the issue. See Dickerson v. State, 363 Ark. 437, 214 S.W.3d 811 (2005). Further, there was no ruling on the objection.

Waiver of the objection precludes appellate review of the issue. See Dickerson v. State, 363 Ark. 437, 214 S.W.3d 811 (2005). Further, there was no ruling on the objection.

In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress a statement, we conduct a de novo review based on the totality of the circumstances, reviewing findings of historical fact for clear error and determining whether those facts give rise to reasonable suspicion or probable cause, giving due weight to inferences drawn by the circuit court and proper deference to the circuit court's findings. Dickerson v. State, 363 Ark. 437, 214 S.W.3d 811 (2005). A statement made while in custody is presumptively involuntary, and the burden is on the State to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a custodial statement was given voluntarily and was knowingly and intelligently made.

Probable or reasonable cause exists where there is a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious person to believe that a crime has been committed by the person suspected. Dickerson v. State, 363 Ark. 437, 214 S.W.3d 811 (2005); Bennett v. State, 345 Ark. 48, 44 S.W.3d 310 (2001). In assessing the existence of probable cause, our review is liberal rather than strict.

Under step three of the Batson procedure, the ultimate burden of persuasion that there is a purposeful discriminatory intent "rests with and never shifts from the party opposing the strikes." Dickerson v. State, 363 Ark. 437, 450, 214 S.W.3d 811, 821 (2005) (quoting Holder v. State, 354 Ark. 364, 381, 124 S.W.3d 439, 451 (2003)). While Armstrong did argue further after the race-neutral explanation in an attempt to persuade the circuit court that Ms. Hines's opinion was a useful one, the circuit court concluded that counsel had not proven purposeful discrimination.