Opinion
23-CV-6387 (LTS)
01-02-2024
JASON DICKERSON, Plaintiff, v. NEW YORK CITY, et al., Defendants.
ORDER TO AMEND
LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Plaintiff, who is currently detained at the Anna M. Kross Center (“AMKC”) on Rikers Island, brings this pro se action, alleging that Defendants violated his rights. The Court construes the complaint as asserting constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as claims under state law. By order dated July 7, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees.For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order.
Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint, or portion thereof, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. A complaint states a claim for relief if the claim is plausible. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). In reviewing a complaint for plausibility, the Court accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in the pleader's favor. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). The Court need not accept, however, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially legal conclusions. Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible - not merely possible - that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff brings this action against the City of New York, the New York City Department of Correction (“DOC”), and unidentified individuals. He asserts claims arising from events that occurred at AMKC from April 2022 to August 2022, and from December 2022 to July 2023. Plaintiff seeks money damages.
The following information is taken from the complaint. After Plaintiff heard that Andre Antrobus, another detainee, was getting people out of jail, he witnessed several DOC employees “threaten Andre Antrobus with imminent serious injury” and “opening and blocking mail.” (ECF 1, at 4.)Corrections officers took Antrobus' documents, including his court documents and evidence, his birth certificate, and his mother's death certificate. Plaintiff claims that, because he assisted Antrobus, he is being subjected to unconstitutional conduct. The alleged violations include: (1) getting “punch[ed] and gang assaulted”; (2) being “punched and stomped by D.O.C. boot (dangerous instruments) on to the floor in [his] head several times”; (3) getting hit in the eye with a mop stick; (4) opening and holding his mail relating to “Article 78s, writs, petitions, motions and grievances”; (5) taking his “evidence for liberty and freedom”; and (6) denying him medical care. (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff also asserts that someone said that “they won't press charges, and weeks later, “30 envelopes for freedom” were returned. (Id.)
Plaintiff writes using irregular capitalization. For readability, the Court uses standard capitalization when quoting from the amended complaint. All other grammar, spelling, and punctuation are as in the original unless otherwise indicated.
DISCUSSION
A. Plaintiff cannot bring claims on behalf of Andre Antrobus
The statutory provision governing appearances in federal court, 28 U.S.C. § 1654, allows two types of representation: “that by an attorney admitted to the practice of law by a governmental regulatory body, and that by a person representing himself.” Eagle Assocs. v. Bank of Montreal, 926 F.2d 1305, 1308 (2d Cir. 1991) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[B]ecause pro se means to appear for one's self, a person may not appear on another person's behalf in the other's cause. A person must be litigating an interest personal to him.” Iannaccone v. Law, 142 F.3d 553, 558 (2d Cir. 1998).
Plaintiff has not alleged any facts suggesting that he is an attorney. Therefore, he cannot assert any claims on behalf of Antrobus, and the Court dismisses any claims Plaintiff asserts on behalf of that individual.
B. Plaintiff does not allege viable claims on his own behalf
1. Interference with mail claims
The Court liberally construes Plaintiff's claims that correction staff opened interfered with his mail as arising under the First Amendment. A prisoner's First Amendment rights encompass the right to “adequate, effective and meaningful” access to the courts and to the free flow of incoming and outgoing mail. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 822 (1977); Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 351 (2d Cir. 2003). “[C]ourts have consistently afforded greater protection to legal mail than to non-legal mail, as well as greater protection to outgoing mail than to incoming mail.” Davis, 320 F.3d at 351 (citing Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413 (1989)).
Plaintiff's allegations concerning his legal mail implicate both an access-to-courts claim and a general mail tampering claim.
a. Access to courts claim
Prisoners have “a constitutional right of access to the courts [that] gives rise to a number of derivative rights, including the right to access legal materials to prepare a case, and the right of indigent inmates to be provided with paper and pens to draft legal documents and stamps to mail them.” Collins v. Goord, 581 F.Supp.2d 563, 573 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (citing Bounds, 420 U.S. at 824-28). Protecting these rights “requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.” Bourdon v. Loughren, 386 F.3d 88, 92-93 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Bounds, 420 U.S. at 821, 828). Assistance from prison authorities, however, is “only the means for ensuring a reasonably adequate opportunity to present claimed violations of fundamental constitutional rights to the courts.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted).
To state a claim for denial of access to the courts, a plaintiff must allege facts showing that the defendant's conduct: (1) “was deliberate and malicious,” and (2) “resulted in actual injury to the plaintiff such as the dismissal of an otherwise meritorious legal claim.” Davis, 320 F.3d at 351 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002). To demonstrate actual injury, a plaintiff must allege: (1) a valid underlying cause of action separate from the right-of-access claim; and (2) frustration or hindrance of the litigation caused by the defendant's actions. See Harbury, 546 U.S. at 415. A mere “delay in being able to work on one's legal action or communicate with the courts does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.” Jermosen v. Coughlin, 877 F.Supp. 864, 871 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (citing Jones v. Smith, 784 F.2d 149, 151- 52 (2d Cir. 1986)). Furthermore, when a prisoner with appointed counsel claims that prison officials hindered his efforts to defend himself or pursue other legal claims, “he must show that, on the facts of his case, the provision of counsel did not furnish him with the capability of bringing his challenges before the courts.” Bourdon, 386 F.3d at 98.
Here, Plaintiff, who is a pretrial detainee with pending criminal proceedings, suggests that correction staff's alleged interference with his legal mail may have affected state-court proceedings, including an Article 78 proceeding and unspecified writs and motions. He does not, however, allege any facts suggesting that he is pursuing a “nonfrivolous, ‘arguable' underlying claim” that has been hindered as a result of delays or withholding of his mail. Harbury, 546 U.S. at 415. Furthermore, even if Plaintiff, who is presumably represented by counsel in his pending criminal case, is pursuing a meritorious legal issue arising from his criminal proceedings, he does not allege any facts explaining why his counsel would be unable to assert the claims on his behalf. See Bourdon, 386 F.3d at 98. Because Plaintiff does not allege the existence of a valid nonfrivolous underlying cause of action, and he does not explain why his defense attorney could not press his argument for exoneration in his criminal case, he fails to state an access to courts claim under the First Amendment.
The Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint naming as defendants the individual DOC officers whom he alleges violated his rights and alleging additional facts to state a Section 1983 access-to-the-court claim.
b. Mail tampering claim
To state a claim based on general mail tampering, a plaintiff must allege that the incidents: (1) suggest an ongoing practice of censorship unjustified by a substantial government interest, or (2) have unjustifiably chilled the prisoner's right of access to the court or impaired his legal representation. Davis, 320 F.3d at 351. “[A]n isolated incident of mail tampering is usually insufficient to establish a constitutional violation.” Id. at 351-52. As few as two incidents of mail tampering, however, may constitute a First Amendment violation if they are indicative of “regular” and “unjustifiable” interference with a prisoner's mail. Id. at 351; see Washington v. James, 782 F.2d 1134, 1139 (2d Cir. 1986).
Plaintiff does not allege enough facts to suggest that correction staff interfered or tampered with his mail in a manner that rises to the level of a constitutional violation. He alleges that his mail was held and that, weeks later, “30 envelopes for freedom” were returned. (ECF 1, at 5.) To the extent Plaintiff is alleging that his mail was delayed, he does not allege facts suggesting that any such delay was the result of unjustified government censorship or tampering. Plaintiff's allegations do not suggest that correction staff subjected him to regular and unjustifiable interference with his mail or that such interference affected his ability to access the courts. Moreover, Plaintiff does not name as defendants the individual DOC officers whom he alleges interfered with his mail.
The Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint naming as defendants the individual DOC officers, including those in the mailroom, whom he alleges violated his rights and alleging additional facts sufficient to state a Section 1983 access to the court or mail tampering claim. For an access-to-the-court claim, Plaintiff must allege facts suggesting that he was hindered from pursuing an arguably meritorious legal claim for which he is not represented by counsel. In support of a mail tampering claim, he must allege facts indicating that named defendants subjected him to regular and unjustifiable interference with his mail.
2. Property claim
A claim for deprivation of property is not recognized in federal court if the relevant state court provides a remedy for the deprivation of that property. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984); Marino v. Ameruso, 837 F.2d 45, 47 (2d Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). “[T]he availability of an action in the Court of Claims provides [an] adequate post-deprivation remedy for prisoners who claim deprivation of personal property by prison officials.” Jones v. Harris, 665 F.Supp.2d 384, 401 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (describing procedure available to state prisoners). Thus, “even the intentional destruction of an inmate's property by a prison officer does not violate the Due Process Clause if the state provides that inmate with an adequate postdeprivation remedy.” Little v. Mun. Corp., 51 F.Supp.3d 473, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (identifying that New York state law provides pretrial detainees with an adequate post-deprivation remedy, that is, Section 9 of the Court of Claims Act).
Plaintiff alleges that correction staff took his “evidence for liberty and freedom.” To the extent he seeks damages for the loss of property, he fails to allege facts demonstrating that his available state remedies are in any way inadequate. See Butler v. Castro, 896 F.2d 698, 700-04 (2d Cir. 1990). Plaintiff's claim concerning the loss of his property is therefore dismissed for failure to state a claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
3. Excessive force claim
The Court construes Plaintiff's allegations of being “punch[ed] and gang assaulted” and being “punched and stomped by D.O.C. boot (dangerous instruments) on to the floor in [his] head several times” as asserting claims of excessive force under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Edrei v. Maguire, 892 F.3d 525, 533 (2d Cir. 2018). To state such a claim, a plaintiff must allege facts showing that a correction officer engaged in an “exercise of power without any reasonable justification in the service of a legitimate government objective.” Id. (citation omitted); see also Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 396-97 (2015) (noting a pretrial detainee asserting an excessive force claim must show only that the force used against him was objectively unreasonable and is not required to prove the defendant's subjective intent, as has been required in cases involving convicted prisoners).
Plaintiff indicates that he was subjected to several assaults, but he does not allege when these incidents occurred, identify the correction officers involved, or allege what the correction officers did. The Court therefore grants Plaintiff leave to state more facts regarding the assault claims, including identifying the correction staff members who were involved.
4. Retaliation claim
Plaintiff asserts that correction staff at AMKC are violating his rights in retaliation for providing unspecified assistance to Andre Antrobus. His assertions could be read as an attempt to assert a First Amendment retaliation claim. To state such a claim, a prisoner must allege “(1) that the speech or conduct at issue was protected, (2) that the defendant took adverse action against the [prisoner], and (3) that there was a causal connection between the protected conduct and the adverse action.” Holland v. Goord, 758 F.3d 215, 225 (2d Cir. 2014) (citation and alteration omitted). An adverse action is any “retaliatory conduct that would deter a similarly situated individual of ordinary firmness from exercising his or her constitutional rights.” Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 353 (2d Cir. 2003) (quotation marks omitted). “In order to satisfy the causation requirement, allegations must be sufficient to support the inference that the speech played a substantial part in the adverse action.” Davis, 320 F.3d at 354. For example, “[a] plaintiff can establish a causal connection that suggests retaliation by showing that protected activity was close in time to the adverse action.” Espinal v. Goord, 558 F.3d 119, 129 (2d Cir. 2009); see also Mateo v. Fischer, 682 F.Supp.2d 423, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (endorsing incorporation of circumstantial evidence of causation “where the adverse action occurs soon after the protected activity,” and holding that, where a false misbehavior report was filed one day after he filed a grievance, causation requirement was met) (citation omitted).
Nevertheless, “because virtually any adverse action taken against a prisoner by a prison official-even those otherwise not rising to the level of a constitutional violation-can be characterized as a constitutionally proscribed retaliatory act,” the Second Circuit has instructed that district courts must “approach prisoner retaliation claims with skepticism and particular care.” Dolan v. Connolly, 794 F.3d 290, 295 (2d Cir. 2015) (quotation marks omitted); see also Graham v. Henderson, 89 F.3d 75, 79 (2d Cir. 1996) (“Retaliation claims by prisoners are prone to abuse since prisoners can claim retaliation for every decision they dislike.” (quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, First Amendment retaliation claims must be “supported by specific and detailed factual allegations” and may not be stated “in wholly conclusory terms.” Dolan, 794 F.3d at 295 (citation omitted).
Here, Plaintiff does not provide sufficient facts to suggest a viable claim for retaliation. He does not allege that, in assisting Antrobus, he engaged in any protected activity under the First Amendment for which correction staff took adverse action against him. Nor does Plaintiff allege facts sufficient to suggest a causal connection between the unspecified conduct and the alleged actions taken against him. See Espinal, 558 F.3d at 129. Plaintiff thus fails to state a First Amendment retaliation claim upon which relief can be granted.
The Court grants Plaintiff leave to allege facts in an amended complaint sufficient to state a claim of retaliation under Section 1983; specifically, he must allege facts showing a causal connection between his protected activity and any adverse action. In the amended complaint, Plaintiff should provide additional facts explaining the alleged assistance he provided to Antrobus, including the dates of the conduct, and how his assisting Antrobus led to the alleged violations of his rights.
C. Plaintiff cannot proceed against the DOC and has not stated a claim upon which relief may be granted against the City of New York
1. Claims against the New York City Department of Correction
Plaintiff's claims against the DOC must be dismissed because an agency of the City of New York is not an entity that can be sued. N.Y. City Charter ch. 17, § 396 (“[A]ll actions and proceedings for the recovery of penalties for the violation of any law shall be brought in the name of the city of New York and not in that of any agency, except where otherwise provided by law.”); Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 93 n.19 (2d Cir. 2007); see also Emerson v. City of New York, 740 F.Supp.2d 385, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[A] plaintiff is generally prohibited from suing a municipal agency.”). The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff's claims against DOC. See N.Y. City Charter ch. 17, § 396. Plaintiff's claims against DOC will be considered as brought against the City of New York, which is named as a defendant.
2. Claims against the City of New York
When a plaintiff sues a municipality under Section 1983, it is not enough for the plaintiff to allege that one of the municipality's employees or agents engaged in some wrongdoing. The plaintiff must show that the municipality itself caused the violation of the plaintiff's rights. See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (“A municipality or other local government may be liable under this section [1983] if the governmental body itself ‘subjects' a person to a deprivation of rights or ‘causes' a person ‘to be subjected' to such deprivation.”) (quoting Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978)); Cash v. Cnty. of Erie, 654 F.3d 324, 333 (2d Cir. 2011). In other words, to state a Section 1983 claim against a municipality, the plaintiff must allege facts showing (1) the existence of a municipal policy, custom, or practice, and (2) that the policy, custom, or practice caused the violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Jones v. Town of East Haven, 691 F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir. 2012); Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997) (internal citations omitted).
Here, Plaintiff alleges no facts suggesting that the City of New York has a policy, practice, or custom that has caused a violation of his federal constitutional rights. The Court, however, grants Plaintiff leave to plead in the amended complaint a municipal liability claim against the City of New York.
LEAVE TO AMEND
Plaintiff proceeds in this matter without the benefit of an attorney. District courts generally should grant a self-represented plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its defects, unless amendment would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Indeed, the Second Circuit has cautioned that district courts “should not dismiss [a pro se complaint] without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999)). Because Plaintiff may be able to allege additional facts to state a valid Section 1983 claim, the Court grants Plaintiff 60 days' leave to amend his complaint to detail his claims.
Plaintiff is granted leave to amend his complaint to provide more facts about his access-to-court, mail tampering, excessive force, and retaliation claims, and to allege additional facts suggesting that the City of New York has a policy, practice, or custom that resulted in a violation of his rights. Plaintiff must name as defendant(s) in the captionand in the statement of claim those individuals who were allegedly involved in the deprivation of his federal rights. If Plaintiff does not know the name of a defendant, he may refer to that individual as “John Doe” or “Jane Doe” in both the caption and the body of the amended complaint. The naming of John Doe defendants, however, does not toll the three-year statute of limitations period governing this action and Plaintiff shall be responsible for ascertaining the true identity of any “John Doe” defendants and amending his complaint to include the identity of any “John Doe” defendants before the statute of limitations period expires. Should Plaintiff seek to add a new claim or party after the statute of limitations period has expired, he must meet the requirements of Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The caption is located on the front page of the complaint. Each individual defendant must be named in the caption. Plaintiff may attach additional pages if there is not enough space to list all of the defendants in the caption. If Plaintiff needs to attach an additional page to list all defendants, he should write “see attached list” on the first page of the amended complaint. Any defendants named in the caption must also be discussed in Plaintiff's statement of claim.
For example, a defendant may be identified as: “Correction Officer John Doe #1 on duty August 31, 2023, at AMKC, during the 7-3 p.m. shift.”
In the “Statement of Claim” section of the amended complaint form, Plaintiff must provide a short and plain statement of the relevant facts supporting each claim against each defendant. If Plaintiff has an address for any named defendant, Plaintiff must provide it. Plaintiff should include in the amended complaint all of the information that Plaintiff wants the Court to consider in deciding whether the amended complaint states a claim for relief. That information should include:
a) the names and titles of all relevant people;
b) a description of all relevant events, including what each defendant did or failed to do, the approximate date and time of each event, and the general location where each event occurred;
c) a description of the injuries Plaintiff suffered; and
d) the relief Plaintiff seeks, such as money damages, injunctive relief, or declaratory relief.
Essentially, Plaintiff's amended complaint should tell the Court: who violated his federally protected rights and how; when and where such violations occurred; and why Plaintiff is entitled to relief.
Because Plaintiff's amended complaint will completely replace, not supplement, the original complaint, any facts or claims that Plaintiff wants to include from the original complaint must be repeated in the amended complaint.
CONCLUSION
The Court dismisses Plaintiff's claims against the New York City Department of Correction. See N.Y. City Charter ch. 17, § 396.
The Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint that meets the standards set forth above. Plaintiff must submit the amended complaint to this Court's Pro Se Intake Unit within 60 days of the date of this order, caption the document as an “Amended Complaint,” and label the document with docket number 23-CV-6387 (LTS). An Amended Civil Rights Complaint form is attached to this order. No summons will issue at this time. If Plaintiff fails to comply within the time allowed, and he cannot show good cause to excuse such failure, the complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).
SO ORDERED.