227 Va. at 110, 314 S.E.2d at 164. We bear in mind, however, that we are dealing with the regulation of an industry "affected with a public interest," Com. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 181 Va. 678, 683, 26 S.E.2d 94, 96 (1943), and one which can have a profound effect upon the safety, health, and well-being of Virginia communities, Dickerson v. Commonwealth, 181 Va. 313, 321, 24 S.E.2d 550, 554 (1943), aff'd, 321 U.S. 131 (1944). Using the analysis suggested by Waterman's Assoc., we first examine the contractual rights affected by the Act.

Manifestly, this legislation, passed in the wake of the repeal of Prohibition, was a licensing act directed to promotion of sobriety and public morality. Although enacted pursuant to the police power of the State, "in the interest of the safety, health, and well-being of the local communities," Dickerson v. Commonwealth, 181 Va. 313, 321, 24 S.E.2d 550, 554 (1943), the legislation was not a public safety measure. The danger confronted by the enactment was the unrestrained sale of intoxicants with the resulting threat to public sensibilities.

This brings us to Laird's remaining contention, viz., that the trial court erred in "not finding the rezoning of Lot 35A to be improper." The case of Dickerson v. Commonwealth, 181 Va. 313, 24 S.E.2d 550 (1943), aff'd sub nom. Carter v. Virginia, 321 U.S. 131 (1944), cited by Laird, is inapposite. The decision stands for the principle that the General Assembly may delegate to an administrative board the power to make rules and regulations to carry out the purposes and provisions of a legislative enactment.

The exigencies of modern government have increasingly dictated the use of general rather than minutely detailed standards. . . ." See, Dickerson v. Commonwealth, 181 Va. 313, 24 S.E.2d 550 (1943). Although, in the instant case, the standards relating to housing for the elderly and higher income groups and to industrial housing might have been stated with greater definiteness, it is reasonably apparent from the Act what those standards are. See, Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency v. New England Merchants National Bank of Boston, 356 Mass. 202, 249 N.E.2d 599 (1969).

The question of the constitutionality of the two Virginia statutes, Sections 18.1-356 and 18.1-357, must be determined according to the pronouncements of the Supreme Court. "We are bound by the judicial construction placed upon the provisions of the Federal Constitution by the Supreme Court of the United States. It is the final authority on that subject." Dickerson v. Commonwealth, 181 Va. 313, 330, 24 S.E.2d 550, 558. In Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495, 74 S.Ct. 686, 692, 98 L.ed. 873, the Supreme Court held that "in the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place."

Somewhat to the contrary is Ackerman v. Kogut, 117 Vt. 40, 84 A.2d 131, which holds that "definite" rules of action are not required. (See also, Dickerson v. Commonwealth, 181 Va. 313, 24 S.E.2d 550, which upholds regulation of Alcoholic Beverage Control Board relating to transportation of liquor as within "specific definite standards" prescribed by the act.) The statute here considered does not come within any of these exceptions, for, as noted by the majority, "* * * it is true that the act contains no standards expressed as such."

The administrative agency may be vested with power to ascertain the facts and conditions to which the policy and the principles apply. The Commonwealth argues that the decision in Reynolds v. Milk Commission, 163 Va. 957, 179 S.E. 507, and Dickerson v. Commonwealth, 181 Va. 313, 24 S.E.2d 550, aff'd. 321 U.S. 131, 64 S.Ct. 464, 88 L. ed. 605, are controlling in this case.

That the above regulations regarding the transportation of liquor are not invalid is likewise settled. Carter v. Commonwealth, 321 U.S. 131, 64 S.Ct. 464, 88 L. ed. 605, affirming Carter v. Commonwealth, 181 Va. 306, 24 S.E.2d 569; and Dickinson v. Commonwealth, 181 Va. 313, 24 S.E.2d 550. A determination of the question whether the trial court was justified in taking judicial notice of the regulations of the A. B. C. Board involves an interpretation of Virginia Code, 1942 (Michie), section 4675 (5), Acts 1934, page 105, Acts 1936, page 419.

We accordingly held that, under the second paragraph of the section, the possession of ardent spirits not bearing the required government stamps or seals constituted a fact or circumstance creating a legal presumption, which, standing alone, unexplained or unrebutted, was sufficient to prove illegal acquisition. The broad police powers of Virginia respecting the control, possession, and transportation of alcoholic beverages within its borders have been upheld recently by the Supreme Court of the United States in Carter v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 321 U.S. 131, 64 S.Ct. 464, 88 L.Ed. 387, affirming Carter v. Commonwealth, 181 Va. 306, 24 S.E.2d 569, and Dickerson v. Commonwealth, 181 Va. 313, 24 S.E.2d 550. The first question in this case is as to the admission of the evidence of the witness, Younce, that he "understood the defendant runs the place and everybody says he runs the place."

In light of these decisions, the Virginia Supreme Court explicitly overruled Williams in 1943. See Dickerson v. Commonwealth, 181 Va. 313, 330, 24 S.E.2d 550, 558 (1943), judgment aff'd. by Carter v. Commonwealth, 321 U.S. 131, 64 S.Ct. 464, 88 L.Ed. 605 (1944). For the foregoing reasons, we affirm appellant's convictions of possession of a Schedule II controlled substance with the intent to distribute in violation of Code § 18.2-248 and of transportation of one or more ounces of cocaine into the Commonwealth with the intent to distribute in violation of Code § 18.2-248.01.