Opinion
No. 707, 2002.
Submitted: March 20, 2003.
Decided: April 21, 2003.
Court Below-Superior Court of the State of Delaware, in and for New Castle County Cr.A. Nos. IN79-08-0371; 0372 0376; 0377
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and STEELE, Justices
Appeal dismissed.
Unpublished opinion is below.
LAWRENCE B. DICKENS, Defendant Below-Appellant, v. STATE OF DELAWARE, Plaintiff Below-Appellee. No. 707, 2002. Supreme Court of Delaware. Submitted: March 20, 2003. Decided: April 21, 2003.
ORDER
This 21st day of April 2003, upon consideration of the appellant's opening brief and the appellee's motion to affirm pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 25(a), it appears to the Court that:
(1) The defendant-appellant, Lawrence B. Dickens, filed an appeal from the Superior Court's December 6, 2002 order denying his third motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61. The plaintiff-appellee, the State of Delaware, has moved to affirm the judgment of the Superior Court on the ground that it is manifest on the face of Dickens' opening brief that the appeal is without merit. We agree and AFFIRM.
SUPR.CT.R. 25(a).
(2) In February 1980, a Superior Court jury convicted Dickens of Murder in the First Degree, Attempted Murder in the First Degree, Assault in the First Degree and Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a Felony. He was sentenced on the murder conviction to a life sentence and on the remaining convictions to additional time at Level V. Dickens' convictions and sentences were affirmed by this Court on direct appeal.
Dickens v. State, 437 A.2d 159 (Del. 1981).
Dickens subsequently filed two motions for postconviction relief. The Superior Court denied both motions and this Court affirmed.
Dickens v. State, Del. Supr., No. 453, 1989, Christie, C.J. (Mar. 22, 1990); Dickens v. State, Del. Supr., No. 118, 1994, Walsh, J. (Aug. 25, 1994).
(3) In this appeal, Dickens claims that the Superior Court should not have denied his postconviction motion as untimely because: a) his failure to timely file the motion was the fault of court-related personnel; and b) his attorney's ineffective assistance excuses any procedural default.
(4) Dickens' claims are unavailing. The Superior Court correctly ruled that his postconviction motion was time-barred and there is no evidence either that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to try Dickens or that there was a miscarriage of justice due to a constitutional violation. Dickens' claims of error on the part of court-related personnel and his counsel lack factual support. Moreover, his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is procedurally barred as formerly adjudicated and there is no evidence that reconsideration of that claim is warranted in the interest of justice.
Dickens' conviction became final in 1981. SUPER.CT.CRIM.R. 61(i)(1).
SUPER.CT.CRIM.R. 61(i)(5).
SUPER.CT.CRIM.R. 61(i)(4).
(5) It is manifest on the face of Dickens' opening brief that this appeal is without merit because the issues presented on appeal are controlled by settled Delaware law and, to the extent that judicial discretion is implicated, clearly there was no abuse of discretion.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 25(a), the State of Delaware's motion to affirm is GRANTED. The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.