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Dickens v. Shelby County

178 Tenn. 305 (Tenn. 1942)
Dickens v. Shelby County

6 Citing cases

  1. Cox v. State

    217 Tenn. 644 (Tenn. 1965)   Cited 39 times
    Holding that suits against state employees in their official capacities are deemed to be suits against the State itself

    Since, as heretofore pointed out, T.C.A. sec. 51-107 confers upon the Game and Fish Commission power to acquire lands by condemnation, if it in fact took the lands by purchase from one whose title was bad, then the sole remedy of the owner of the property is an action at law for just compensation pursuant to T.C.A. sec. 23-1423, and a bill in equity may not be maintained. In Dickens v. Shelby County, 178 Tenn. 305, 157 S.W.2d 825, the County acquired property for school purposes by deed which purported to convey a fee simple title from one who owned only a life estate. A bill in chancery was filed by those who claimed to own the remainder interest, seeking to recover the land.

  2. U.S. v. 371.94 Acres of Land

    431 F.2d 975 (6th Cir. 1970)   Cited 2 times

    Actions "in equity" — such as, ejectment or recovery of the land and mesne profits against the State of Tennessee — were not available to the Warlicks under Tennessee law, although they would have been available had the adverse possessor been a private party. Cox v. State, 217 Tenn. 644, 399 S.W.2d 776 (1965); Dickens v. Shelby County, 178 Tenn. 305, 309, 157 S.W.2d 825, 827 (1942). Actions "at law" were available to the Warlicks only during a small portion of the twenty-year period during which the State of Tennessee was adversely possessing their land, Tennessee Constitution Article 1, § 17; Tennessee Code Annotated §§ 20-1702, 23-1423, 23-1424.

  3. Willowmet Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Brentwood

    No. M2012-01315-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. May. 16, 2013)

    Cf. Cheatham, 363 F.2d at 584 (Carter County instituted condemnation proceedings). In so finding, the trial court relied upon Dickens v. Shelby County, 157 S.W.2d 825 (Tenn. 1942). We have determined that the trial court's reliance on Dickens is misplaced because the plaintiff's claim in Dickens was for ejectment only, not compensation under inverse condemnation.

  4. Johnson v. City of Mt. Pleasant

    713 S.W.2d 659 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986)   Cited 8 times
    In Johnson, this Court examined all of the evidence presented and determined that no material evidence existed to support the jury's verdict establishing the boundary line in question when the jury had found the line to be different from that determined by the surveyor and the surveyor's testimony was the only testimony locating the line.

    Actions "in equity" — such as, ejectment or recovery of the land and mesne profits against the State of Tennessee — were not available to the Warlicks under Tennessee law, although they would have been available had the adverse possessor been a private party. Cox v. State, 217 Tenn. 644, 399 S.W.2d 776 (1965); Dickens v. Shelby County, 178 Tenn. 305, 309, 157 S.W.2d 825, 827 (1942). Actions "at law" were available to the Warlicks only during a small portion of the twenty-year period during which the State of Tennessee was adversely possessing their land, Tennessee Constitution Article 1, § 17; Tennessee Code Annotated §§ 20-1702, 23-1423, 23-1424.

  5. Johnston v. City of Chattanooga

    401 S.W.2d 199 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1966)

    It is said in Hopper v. Davidson County, supra, the eminent domain statute implements this constitutional provision. We have been unable to find a case exactly in point but the cases of Dickens, et al v. Shelby County, et al, 178 Tenn. 305, 157 S.W.2d 825, and Southern Railway Co. v. Jennings, 130 Tenn. 450, 171 S.W. 82, are the closest in point. Both of these cases involve tracts of land where the property had been taken by private contract.

  6. Rogers v. Murfreesboro Housing Authority

    365 S.W.2d 441 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1963)   Cited 14 times

    See Blair v. Durham, 6 Cir., 134 F.2d 729; Norton v. Standard Coosa-Thatcher Co., 203 Tenn. 649, 315 S.W.2d 245. As regards the application of the Statute of Limitations we refer to Dickens v. Shelby County, 178 Tenn. 305, 157 S.W.2d 825; Campbell v. Lewisburg Northern Railway, 160 Tenn. 477, 26 S.W.2d 141; Southern Railway v. Jennings, 130 Tenn. 450, 171 S.W. 82. Assignment No. 8, is overruled.