Dick v. State

83 Citing cases

  1. Cargill v. State

    255 Ga. 616 (Ga. 1986)   Cited 153 times
    Holding that neither the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution nor the Georgia Constitution affords a criminal defendant the hybrid right to simultaneously represent himself and to be represented by counsel

    For reasons which follow, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in placing the complained-of limitations on defense counsel's cross-examination of the state's witnesses. E.g., Dick v. State, 246 Ga. 697 (16) ( 273 S.E.2d 124) (1980) and cits. (a) Brenda Mathis testified that, as she recalled, the appellant was in possession of the murder weapon on January 20. Andy Ferguson testified that, as he recalled, he did not sell the pistol until January 21. Brenda Mathis testified that on the night of the murder, the appellant brought home a "box of Kentucky fried chicken."

  2. Berryhill v. State

    249 Ga. 442 (Ga. 1982)   Cited 72 times
    Holding that deliberations of more than ten hours in capital case were insufficient

    In fact, the appellant concedes that there is no evidence of a "total inundation of the judicial process by the media" at this trial. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 ( 86 S.C. 1507, 16 L.Ed.2d 600) (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 ( 85 S.C. 1628, 14 L.Ed.2d 543) (1965); Dick v. State, 246 Ga. 697 ( 273 S.E.2d 124) (1980). Appellant argues that the press coverage at the first trial of the appellant created such an atmosphere in the community that an impartial jury and a fair trial were impossible. However, this pretrial publicity occurred over six years prior to the time of the second trial.

  3. Smith v. State

    249 Ga. 228 (Ga. 1982)   Cited 42 times
    In Smith v. State, 249 Ga. 228 (5) (290 SE2d 43) (1982), we addressed the use of pre-printed verdict forms and expressed concern that the jury might "draw an inference, however unfounded, of predisposition on the part of the trial judge" because of the "antecedence of the word `guilty' over the words `not guilty'" in the form.

    The photographs were relevant in that they depicted the location and nature of the wounds received by the victim and corroborated the confession of the defendant. Davis v. State, 242 Ga. 901 ( 252 S.E.2d 443) (1979); Brooks v. State, 244 Ga. 574 ( 261 S.E.2d 379) (1979); Cobb v. State, 244 Ga. 344 ( 260 S.E.2d 60) (1979); Franklin v. State, 245 Ga. 141 ( 263 S.E.2d 666) (1980); Fair v. State, 245 Ga. 868 ( 268 S.E.2d 316) (1980); Dick v. State, 246 Ga. 697 ( 273 S.E.2d 124) (1980). We find no merit in this enumeration of error.

  4. Gilbert v. State

    291 Ga. App. 898 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008)   Cited 2 times

    Here, even if the victim's family reacted emotionally when the pictures of her injuries were shown, the only indication is that some family members were crying. "[S]uch emotions are reasonably expected" from a victim's family members. Dick v. State, 246 Ga. 697, 705 (14) ( 273 SE2d 124) (1980). The record does not reflect that any of the family members "became hysterical or made any prejudicial comments."

  5. Paige v. State

    277 Ga. App. 687 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006)   Cited 20 times

    (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Dick v. State, 246 Ga. 697, 705 (14) ( 273 SE2d 124) (1980). "Our reliance on the trial court's sound discretion is particularly appropriate when the objection is to the manner in which the witness testifies, since the trial court can see and hear the [witness] while we must rely on a cold record."

  6. Favors v. State

    305 Ga. 366 (Ga. 2019)   Cited 10 times

    Additionally, "the trial court stopped the trial and allowed the witness to compose himself, and it is unlikely that the witness’ [emotional response] without more prejudiced [Favors’] defense." Dick v. State , 246 Ga. 697, 706 (14), 273 S.E.2d 124 (1980), overruled on other grounds by Tolver v.State , 269 Ga. 530, 500 S.E.2d 563 (1998). Moreover, any prejudice to Favors’ defense was cured by the instruction given by the trial court in its charge regarding objectivity, which the jury is presumed to have followed.

  7. Williams v. State

    276 Ga. 384 (Ga. 2003)   Cited 23 times
    Holding that the defendant's knowledge of whether his coconspirator had a gun “was not a necessary component of his guilt for armed robbery and, consequently, for felony murder” and that “[a]ll that the State was required to prove was that Appellant was a member of a conspiracy to rob the store and that [his co-conspirator's] use of the weapon was naturally or necessarily done in furtherance of that crime”

    "The emotional outburst in this case consisted of the witness crying. . . . [S]uch emotions are reasonably expected by one who is a close [friend] of a murder victim." Dick v. State, 246 Ga. 697, 705(14) ( 273 S.E.2d 124) (1980). The record does not contain any "evidence that [the witness] became hysterical or made any prejudicial comments.

  8. Brannan v. State

    275 Ga. 70 (Ga. 2002)   Cited 39 times
    Holding it race neutral to strike a juror who had previously been charged with a criminal offense

    The prosecutor responded that Deputy Matecun was a relevant witness because he was the first officer at the scene, and that he did not react emotionally when shown the crime scene photograph before trial. "Demonstrations and outbursts which occur during the course of a trial are matters within the trial court's discretion unless a new trial is necessary to insure a fair trial." Dick v. State, 246 Ga. 697 (14) ( 273 S.E.2d 124) (1980). Although the witness cried, there is no evidence that he became hysterical or made any prejudicial comments.

  9. Isaac v. State

    269 Ga. 875 (Ga. 1998)   Cited 36 times

    We disagree. "The decision of whether to grant a motion for mistrial lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge, and his judgment will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of abuse of discretion. [Cits.]" Dick v. State, 246 Ga. 697, 706 ( 273 S.E.2d 124) (1980). See also Ladson v. State, 248 Ga. 470, 475 (6) ( 285 S.E.2d 508) (1981).

  10. Tolver v. State

    269 Ga. 530 (Ga. 1998)   Cited 38 times
    Affirming trial court’s ruling that surveillance tape that had been spliced and was identified only by its brand name label was admissible where the court heard testimony from the store supervisor regarding the store’s surveillance camera procedures, the GBI agent who found the tape, the forensic photographer who repaired the tape, and the investigator who copied the tape for admission at trial

    In suggesting that objecting counsel must educate opposing counsel on how to establish the missing foundational elements, the standard formulation of this rule is misleading. Rather, as shown in the case in which this rule originated, this rule is simply a statement of the general principle that counsel must assert objections with specificity to enable the trial court to intelligently rule on the objection and to create a clear record for the appellate court.Dick v. State, 246 Ga. 697, 704 ( 273 S.E.2d 124) (1980); Freeman v. Young, 147 Ga. 699 (3) (a) ( 95 S.E. 236) (1918); Dunn v. State, 218 Ga. App. 329 ( 461 S.E.2d 294) (1995).Freeman, 147 Ga. at 700.