For reasons which follow, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in placing the complained-of limitations on defense counsel's cross-examination of the state's witnesses. E.g., Dick v. State, 246 Ga. 697 (16) ( 273 S.E.2d 124) (1980) and cits. (a) Brenda Mathis testified that, as she recalled, the appellant was in possession of the murder weapon on January 20. Andy Ferguson testified that, as he recalled, he did not sell the pistol until January 21. Brenda Mathis testified that on the night of the murder, the appellant brought home a "box of Kentucky fried chicken."
In fact, the appellant concedes that there is no evidence of a "total inundation of the judicial process by the media" at this trial. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 ( 86 S.C. 1507, 16 L.Ed.2d 600) (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 ( 85 S.C. 1628, 14 L.Ed.2d 543) (1965); Dick v. State, 246 Ga. 697 ( 273 S.E.2d 124) (1980). Appellant argues that the press coverage at the first trial of the appellant created such an atmosphere in the community that an impartial jury and a fair trial were impossible. However, this pretrial publicity occurred over six years prior to the time of the second trial.
The photographs were relevant in that they depicted the location and nature of the wounds received by the victim and corroborated the confession of the defendant. Davis v. State, 242 Ga. 901 ( 252 S.E.2d 443) (1979); Brooks v. State, 244 Ga. 574 ( 261 S.E.2d 379) (1979); Cobb v. State, 244 Ga. 344 ( 260 S.E.2d 60) (1979); Franklin v. State, 245 Ga. 141 ( 263 S.E.2d 666) (1980); Fair v. State, 245 Ga. 868 ( 268 S.E.2d 316) (1980); Dick v. State, 246 Ga. 697 ( 273 S.E.2d 124) (1980). We find no merit in this enumeration of error.
Here, even if the victim's family reacted emotionally when the pictures of her injuries were shown, the only indication is that some family members were crying. "[S]uch emotions are reasonably expected" from a victim's family members. Dick v. State, 246 Ga. 697, 705 (14) ( 273 SE2d 124) (1980). The record does not reflect that any of the family members "became hysterical or made any prejudicial comments."
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Dick v. State, 246 Ga. 697, 705 (14) ( 273 SE2d 124) (1980). "Our reliance on the trial court's sound discretion is particularly appropriate when the objection is to the manner in which the witness testifies, since the trial court can see and hear the [witness] while we must rely on a cold record."
Additionally, "the trial court stopped the trial and allowed the witness to compose himself, and it is unlikely that the witness’ [emotional response] without more prejudiced [Favors’] defense." Dick v. State , 246 Ga. 697, 706 (14), 273 S.E.2d 124 (1980), overruled on other grounds by Tolver v.State , 269 Ga. 530, 500 S.E.2d 563 (1998). Moreover, any prejudice to Favors’ defense was cured by the instruction given by the trial court in its charge regarding objectivity, which the jury is presumed to have followed.
"The emotional outburst in this case consisted of the witness crying. . . . [S]uch emotions are reasonably expected by one who is a close [friend] of a murder victim." Dick v. State, 246 Ga. 697, 705(14) ( 273 S.E.2d 124) (1980). The record does not contain any "evidence that [the witness] became hysterical or made any prejudicial comments.
The prosecutor responded that Deputy Matecun was a relevant witness because he was the first officer at the scene, and that he did not react emotionally when shown the crime scene photograph before trial. "Demonstrations and outbursts which occur during the course of a trial are matters within the trial court's discretion unless a new trial is necessary to insure a fair trial." Dick v. State, 246 Ga. 697 (14) ( 273 S.E.2d 124) (1980). Although the witness cried, there is no evidence that he became hysterical or made any prejudicial comments.
We disagree. "The decision of whether to grant a motion for mistrial lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge, and his judgment will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of abuse of discretion. [Cits.]" Dick v. State, 246 Ga. 697, 706 ( 273 S.E.2d 124) (1980). See also Ladson v. State, 248 Ga. 470, 475 (6) ( 285 S.E.2d 508) (1981).
In suggesting that objecting counsel must educate opposing counsel on how to establish the missing foundational elements, the standard formulation of this rule is misleading. Rather, as shown in the case in which this rule originated, this rule is simply a statement of the general principle that counsel must assert objections with specificity to enable the trial court to intelligently rule on the objection and to create a clear record for the appellate court.Dick v. State, 246 Ga. 697, 704 ( 273 S.E.2d 124) (1980); Freeman v. Young, 147 Ga. 699 (3) (a) ( 95 S.E. 236) (1918); Dunn v. State, 218 Ga. App. 329 ( 461 S.E.2d 294) (1995).Freeman, 147 Ga. at 700.