Opinion
22-CV-5926 (LTS)
09-02-2022
VINCENT DiBENEDETTO, Plaintiff, v. MAURICE COLEY, BADGE #4013; NEW YORK STATE POLICE, Defendants.
ORDER TO AMEND
LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge:
Plaintiff brings this pro se action, for which the filing fees have been paid, alleging that Defendants violated his constitutional rights. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court has the authority to dismiss a complaint, even when the plaintiff has paid the filing fee, if it determines that the action is frivolous, Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 363-64 (2d Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (citing Pillay v. INS, 45 F.3d 14, 16-17 (2d Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (holding that Court of Appeals has inherent authority to dismiss frivolous appeal)), or that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999). The Court also may dismiss an action for failure to state a claim, “so long as the plaintiff is given notice and an opportunity to be heard.” Wachtler v. County of Herkimer, 35 F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 1994) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The Court is obliged, however, to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
BACKGROUND
The following facts are drawn from the complaint, which was filed on July 11, 2022, and which names as defendants New York State Trooper Maurice Coley and the New York State Police. On August 15, 2018, Plaintiff was driving his 9 year-old daughter to camp. As he entered the eastbound entrance ramp to I-84, “off of Route 311 in Carmel, NY located down the road from [his] home,” Coley gestured to Plaintiff to pull over, near where another vehicle “on a Flat bed tow truck” was already located. (ECF 1 ¶ III.) Coley told Plaintiff that he had pulled him over because he believed that he had seen Plaintiff driving while holding a cell phone. Plaintiff told Coley that he had been holding a cup of coffee. Coley instructed Plaintiff to give him his cell phone, and Plaintiff complied. Coley looked at the phone, then gave it back to Plaintiff and demanded that Plaintiff “open” it. Plaintiff also complied with that request, although he later learned that Coley's demand was not proper. Coley “searched very thoroughly through the cellphone,” and “saw nothing was in use or open.” (Id.) Coley returned the cell phone, and then demanded to see Plaintiff's license and registration. Coley ticketed Plaintiff for using a cellphone while driving, although there was no evidence that he had done so. During the entire exchange, Coley was extremely and unnecessarily hostile, which scared Plaintiff's daughter. After Coley was finished with Plaintiff, he pulled over another vehicle. (Id.)
In April 2019, Plaintiff went to court to challenge the ticket. The presiding judge, Judge Caruso, did not allow Plaintiff to question Coley, who showed up three hours late in plainclothes, but did allow the prosecutor to: (1) bring up a 1989 “seatbelt violation” on Plaintiff's driving record; and (2) express “shock” that Plaintiff's daughter had a cellphone. Plaintiff alleges that “some bias was happening” during the proceeding. (Id.) It appears that Plaintiff was found guilty of the traffic infraction. Plaintiff asserts in this complaint that Coley violated his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, for which he seeks money damages.
DISCUSSION
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege both that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the right was violated by a person acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988). The Court construes Plaintiff's allegations that Defendants violated his constitutional rights as arising under section 1983.
A. New York State Police
“[A]s a general rule, state governments may not be sued in federal court unless they have waived their Eleventh Amendment immunity, or unless Congress has abrogated the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity ....” Gollomp v. Spitzer, 568 F.3d 355, 366 (2d Cir. 2009).
“The immunity recognized by the Eleventh Amendment extends beyond the states themselves to state agents and state instrumentalities that are, effectively, arms of a state.” Id. New York has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity to suit in federal court, and Congress did not abrogate the states' immunity in enacting 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Trotman v. Palisades Interstate Park Comm'n, 557 F.2d 35, 40 (2d Cir. 1977). The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff's section 1983 claims against the New York State Police under the doctrine of Eleventh Amendment immunity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii).
B. Trooper Coley
It appears that Plaintiff's section 1983 claims against Trooper Coley are time-barred. The statute of limitations for section 1983 claims is found in the “general or residual [state] statute [of limitations] for personal injury actions.” Pearl v. City of Long Beach, 296 F.3d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1989)). In New York, that period is three years. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5). Section 1983 claims generally accrue when a plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that is the basis of the claim. Hogan v. Fischer, 738 F.3d 509, 518 (2d Cir. 2013).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that, on August 15, 2018, Trooper Coley pulled him over without cause and improperly searched his cellphone, and that he was denied due process during the April 2019 proceeding. Plaintiff filed this complaint on July 11, 2022, more than three years after the date on which he was pulled over and the date of that proceeding. Plaintiff's complaint is thus untimely with respect to both dates.
Even if the complaint were timely, it does not appear that Plaintiff could state a damages claim arising out of the proceeding. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994) (“[I]n order to recover damages for [an] allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus[.]”). There is no indication that the traffic infraction was declared invalid.
The doctrine of equitable tolling permits a court, “under compelling circumstances, [to] make narrow exceptions to the statute of limitations in order ‘to prevent inequity.'” In re U.S. Lines, Inc., 318 F.3d 432, 436 (2d Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). The statute of limitations may be equitably tolled, for example, when a defendant fraudulently conceals from a plaintiff the fact that the plaintiff has a cause of action, or when the plaintiff is induced by the defendant to forego a lawsuit until the statute of limitations has expired. See Pearl, 296 F.3d at 82-83. In addition, New York law provides that, where a person “is under a disability because of . . . insanity at the time the cause of action accrues,” the applicable statute of limitations will be tolled. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 208; Gardner v. Wansart, No. 05-CV-3351, 2006 WL 2742043, at *5 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2006) (although mental illness is on its own insufficient for equitable tolling purposes, tolling is appropriate if a plaintiff is insane at the time the cause of action accrues and is “unable to protect [his] legal rights because of an overall inability to function in society”). New York also provides by statute for other circumstances in which a limitations period may be tolled. See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 204(a) (where commencement of an action has been stayed by court order), id. at § 204 (where a dispute has been submitted to arbitration but is ultimately determined to be non-arbitrable), id. at § 207(3) (defendant is outside New York at the time the claim accrues), id. at § 208 (plaintiff is disabled by infancy or insanity), id. at § 210 (death of plaintiff or defendant).
Plaintiff does not provide any facts suggesting that the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled in this case. Because the failure to file an action within the limitations period is an affirmative defense, a plaintiff is generally not required to plead that the case is timely filed. See Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 640 (2d Cir. 2007). Dismissal is appropriate, however, where the existence of an affirmative defense, such as the statute of limitations, is plain from the face of the pleading. See Walters v. Indus. and Commercial Bank of China, Ltd., 651 F.3d 280, 293 (2d Cir. 2011) (“[D]istrict courts may dismiss an action sua sponte on limitations grounds in certain circumstances where the facts supporting the statute of limitations defense are set forth in the papers plaintiff himself submitted.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Pino v. Ryan, 49 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1995) (affirming sua sponte dismissal of complaint as frivolous on statute of limitations grounds); see also Abbas, 480 F.3d at 640 (concluding that district court should grant notice and opportunity to be heard before dismissing complaint sua sponte on statute of limitations grounds).
LEAVE TO AMEND
Plaintiff proceeds in this matter without the benefit of an attorney. District courts generally should grant a self-represented plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its defects, unless amendment would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Indeed, the Second Circuit has cautioned that district courts “should not dismiss [a pro se complaint] without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999)). The Court grants Plaintiff 60 days' leave to amend his complaint to address the timeliness issue, that is, to allege facts showing that the claim is not barred by the statute of limitations or that there is a basis for tolling of the statute of limitations. Because Plaintiff's amended complaint will completely replace, not supplement, the original complaint, any facts or claims that Plaintiff wants to include must be repeated in the amended complaint.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint that complies with the standards set forth above. Plaintiff must submit the amended complaint to this Court's Pro Se Intake Unit within sixty days of the date of this order, caption the document as an “Amended Complaint,” and label the document with docket number 22-CV-5926 (LTS). An Amended Complaint form is attached to this order. No summons will issue at this time. If Plaintiff fails to comply within the time allowed, and he cannot show good cause to excuse such failure, the complaint will be dismissed as untimely.
SO ORDERED.