Dibble v. State

13 Citing cases

  1. Phillips v. State

    591 So. 2d 987 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)   Cited 9 times
    In Phillips v. State, 591 So.2d 987 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), a case upon which appellant relies, the prosecutor made a similar comment in an attempt to address the defendant's failure to offer a reasonable explanation as to how he came to be in possession of stolen property.Id. at 990.

    Because we find it necessary to reverse and remand for a new trial, we must initially address the issue raised under Point III regarding whether the trial court erred in admitting the collateral evidence of the Maynard burglary. Primarily, appellant maintains that the state failed to establish he actually committed the Maynard burglary, arguing that it is well-established that evidence of a collateral crime is inadmissible if there is no proof that the accused committed the collateral crime. As support therefor, appellant cites to State v. Norris, 168 So.2d 541 (Fla. 1964), and Dibble v. State, 347 So.2d 1096 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977). In Norris, the supreme court held that in order for evidence of a collateral crime to be allowed against an accused, "there must be accompanying evidence to identify or connect the accused of the collateral facts."

  2. Stallworth v. State

    538 So. 2d 1296 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)   Cited 7 times
    Holding where a defendant stole television sets and sold them four days later, the offenses were part of the same scheme or course of conduct

    We cannot perceive of any problem in establishing appellant's connection with the collateral act, because that transaction, like the sale of the television set, was videotaped. Cf. Sarvis v. State, 465 So.2d 573 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) (although defendant was clearly connected with the commission of the collateral act, the similar fact evidence was introduced only to prove bad character or propensity); Dibble v. State, 347 So.2d 1096 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977) (admission of detective's statement, "You just all hit the wrong guy this time" was error, because there was no proof that a former crime had been committed or that appellant committed it). Furthermore, the fact that appellant was not charged in connection with the sale of the ceiling fans until after he had been charged with the offense arising from the sale of the television set does not make such other evidence inadmissible.

  3. Barber v. State

    829 So. 2d 900 (Fla. 2002)

    PER CURIAM. We initially accepted jurisdiction to review Barber v. State, 781 So.2d 425 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001), and State v. Barber, 783 So.2d 293 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001), based on misapplication of this Court's opinion inState v. Norris, 168 So.2d 541, 543 (Fla. 1964), and express and direct conflict with Smith v. State, 700 So.2d 446, 446-47 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997),Audano v. State, 641 So.2d 1356, 1358-59 (Fla.2d DCA 1994), Dibble v. State, 347 So.2d 1096, 1097 (Fla.2d DCA 1977), Malcolm v. State, 415 So.2d 891, 892 (Fla.3d DCA 1982), and Smith v. State, 743 So.2d 141, 143 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). Upon reflection and further consideration, we now conclude that review was improvidently granted. Accordingly, these review proceedings are dismissed.

  4. Mutcherson v. State

    696 So. 2d 420 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)   Cited 10 times

    We conclude that the circumstantial evidence of Mr. Mutcherson's finger and palm prints on the machines, the unusually large amount of change he carried in his pocket at the time of arrest, and the similarities of each burglary together establish clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Mutcherson committed the three crimes. Compare Phillips v. State, 591 So.2d 987 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (presence and subsequent flight from scene of burglarized home, coupled with evidence of defendant's fingerprints and possession of items missing from residence, constituted clear and convincing evidence connecting defendant to prior burglary), with State v. Norris, 168 So.2d 541, 543 (Fla. 1964) (evidence of prior arsenic poisonings inadmissible where state failed to connect defendant to prior murders), and Dibble v. State, 347 So.2d 1096, 1097 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977) (mistrial should have been granted where detective implied that defendant engaged in prior criminal activity without offering proof that a prior crime was committed or that defendant committed prior crime). Admittedly, we are not examining each crime to determine whether there is separate, independent evidence that clearly and convincingly identifies Mr. Mutcherson as the burglar in each case. Under the circum stances in Mr. Mutcherson's case, we conclude that theWilliams rule evidence can be assessed collectively to establish the necessary level of proof.

  5. Commonwealth v. Adames

    668 N.E.2d 848 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996)   Cited 3 times

    The latter is commonly admitted in evidence without expert opinion. See Dibble v. State, 347 So.2d 1096, 1097 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Rusher v. State, 270 N.E.2d 748, 749 (Ind. 1971) State v. Washington, 533 So.2d 392, 393 (La. Ct. App. 1988); Maumee v. Geiger, 344 N.E.2d 133, 134 (Ohio 1976); Jackson v. State, 265 S.W.2d 829, 830 (Tex.Crim. App. 1954). See also Giannelli Imwinkelreid, supra at 1119-1120, and cases cited therein.

  6. Audano v. State

    641 So. 2d 1356 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)   Cited 38 times
    Holding a conviction is not required for admission of evidence of other crimes

    Before evidence of a collateral offense can be admitted under the Williams Rule, there must be clear and convincing evidence that the former offense was actually committed by the defendant. State v. Norris, 168 So.2d 541, 543 (Fla. 1964); Dibble v. State, 347 So.2d 1096, 1097 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977). In determining the admissibility of collateral crime evidence, the trial court must make two determinations: (1) whether the evidence is relevant or material to some aspect of the offense being tried, and (2) whether the probative value is substantially outweighed by any prejudice. See ยงยง 90.402, 90.403 and 90.404(2), Fla. Stat. (1993).

  7. Wilkins v. State

    607 So. 2d 500 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)   Cited 8 times
    Calling evidence that the defendant and his wife considered having an abortion of the baby-victim "excludable . . . as . . . an impermissible assault on the defendant's character" and "otherwise irrelevant and inflammatory"

    vere injuries he inflicted on the baby-victim; we are equally concerned about the prosecuting attorney's closing argument to the jury in which this evidence was argued to the jury as evidence of guilt. Plainly, this evidence and argument was excludable at trial as it constituted an impermissible assault on the defendant's character and was otherwise irrelevant and inflammatory. United States v. Vosper, 493 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1974); Jordan v. State, 107 Fla. 333, 144 So. 669 (1932); Bouchard v. State, 556 So.2d 1215, 1216-17 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); King v. State, 545 So.2d 375 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. denied, 551 So.2d 462 (Fla. 1989); Elkin v. State, 531 So.2d 219 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); McClain v. State, 516 So.2d 53 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987); Rolle v. State, 431 So.2d 326 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Chapman v. State, 417 So.2d 1028 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Banks v. State, 400 So.2d 188 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Armstrong v. State, 377 So.2d 205 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); Donaldson v. State, 369 So.2d 691 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); Dibble v. State, 347 So.2d 1096 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977); Charles Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence ยง 608.2 (1992). We need not decide, however, whether such points were properly preserved for appellate review or, if not, whether the complained-of points present fundamental error inasmuch as the case will have to be retried in any event.

  8. Tumblin v. State

    559 So. 2d 458 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)

    PER CURIAM. Reversed and remanded for a new trial on the authority of Dibble v. State, 347 So.2d 1096 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977). HERSEY, C.J., and ANSTEAD and STONE, JJ., concur.

  9. McClain v. State

    516 So. 2d 53 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)   Cited 4 times
    In McClain, the defendant was convicted of sexual battery on a fourteen-year-old who was a babysitter for his stepchildren.

    The statement was not "evidence" of a past criminal activity, but only a bare allegation of past criminal activity. This statement was the same type of statement that warranted a mistrial in Dibble v. State, 347 So.2d 1096 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977). "The only reasonable inference . . . is that the appellant had in some way been involved in similar criminal activities in the past. There was no proof that a former crime had been committed or if a prior crime had been committed, that the appellant committed it.

  10. Sarvis v. State

    465 So. 2d 573 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)   Cited 16 times
    In Sarvis v. State, 465 So.2d 573 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985), where a defendant jumped bail during trial, the appellate court held that the trial court improperly deviated from the sentencing guidelines when it departed because of the defendant's absconding during a trial and also figured the defendant's bail bond jumping into the scoresheet.

    The testimony failed to establish commission of a collateral crime; rather, it merely impugned appellant's character and intimated criminal conduct without proof that a crime had been committed. Dibble v. State, 347 So.2d 1096 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977). In light of the overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt, however, we find such error harmless.