Opinion
2:22-CV-0796-YY
07-07-2023
ENRIQUE DIAZ, Plaintiff, v. S. WASHBURN and H. NEVIL, Defendants.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Youlee Yim You, United States Magistrate Judge
FINDINGS
Pro se plaintiff Enrique Diaz, an adult in the custody of Oregon Department of Corrections (“ODOC”), brings this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against two ODOC employees, S. Washburn and H. Nevil. Plaintiff alleges that defendants deprived him of his property without due process of law in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment (ECF 25) in which they contend they provided plaintiff with all of the process that he is due. For the reasons discussed below, defendants' motion for summary judgment (ECF 25) should be GRANTED and this case should be dismissed with prejudice.
I. Legal Standards
A. Summary Judgment
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for the motion and identifying portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, or affidavits that demonstrate the absence of a triable issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the moving party does so, the nonmoving party must “go beyond the pleadings” and “designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'” Id. at 324 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)).
In determining what facts are material, the court considers the underlying substantive law regarding the claims. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Otherwise stated, only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit preclude the entry of summary judgment. Id. A dispute about a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the non-moving party. Id. at 248-49. A “scintilla of evidence” or “evidence that is merely colorable or not significantly probative” is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. Addisu v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 198 F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 2000). The court “does not weigh the evidence or determine the truth of the matter, but only determines whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Balint v. Carson City, Nev., 180 F.3d 1047, 1054 (9th Cir. 1999). “Reasonable doubts as to the existence of material factual issue are resolved against the moving parties and inferences are drawn in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Addisu, 198 F.3d at 1134 (citation omitted).
B. Pro Se Pleadings
Federal courts hold a pro se litigant's pleadings to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1987). “Although . . . pro se litigant[s] . . . may be entitled to great leeway when the court construes [their] pleadings, those pleadings nonetheless must meet some minimum threshold in providing a defendant with notice of what it is that it allegedly did wrong.” Brazil v. U.S. Dep't of Navy, 66 F.3d 193, 199 (9th Cir. 1995). Moreover, on a motion for summary judgment, a pro se party involved in civil litigation “should not be treated more favorably than parties with attorneys of record.” Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362, 1364 (9th Cir. 1986). “It is not the district court's job to sift through the record to find admissible evidence in support of a non-moving party's case.” Claar v. BurlingtonN.R.R., 29 F.3d 499, 504 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324). Simply put, in areas “where [a] plaintiff does not identify specific evidence in the record to support his assertions, the Court is not required to search for it.” Woodroffe v. Oregon, No. 2:12-CV-00124-SI, 2015 WL 2125908, at *2 (D. Or. May 6, 2015), aff'd sub nom. Woodroffe v.Kulongoski, 745 Fed.Appx. 728 (9th Cir. 2018).
II. Background
Plaintiff's due process claim arises from his previous incarceration as an adult in custody (“AIC”) at Eastern Oregon Correctional Institution (“EOCI”). Washburn is the former superintendent of EOCI, and Nevil is a hearings officer at EOCI. Am. Compl. 2, ECF 8; Mot. 1, ECF 25 (noting each defendant's employment status). The following facts are not in dispute:
Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at Oregon State Correctional Institution.
On December 14, 2021, EOCI issued plaintiff a misconduct report for assaulting another AIC, Victor Almazan. See Nevil Decl., Ex. 1 at 4, ECF 26. The misconduct report stated that “[the] assault resulted in an outside medical trip, with the costs to be determined.” Id. On December 21, 2021, Nevil presided over plaintiff's disciplinary hearing regarding the assault of AIC Almazan. Id. at ¶ 5. Nevil explains, and the record shows, that plaintiff attended the hearing and “confirmed that he had received a copy of the misconduct report, notice of hearing, notice of rights in a hearing, and rules of prohibited conduct.” Id. at ¶ 6; Id., Ex. 1 at 1. Plaintiff entered a plea of “admit” regarding three charges against him: Assault I, Disrespect I, and Disobedience of an Order I. Id., Ex. 1, at 1. During the disciplinary hearing, Nevil informed plaintiff that he would be responsible for paying restitution “to cover the cost of AIC Almazan's treatment at an outside care facility due to injuries he sustained as a result of the assault.” Id. at ¶ 8. On December 23, 2021, Nevil issued a “Finding of Fact, Conclusion, and Order” that stated:
AIC Almazan suffered a serious physical injury when he was assaulted by [plaintiff] which warranted transport to an outside health care facility for treatment. Photographic evidence shows blood all over the area of the fight and AIC Almazan's person due to [plaintiff's] assaultive behavior.
Nevil Decl., Ex. 1 at 1, ECF 26. Plaintiff's sanctions included restitution for “100% cost of care for [AIC] Almazan . . . to be determined.” Id. at 2.
On February 18, 2022, Corrections Officer K. Hickey served plaintiff with a notice of restitution hearing. See Nevil Decl., Ex. 2 at 1, ECF 26. The notice informed plaintiff of the date and time of the hearing and stated, “[t]he restitution amount being considered is $3,769 for cost of outside medical care for AIC Almazan[.]” Id. On February 25, 2022, Corrections Officer Alexenko asked plaintiff if he wanted to attend the restitution hearing, and plaintiff declined stating, “No. I'm good.” See Nevil Decl., Ex. 3 at 1, ECF 26. Plaintiff's response was documented on an “Inmate Refusal to Attend Disciplinary Hearing” form that was witnessed and signed by Corrections Officer Alexenko. See id.
On February 25, 2022, Nevil presided over plaintiff's restitution hearing without plaintiff in attendance. Nevil Decl. ¶ 14, ECF 26. Nevil “made a recording stating that [he] had considered evidence regarding the restitution-i.e., the medical bills associated with AIC Almazan's care[.]” Id. On the same day, Nevil issued his restitution recommendation in an addendum to his earlier Findings of Fact, Conclusions, and Order. See Nevil Decl., Ex. 4 at 1, ECF 26 (Addendum to Findings of Fact, Conclusions, and Order-hereinafter, “restitution order”). Nevil explained:
[Plaintiff's] case was heard on December 21, 2021, evidence was presented, considered, and a Findings of Fact was made at that time. However, while most of the sanctions were recommended during this hearing, there wasn't information available regarding cost of outside medical care for AIC Almazan[.]
The hearing was reconvened on February 25, 2022, to consider . . . the aforementioned medical costs.Id. Nevil recommended that “[plaintiff] be assessed costs of restitution for $3,769.55,” and Washburn approved the recommendation. Id.
On March 1, 2022, plaintiff filed a petition for administrative review challenging the restitution order. See Pl.'s Exs., ECF 11 at 14. In his petition, plaintiff asserted that AIC Almazan “was not hurt bad enough for an outside transport to a medical agency.” Id. Plaintiff alleged “[t]he hearings officer said information wasn't available regarding the cost of outside medical care for [AIC] Almazan,” and “[t]hey don't even know if he went on the outside medical trip or just up to regular medical.” Id. at 15. Assistant Inspector General Jeremy Nofziger denied plaintiff's petition by letter, stating: “The review indicates . . . the finding was based upon a preponderance of the evidence[.]” Id. at 16.
On April 1, 2022, ODOC's Central Trust received notice that plaintiff owed $3,769.55 in restitution for AIC Almazan's medical care and assessed plaintiff's trust account for the full amount of the restitution. Culp Decl. ¶ 6, ECF 27. The manager of the Central Trust, B. Culp, explains that plaintiff's trust account carried a balance of only $532.37. Id. at ¶ 8. The Central Trust therefore withdrew $532.37 from plaintiff's account and charged his account for “the remaining obligation.” Id.
See O.A.R. 291-158-0010(2) (identifying the Central Trust as “[a] unit within the Department of Corrections that is responsible for administering and managing inmate trust accounts; including making authorized transactions consistent with state or federal law in inmate trust accounts and administrative trust accounts”).
Plaintiff brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that he was “deprived of [his] property on 4/1/2022 at [EOCI] in which $532.77 was unlawfully taken . . . from [his] inmate prison trust account.” Am. Compl. 5, ECF 8. Plaintiff claims that, by issuing the restitution order, defendants denied him due process because “there was no evidence of an outside medical trip as there wasn't any information available regarding the cost of care[.]” Id.
III. Discussion
Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment because they “provided plaintiff with all the process he was due before requiring him to pay restitution and assessing the funds in his AIC trust account,” Mot. 7, ECF 25, and “Nevil set plaintiff's restitution for the amount that ODOC paid for [AIC Almazan's] treatment” at “an outside health care facility.” Id. at 6.
In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), the Supreme Court defined the contours of an AIC's due process rights at a disciplinary hearing. Pursuant to Wolff, an AIC must have (1) “an opportunity to appear before the decision making body,” (2) “staff representation if he wishes,” (3) “written notice of the charge against him in advance of the hearing,” (4) “conditional opportunity to present witnesses and documentary evidence,” and (5) “a written statement of the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the sanction taken.” Brown v. Williams, No. CIV. 041064CO, 2005 WL 1109690, at *4 (D. Or. May 6, 2005), report and recommendation adopted (D. Or. June 9, 2005) (citing Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-73). “Judicial review of a prison disciplinary action is limited to whether the requirements set forth in Wolff v. McDonnell were met and whether there is ‘some' evidence to support the finding.” Id. (citing Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985)).
The Supreme Court has since clarified that “the requirements of due process are satisfied if some evidence supports the decision of the prison disciplinary board[.]” Hill, 472 U.S. at 455. “This standard is met if ‘there was some evidence from which the conclusion of the administrative tribunal could be deduced . . . [.]'” Id. (citation omitted).
Ascertaining whether this standard is satisfied does not require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence. Instead, the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.Id. (citations omitted).
Here, there is no dispute that ODOC officials provided plaintiff with notice of the charges against him, an opportunity to attend his disciplinary hearing and present evidence, and a written statement of Nevil's findings and conclusions. Indeed, the evidence demonstrates that plaintiff attended his disciplinary hearing on December 21, 2021, and “confirmed that he had received a copy of the misconduct report, notice of hearing, notice of rights in a hearing, and rules of prohibited conduct.” Nevil Decl. ¶ 6, ECF 26. There is also no dispute that ODOC notified plaintiff regarding the date and time of his restitution hearing and informed him that “the amount being considered is $3,769.55 for cost of outside medical care for AIC Almazan[.]” Id., Ex. 2 at 1. Despite being informed of the hearing and the amount being considered for restitution, plaintiff declined to attend the restitution hearing on February 25, 2022. See Id., Ex. 3. Thus, there is no issue of material fact that ODOC met the minimal procedural requirements of Wolff.
The next question is “‘whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached'” by Nevil and Washburn in the restitution order. Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-56. Plaintiff challenges the sufficiency of the evidence regarding the restitution amount of $3,769.55 based on a misreading of Nevil's restitution order. Plaintiff argues here-as he did in his petition for administrative review, see Pl.'s Exs., ECF 11 at 15-that he “was still charged for the med trip” despite Nevil stating in the restitution order that “there wasn't information available regarding the cost of outside medical care[.]” Diaz Decl. 1, ECF 15. Plaintiff takes Nevil's statement out of context and fails to acknowledge that Nevil made that statement in reference to the lack of information regarding AIC Almazan's medical costs at the disciplinary hearing that took place on December 23, 2021. When Nevil issued the restitution order on February 25, 2022, he referred to the lack of information in December 2021 regarding AIC Almazan's medical costs to explain why plaintiff's disciplinary hearing was “reconvened” in February 2022-i.e., to determine the amount of the restitution based on “the medical bills associated with AIC Almazan's medical care.” See Nevil Decl. ¶ 14, ECF 26.
Plaintiff filed no formal response to the motion for summary judgment, see n. 4, infra, but filed four declarations as well as exhibits in this case before the motion for summary judgment was filed.
Further, there is no question that there is “some evidence from which the conclusion of the administrative tribunal could be deduced[.]” Hill, 472 U.S. at 455. First, Corrections Officer S. Hale, who responded to plaintiff's assault of AIC Almazan, reported that “[the] assault resulted in an outside medical trip[.]” Nevil Decl., Ex. 1 at 4, ECF 26. Further, despite plaintiff's impression that AIC Almazan “was not hurt bad enough for an outside transport to a medical agency[,]” Pl.'s Exs., ECF 11 at 14, the Findings of Fact from his December 23, 2021, disciplinary hearing determined that “AIC Almazan suffered a serious physical injury when he was assaulted by [plaintiff] which warranted transport to an outside health care facility for treatment” and referenced photographic evidence showing “blood all over the areas of the fight.” Nevil Decl., Ex. 1 at 1, ECF 26. Moreover, Nevil submitted a declaration in which he explains that he “considered . . . the medical bills associated with AIC Almazan's medical care” at the restitution hearing on February 25, 2022. Id. at ¶ 14. Therefore, the record clearly demonstrates that “some evidence” supported the restitution order against plaintiff. See Cato v. Rushen, 824 F.2d 703, 705 (9th Cir. 1987) (emphasizing that “[t]he standard is ‘minimally stringent' only requiring ‘any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board'”) (citing Hill, 472 U.S. at 454-55 (emphasis added in Cato)); see also Whitev. Taylor, No. 2:17-CV-00981-AC, 2020 WL 3964996, at *7 and *9 (D. Or. July 13, 2020) (denying the plaintiff's due process challenge to an EOCI disciplinary hearing, emphasizing that “[a] court must defer to prison officials' judgments and cannot substitute its view of the facts presented in a prison disciplinary hearing”-citing Hill, 472 U.S. at 455, and finding that “the record readily supports the ‘some evidence' standard in this case”).
In sum, plaintiff's due process claim fails because there is no genuine issue of material fact that defendants assessed plaintiff $3,769.55 in restitution for AIC Almazan's medical costs based on “some evidence” and that the Central Trust properly deducted $532.37 from plaintiff's trust account to pay for a portion of the restitution due. Defendants are therefore entitled to summary judgment. See Weakley v. Shartle, 2017 WL 4124910, at *9 (D. Ariz. September 18, 2017) (granting the defendants summary judgment on the plaintiff's due process claim because the prison officials' findings and order “were supported by ‘some evidence'”).
As previously noted, plaintiff filed no formal response to defendants' motion for summary judgment. After defendants filed their motion for summary judgment on March 3, 2023, the court issued a Summary Advice Notice on March 6, 2023, and indicated that plaintiff's response was due by April 5, 2023. ECF 28. On March 27, 2023, plaintiff filed two declarations in response to the motion for summary judgment-but mistakenly filed those declarations in another case, Diaz v. Oregon Department of Corrections, 2:22-cv-01048-YY. On April 12, 2023, defendants filed a reply (ECF 29) in which they noted plaintiff's apparent error. In light of the circumstances, the court issued an order on April 13, 2023, noting that plaintiff's response had been due on April 5, 2023, extending plaintiff's deadline to file a response to April 27, 2023, and advising plaintiff that “if he fails to file a response by 4/27/2023, the court will take Defendants' motion under advisement on the record before the court.” ECF 30. Plaintiff did not correct his erroneous filings and did not file a response. Nevertheless, even if this court considers the declarations that plaintiff filed in Case No. 2:22-cv-1048-YY (see ECF 36 and 37), they do not change the analysis because they merely repeat plaintiff's allegations and offer no counter evidence. Plaintiff attests that “the information I was provided in the notice on February 18, 2022 about the seeking of restitution was not accurate.” Case No. 2:22-cv-1048, Diaz Decl., ECF 36. But the notice was clearly marked “NOTICE OF RESTITUTION HEARING,” and indicated that “[t]he restitution amount being considered is $3,769.55 for cost of outside medical care for AIC Almazan, Victor (#17141998) due to misconduct that occurred on December 5, 2021.” Id. Plaintiff also claims that he “felt it unnecessary to attend the hearing in which I was not afforded proper due process” because the “restitution is unfair,” Id., and “the outside medical trip seemed fraudulent.” Id., Diaz Decl., ECF 37. But plaintiff's unsupported belief that the restitution was unfair or fraudulent is not the determining factor, as there was “some evidence” that AIC suffered “serious” injury and “warranted transport to an outside health care facility for treatment Almazan,” which was documented by medical bills and photographic evidence showing “blood all over the area of the fight.” Nevil Decl. ¶ 14, ECF 26; Id., Ex. 1 at 1. Therefore, plaintiff's due process rights were not violated.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Defendants' motion for summary judgment (ECF 25) should be GRANTED and plaintiff's claims should be dismissed with prejudice.
SCHEDULING ORDER
These Findings and Recommendations will be referred to a district judge. Objections, if any, are due Tuesday, June 20, 2023. If no objections are filed, then the Findings and Recommendations will go under advisement on that date.
If objections are filed, then a response is due within 14 days after being served with a copy of the objections. When the response is due or filed, whichever date is earlier, the Findings and Recommendations will go under advisement.
NOTICE
These Findings and Recommendations are not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any Notice of Appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of a judgment.