; Diaz v. Warden Lewisburg USP, 630 Fed.Appx. 148, 151 (3d Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (prison officials who were administrators and who “are not themselves physicians” were not liable for deliberate indifference where plaintiff could not establish that their “involvement in the matter consisted of anything more than, at most, receiving letters from Diaz expressing his dissatisfaction with the medical care he was receiving”); Burk v. Crowe, No. 19-5792, 2020 WL 42758, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 3, 2020) (plaintiff's “general allegation that he ‘wrote to' Crowe, Cassidy, Budd, and Lagana ‘when this happen[ed]' is too vague and undeveloped to state a plausible basis for liability against these individuals”)
That is particularly so in the case of nonmedical Defendants such as Roberts. See Diaz v. Warden Lewisburg USP, 630 Fed.Appx. 148, 151 (3d Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (prison officials who were administrators and who “are not themselves physicians” were not liable for deliberate indifference where plaintiff could not establish that their “involvement in the matter consisted of anything more than, at most, receiving letters from Diaz expressing his dissatisfaction with the medical care he was receiving”); see also Berry, 604 F.3d at 440 (“[T]he law encourages non-medical security and administrative personnel at jails and prisons to defer to the professional medical judgments of the physicians and nurses treating the prisoners in their care without fear of liability for doing so”).
(“[A]bsent a reason to believe (or actual knowledge) that prison doctors or their assistants are mistreating (or not treating) a prisoner, a non-medical prison official . . . will not be chargeable with . . . deliberate indifference.”); see also Diaz v. Warden Lewisburg USP, 630 Fed.Appx. 148, 151 (3d Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (prison officials who were administrators and who “are not themselves physicians” were not liable for deliberate indifference where plaintiff could not establish that their “involvement in the matter consisted of anything more than, at most, receiving letters from Diaz expressing his dissatisfaction with the medical care he was receiving”). Although Dr. Zarkoski is identified as a dentist, the Amended Complaint does not indicate if he is the dentist who spoke with Taylor about his teeth and denied him treatment other than extraction of the diseased teeth.
(“[A]bsent a reason to believe (or actual knowledge) that prison doctors or their assistants are mistreating (or not treating) a prisoner, a non-medical prison official . . . will not be chargeable with . . . deliberate indifference.”); see also Diaz v. Warden Lewisburg USP, 630 Fed.Appx. 148, 151 (3d Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (prison officials who were administrators and who “are not themselves physicians” were not liable for deliberate indifference where plaintiff could not establish that their “involvement in the matter consisted of anything more than, at most, receiving letters from Diaz expressing his dissatisfaction with the medical care he was receiving”).
Freeman has also failed to state a plausible deliberate indifference claim against Warden Williams based on Williams's receipt of grievances or involvement in the grievance process, since involvement of non-medical prison officials in the grievance process does not constitute personal involvement in the underlying constitutional violation in the context of a deliberate indifference claim. See Diaz v. Warden Lewisburg USP, 630 Fed.Appx. 148, 151 (3d Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (prison officials who were administrators and who “are not themselves physicians” were not liable for deliberate indifference where plaintiff could not establish that their “involvement in the matter consisted of anything more than, at most, receiving letters from Diaz expressing his dissatisfaction with the medical care he was receiving”); Curtis v. Wetzel, 763 Fed.Appx. 259, 263 (3d Cir. 2019) (per curiam)
“These types of allegations - i.e., a claim that grievances were sent to a warden or other administrator after an alleged denial of care - are generally insufficient to establish supervisory liability, absent a plausible allegation that the supervisor had contemporaneous knowledge of the denial of care and either directed or acquiesced in it.” Graham v. Aviles, No. 22-5760, 2022 WL 16949131, at *3 (D.N.J. Nov. 14, 2022) (citing Diaz v. Warden Lewisburg USP, 630 Fed.Appx. 148, 151 (3d Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (prison officials who were administrators and who “are not themselves physicians” were not liable for deliberate indifference where plaintiff could not establish that their “involvement in the matter consisted of anything more than, at most, receiving letters from Diaz expressing his dissatisfaction with the medical care he was receiving”)).
Again, Plaintiff's allegation that he filed complaints that were not responded to does not show that Defendant Aviles had contemporaneous knowledge of Plaintiff's medical treatment. See, e.g., Diaz v. Warden Lewisburg USP, 630 Fed.Appx. 148, 151 (3d Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (prison officials who were administrators and who “are not themselves physicians” were not liable for deliberate indifference where plaintiff could not establish that their “involvement in the matter consisted of anything more than, at most, receiving letters from Diaz expressing his dissatisfaction with the medical care he was receiving”).
Plaintiff received treatment for his injury, and "[c]orrectional defendant-administrators who are not themselves physicians cannot 'be considered deliberately indifferent simply because they failed to respond directly to the medical complaints of a prisoner who was already being treated by the prison doctor.'" Diaz v. Warden Lewisburg USP, 630 Fed.Appx. 148, 151 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Durmer v. O' Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 69 (3d Cir. 1993)) .
To the extent Plaintiff holds Viles responsible for the Medical Department's alleged failure to treat him, “[t]hese types of allegations . . . are generally insufficient to establish supervisory liability, absent a plausible allegation that the supervisor had contemporaneous knowledge of the denial of care and either directed or acquiesced in it.” Graham, 2022 WL 16949131, at *3 (citing Diaz v. Warden Lewisburg USP, 630 Fed.Appx. 148, 151 (3d Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (prison officials who were administrators and who “are not themselves physicians” were not liable for deliberate indifference where plaintiff could not establish that their “involvement in the matter consisted of anything more than, at most, receiving letters from Diaz expressing his dissatisfaction with the medical care he was receiving”)).
“These types of allegations - i.e., a claim that grievances were sent to a warden or other administrator after an alleged denial of care - are generally insufficient to establish supervisory liability, absent a plausible allegation that the supervisor had contemporaneous knowledge of the denial of care and either directed or acquiesced in it.” Graham v. Aviles, No. 22-5760, 2022 WL 16949131, at *3 (D.N.J. Nov. 14, 2022) (citing Diaz v. Warden Lewisburg USP, 630 Fed.Appx. 148, 151 (3d Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (prison officials who were administrators and who “are not themselves physicians” were not liable for deliberate indifference where plaintiff could not establish that their “involvement in the matter consisted of anything more than, at most, receiving letters from Diaz expressing his dissatisfaction with the medical care he was receiving”)).