Each discrete discriminatory act starts a new clock for filing charges alleging that act. The charge, therefore, must be filed within the [statutorily prescribed] time period after the discrete discriminatory act occurred.'" Roa, 985 A.2d at 1231-32 (quoting Morgan, 536 U.S. at 113); see also Johnson v. State, 2013 WL 3329400, *2 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2013) ("Because plaintiff concedes that each of the discrete acts alleged in his complaint are independently actionable, his argument that these acts 'trigger' the continuing violation doctrine must fail."); Diaz v. Lezanski, 2011 WL 2115671, *8 (D.N.J. 2011) (explaining even though the plaintiff alleged a continuing failure to accommodate that started at the beginning of the 2006-2007 school year and continued throughout the remainder of her employment, the complaint pleaded only two discrete instances of failure to accommodate, the first being in September of 2006, when she claimed her requests for an elevator key and to have a single work station for the upcoming school year were denied, and holding that any claim for this first alleged failure to accommodate was time-barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations because she should have known of any constructive or actual failure by September 2006, but she did not file her action until January 1, 2009, well after the two-year period had run); Durham v. Atlantic City Elec. Co., 2010 WL 3906673, *9 (D.N.J. 2010) (finding that plaintiff's NJLAD failure-to-accommodate claims accrued no later than November 21, 2005 because that was when the defendant unequivocally informed the pla
Despite these shortcomings, however, the Court has discretion to consider the new evidence if necessary in the interest of justice. See, e.g., Diaz v. Lezanski, Civ. No. 09-223, 2011 WL 3651348, *2 (D.N.J. Aug. 18, 2011) (considering evidence plaintiff previously possessed "to prevent a manifest injustice and further waste of judicial resources"). Here, if the dismissal of Robert's criminal charge was conditioned upon his stipulation that the original charge was properly brought, it would constitute a manifest injustice to allow him to proceed on a civil claim alleging false arrest.