Opinion
No. 00 C 7082
April 30, 2001
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff filed this class action in federal court, contending that defendant has violated the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) in part because of what it did and did not do with respect to debt cancellation coverage, commonly called "GAP" insurance. She also filed a state court action the same day. There she sued Joe Rizza Ford, Inc. (Joe Rizza) and also joined Old Kent Bank, the purported purchaser of retail installment obligations. In that action she alleges various state and federal claims arising out of her purchase of two vehicles, claiming that Joe Rizza inflated the price on the first vehicle and charged an unconscionable amount for the second, charged her for GAP coverage and extended service contract coverage she did not ask for and did not want, unilaterally extended the contract term on the second vehicle, sold her defective vehicles, and failed to provide a required written statement and required terms.
Defendant, understandably concerned about having to defend against plaintiff in two courts at the same time and about the possibility of having to pay plaintiff's attorneys' fees in two actions, moves to stay the proceedings here. It relies on the Colorado River abstention doctrine.
Both parties have cogently argued the reach of that doctrine, but we do not believe it necessary to discuss it in detail here. Both cases arise from plaintiff's vehicle transactions with defendant, and the GAP coverage figures in both. We do not believe, however, that they can truly be described as parallel actions or that the state action protects the federal plaintiff's rights.
The state action claims are personal to plaintiff. The GAP coverage is but a small portion of those claims. Plaintiff's personal stake in the federal action TILA claim is likewise rather modest, certainly far less than the claims she advances in state court. The TILA claim becomes a matter of substance only if it can be pursued as a class action. Could plaintiff join her class claim with her personal claims in state court? We think not. We have some difficulty in casting plaintiff as an appropriate class representative in an action in which she has a far greater stake in her personal claims than in her class claim. In short, we consider it unlikely that plaintiff could pursue a class claim in the pending state action. Accordingly, we deny the motion to stay. We expect, however, the parties to coordinate their discovery so as to avoid duplication. Any discovery in the state action may be used here without any further leave of court.