Opinion
3:23-CV-402-E-BK
04-24-2023
Elias Diaz, #3774-22, Plaintiff, v. Ellis County Jail, et al., Defendants.
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
RENEE HARRIS TOLIVER, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Special Order 3, this pro se case was referred to the United States magistrate judge for case management, including the issuance of findings and a recommended disposition where appropriate. Plaintiff Elias Diaz also moved to proceed in forma pauperis. Doc. 6. As detailed here, this case should be DISMISSED in part and STAYED in part pending the resolution of the state-court criminal proceedings.
I. BACKGROUND
This civil action arises from Diaz's arrest on October 28, 2022, and the ensuing prosecution for the state offense of possession of a controlled substance pending in Cause No. 49244CR, in the 443rd Judicial District Court of Ellis County, Texas. Doc. 9 at 4 (Am. Compl.). Diaz is a pretrial detainee at the Ellis County Jail (Wayne McCollum Detention Center) and is represented by counsel in the pending state criminal case. Doc. 9 at 7.
The criminal case docket sheet is available on the Ellis County website at http:// countyinfosearch.com/home.html (last accessed April 12, 2023).
In his amended complaint, Diaz names as defendants the Ellis County Jail, the Ennis and Palmer Police Departments, Officer Wiser, other unidentified officers, and the state judge. Doc. 9 at 1, 3. As best the Court can glean, Diaz asserts his pending state criminal charge was brought in violation of his constitutional rights. Doc. 9 at 4, 6. He complains about (1) wrongful searches and seizures and arrest, (2) fraudulent evidence, and (3) false imprisonment. Id. Diaz also raises claims related to the conditions of his confinement at the Ellis County Jail. Doc. 9 at 7. As to the latter, he asserts that Lt. Flores improperly tased him with a stun gun on November 1, 2022, while placing him in general population, and that he was later assaulted by fellow inmates there. Doc. 9 at 7. Diaz seeks dismissal of his pending state criminal charge and compensation for wrongful imprisonment, defamation, and pain and suffering. Doc. 9 at 4.
Contemporaneously with this recommendation, Diaz's tasing-incident and inmate-assault claims are severed as misjoined. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 20(a).
After review of the pleadings and the applicable law, the Court concludes that (1) Diaz's request to dismiss his pending state criminal charge is barred by the Younger abstention doctrine and thus should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, and (2) his related claims for damages should be stayed pending the final resolution of his state criminal case.
Because the case should be dismissed in part for lack of jurisdiction and stayed in part, the Court defers ruling on Diaz's motion to proceed in forma pauperis. Doc. 6.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Request to Dismiss State Criminal Charge
This Court must first examine the threshold question of whether it has subject matter jurisdiction. It is an issue of paramount concern that should be addressed, sua sponte if necessary, at any time throughout the proceedings. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999); McDonal v. Abbott Labs., 408 F.3d 177, 182 n.5 (5th Cir. 2005) (“federal court may raise subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(H)(3).
As is relevant here, the Younger abstention doctrine precludes federal courts from granting injunctive relief based on constitutional challenges to state criminal prosecutions that are pending at the time the federal action is instituted. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971). For Younger to apply, three criteria must be satisfied: (1) the dispute must involve an ongoing state judicial proceeding; (2) an important state interest in the subject matter of the proceeding must be implicated; and (3) the state proceeding must afford an adequate opportunity to raise constitutional challenges. Wightman v. Tex. Supreme Court, 84 F.3d 188, 189 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)).
The Younger abstention requirements are met here, as Diaz seeks an order dismissing his pending state criminal proceedings. What Diaz asks this Court to do is “precisely the crux of what Younger forbids a federal court to do.” Boyd v. Farrin, 575 Fed.Appx. 517, 519 (5th Cir. 2014); see also Nobby Lobby, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 970 F.2d 82, 86 (5th Cir. 1992) (“Under Younger and its companion cases, a federal district court must abstain from exercising jurisdiction over a suit when state criminal proceedings are currently pending against the federal plaintiff.”). It is apropos that the state has a vital interest in prosecuting violations of its criminal laws. DeSpain v. Johnston, 731 F.2d 1171, 1176 (5th Cir. 1984) (“The state has a strong interest in enforcing its criminal laws.”). Also, Diaz can raise his claims-including any constitutional challenges-in the state trial court where, importantly, he is represented by counsel. Finally, this case falls outside the very narrow category of “extraordinary” cases in which federal injunctive relief against a pending state prosecution would be warranted. See Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124-25 (1975).
In sum, because Diaz cannot show that any exception to the Younger abstention doctrine is warranted, the Court should abstain from exercising jurisdiction over his challenge to the State's prosecution of him in Ellis County. See Boyd, 575 Fed.Appx. at 519 (Younger abstention doctrine barred injunctive relief claims relating to detainee's pending criminal prosecution).
B. Request for Monetary Damages
As noted, Diaz also seeks compensatory damages. “[T]he Younger abstention doctrine is not applicable to a claim for damages.” Lewis v. Beddingfield, 20 F.3d 123, 125 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (citation omitted). At any rate, “[e]ven if Younger applies [to other requests for relief], the proper course of action is for a district court to stay the claims for damages pending the outcome of the state proceedings, such that they can move forward without interference.” Boyd, 575 Fed.Appx. at 519 (citing Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 202 (1988)); see also Lewis, 20 F.3d at 125 (affirming stay of “claims for monetary relief that cannot be redressed in the [pending] state proceeding”).
Diaz's claims that Defendants allegedly falsely arrested him and tempered with the evidence necessarily imply the invalidity of his pending state charge. Thus, his claims for damages should be stayed until prosecution of the Ellis County charge against Diaz is disposed of. See Profit v. Ouachita Par., 411 Fed.Appx. 708, 709 (5th Cir. 2011) (noting with approval that district court had stayed a civil case attacking the legality of a detainee's arrest, prosecution, and detention pending the resolution of criminal charges); Busick v. City of Madison, 90 Fed.Appx. 713, 713-14 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that, where it is impossible to determine whether civil claims relating to an arrest and criminal prosecution necessarily implicate the validity of any conviction or sentence that the plaintiff might receive in ongoing criminal proceedings, the district court should stay the civil proceedings pending resolution of the criminal charges against the plaintiff).
III. CONCLUSION
For all these reasons, Diaz's claim seeking dismissal of his pending state criminal charge should be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as barred by the Younger abstention doctrine. Diaz's related claims for damages should be STAYED and this case ADMINISTRATIVELY CLOSED, pending the final resolution of the state criminal charge in Ellis County Case Number 49244CR. However, because the prompt resolution of pending matters is important, Diaz should also be (1) ordered to move to reopen this case within 60 days after entry of judgment or an order of dismissal in his referenced state criminal court case, and (2) advised that failure to do so will result in dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for failure to prosecute or comply with a Court order.
SO RECOMMENDED.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT
Any party who objects to any part of this report and recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). An objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and indicate where in the magistrate judge's report and recommendation the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996), modified by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (extending the time to file objections to 14 days).