A three-judge panel granted the petition for review. Diaz-Rodriguez v. Garland , 12 F.4th 1126 (9th Cir. 2021), reh'g en banc granted , 29 F.4th 1018 (9th Cir. 2022) (Mem.). We took the case en banc to consider whether section 273a(a) qualifies as "a crime of child abuse, child neglect, or child abandonment" under § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i).

Other courts of appeals have similarly understood Esquivel-Quintana to require a more searching analysis at Chevron Step One. See, e.g. , Cabeda v. Att'y Gen. of the U.S. , 971 F.3d 165, 185-86, 188 (3d Cir. 2020) (Krause, J. , concurring in part) (criticizing circuit precedent for "wav[ing] the white flag of ambiguity far too readily, and without performing the rigorous analysis Esquivel-Quintana demands" such as "vigorous textual and contextual statutory analysis tailored to the precise interpretive question presented"); Diaz-Rodriguez v. Garland , 12 F.4th 1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 2021) (noting that Esquivel-Quintana is "highly instructive" because "[a]fter observing that Congress had not defined the term ‘sexual abuse of a minor,’ the Court did not throw up its hands and declare the statute ambiguous" but "instead relied on the normal tools of statutory interpretation" (cleaned up)), vacated on other grounds , 55 F.4th 697 (9th Cir. 2022) (en banc); Bastias v. U.S. Att'y Gen. , 42 F.4th 1266, 1277 (11th Cir. 2022) (Newsom, J. , concurring) ("[T]he Supreme Court has taken pains to clarify that Chevron step one has teeth: We judges must actually do the hard work of statutory interpretation; we can't just skip ahead to step two."). It appears that five circuits reject the notion that the BIA's interpretation of "sexual abuse of a minor" in Rodriguez-Rodriguez is entitled to deference.