Opinion
No. 13-72544
06-30-2015
JOEL DIAZ-ARANGO, Petitioner, v. LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General, Respondent.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Agency No. A079-149-303 MEMORANDUM On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Before: HAWKINS, GRABER, and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Joel Diaz-Arango, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge's order denying his application for cancellation of removal. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence the agency's continuous physical presence determination. Serrano Gutierrez v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 1114, 1116 (9th Cir. 2008). We deny the petition for review.
Substantial evidence supports the agency's determination that Diaz-Arango's voluntary return to Mexico interrupted his period of continuous physical presence, where Diaz-Arango does not dispute that he signed a voluntary return form that stated that was giving up the right to a hearing before an immigration judge, the record shows that this form was read to him in Spanish, and Diaz-Arango testified that he relied on an attorney's advice in accepting voluntary return to Mexico. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(A); Ibarra-Flores v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 614, 619-20 (9th Cir. 2006) (in order to interrupt the accumulation of continuous physical presence, the decision to accept voluntary return in lieu of a hearing before an immigration judge must be knowing and voluntary).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.