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Dias v. Stahl

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, First Department
Dec 29, 1998
256 A.D.2d 235 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998)

Summary

holding "[p]laintiff's contentions that liability resulted from the failure of the metal strapping or from the failure to provide other safety devices are without merit, since the metal strapping was not a safety device used in connection with an elevated work site, but a device used to lend support to a completed structure . . ."

Summary of this case from Barden v. City of N.Y.

Opinion

December 29, 1998

Appeal from the Supreme Court, New York County (Lorraine Miller, J.).


We find that plaintiff's injury was not the result of an elevation-related risk within the purview of the absolute liability provision of Labor Law § 240 Lab. (1), but rather the result of a typical construction site hazard. Plaintiff was injured while working at a ground-level demolition site when an integral part of the structure, a section of air conditioning duct work suspended from an approximately 10-foot-high ceiling by metal support straps, fell on him. Under such circumstances, section 240 Lab. (1) does not render an owner or contractor liable and the fact that the injury-causing debris fell from a height has been held to be irrelevant ( Amato v. State of New York, 241 A.D.2d 400, lv denied 91 N.Y.2d 805; Misseritti v. Mark IV Constr. Co., 86 N.Y.2d 487). Plaintiff's contentions that liability resulted from the failure of the metal strapping or from the failure to provide other safety devices are without merit, since the metal strapping was not a safety device used in connection with an elevated work site, but a device used to lend support to a completed structure ( Misseritti v. Mark IV Constr. Co., supra, at 491) and the record shows that the lack of additional safety devices was not a proximate cause of the accident. The authorities cited in support of summary judgment in the order appealed from and by plaintiff in responding to the appeal are inapposite as either factually distinguishable and/or as predating Misseritti.

Cauldwell-Wingate Co., the work site construction manager, was properly granted summary judgment against Avanti. The record indicates that the former's liability was purely vicarious here, entitling it to full common law indemnification from Avanti, plaintiff's employer and active work site supervisor who bore actual responsibility for the work resulting in plaintiff's injuries ( Chapel v. Mitchell, 84 N.Y.2d 345, 347; Kelly v. Diesel Constr. Div., 35 N.Y.2d 1, 6-7; Nappo v. Menorah Campus, 216 A.D.2d 876, 877). Avanti's contentions on this issue are without merit.

Neither of Avanti's briefs contained any challenge to Justice Miller's grant of summary judgment to Stahl; therefore we deem its appeal from the January 26, 1998 order abandoned and it is, accordingly, dismissed ( Matter of Pessano, 269 App. Div. 337, 341, affd 296 N.Y. 564).

Concur — Lerner, P. J., Williams, Tom and Andrias, JJ.


Summaries of

Dias v. Stahl

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, First Department
Dec 29, 1998
256 A.D.2d 235 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998)

holding "[p]laintiff's contentions that liability resulted from the failure of the metal strapping or from the failure to provide other safety devices are without merit, since the metal strapping was not a safety device used in connection with an elevated work site, but a device used to lend support to a completed structure . . ."

Summary of this case from Barden v. City of N.Y.
Case details for

Dias v. Stahl

Case Details

Full title:VICTOR DIAS, Respondent, v. STANLEY STAHL, Individually and Doing Business…

Court:Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, First Department

Date published: Dec 29, 1998

Citations

256 A.D.2d 235 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998)
682 N.Y.S.2d 383

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