Opinion
Civil Action. No. 05-2857.
December 19, 2005
ORDER — MEMORANDUM
AND NOW, this 16th day of December, 2005, upon consideration of Defendant Stefano Vlahovic's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 5), Answer, Reply and Memoranda thereto, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant shall file his response to Plaintiff's Complaint on or before January 6, 2006.
This is an action for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and/or quantum meruit based on an agreement entered into between the parties on May 27, 1998. The agreement provided for compensation in the nature of hourly and contingent fees for services to be rendered by the Plaintiff to the Defendant in connection with an alleged $76 million debt owed by Defendant to Tyson Foods. This lawsuit was initially filed in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County on May 9, 2005, and was thereafter removed to this Court. The Defendant has asserted an entitlement to either dismissal of the Complaint or summary judgment in his favor based on the defense of statute of limitations. Both parties agree that the matter is to be determined on the basis of Pennsylvania law regarding the statute of limitations.
There appears to be no dispute with respect to Pennsylvania law regarding statute of limitations applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case. The parties agree that Pennsylvania's four year statute of limitations for actions upon contract applies. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5525. The parties also agree that, with respect to a services contract that is "continuing," the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the termination of the contractual relationship between the parties. We accept the characterization of both parties that the contract in question in this case is a services contract which is "continuing."
Plaintiff argues that, viewing the submissions in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, the parties' relationship did not terminate until July 2001, when "for the first time, Defendant Vlahovic's counsel informed Diamond that Vlahovic considered his obligations to have been paid in full." (See Pl.'s Resp. Mot. Dismiss Ex. E.) Defendant asserts that an analysis of the Complaint, exhibits, and declarations satisfies Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) or, in the alternative, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 standards entitling Defendant to either dismissal or summary judgment. We reject the Defendant's position.
Our view of the submissions in a light most favorable to Plaintiff raises substantial questions arising out of genuine issues of material fact regarding when the contract was terminated and when Plaintiff's claims accrued. If such questions of fact are resolved in favor of Plaintiff, his claim did not accrue until July 2001, less than four years prior to the filing of this lawsuit.