Id.; Jenkins v. Jenkins, supra, 588. Moreover, "[o]ur rules of statutory construction apply to administrative regulations. . . . Diamond v. Marcinek, [ 226 Conn. 737, 744 n. 8, 629 A.2d 350 (1993)]; Preston v. Dept. of Environmental Protection, 218 Conn. 821, 829 n. 9, 591 A.2d 421 (1991)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Bortner v. Woodbridge, 250 Conn. 241, 258-59, 736 A.2d 104 (1999). Moreover, "[o]ur rules of statutory construction apply to administrative regulations. . . . Diamond v. Marcinek, [ 226 Conn. 737, 744 n. 8, 629 A.2d 350 (1993)]; Preston v. Dept. of Environmental Protection, 218 Conn. 821, 829 n. 9, 591 A.2d 421 (1991)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Our review of the regulation and the authorizing statute is plenary. See Andover Ltd. Partnership I v. Board of Tax Review, 232 Conn. 392, 396, 655 A.2d 759 (1995); Diamond v. Marcinek, 226 Conn. 737, 744 n. 8, 629 A.2d 350 (1993). The question of whether an insurer may offset, pursuant to § 38a-334-6(d)(2), the available limits of coverage by the amount of social security disability benefits paid or payable to an insured is one of first impression for this court.

. . . "`Temporarily out-of-service' means not in use, in that no regular filling or drawing is occurring; or not established and maintained in accordance with these regulations; or not regularly attended and secured. . . ." The Appellate Court's construction of the regulation cannot stand in light of our recent decision in Diamond v. Marcinek, 226 Conn. 737, 629 A.2d 350 (1993). In that case, which involved underground gasoline storage tanks unused since the mid-1940s, we held that even tanks that are "temporarily out-of-service" pursuant to 22a-449(d)-1(a) fall within the disclosure requirement for "existing" facilities contained in subsection (f).

Id. Moreover, our rules of statutory construction apply to administrative regulations. Diamond v. Marcinek, 226 Conn. 737, 744 n. 8, 629 A.2d 350 (1993). Our examination of the guidelines leads us to conclude that the court properly subjected the defendant's commissions to a supplemental order but that the court's order impermissibly deviated from the guidelines.

"General Statutes § 22a-134 through 22a-134d were enacted to protect purchasers of property from being liable for the subsequent discovery of hazardous waste on the property by requiring the transferor of property to submit a formal declaration that the property is free of pollution." Diamond v. Marcinek, 27 Conn. App. 353, 358 (1992), rev'd on other grounds, 226 Conn. 737, (1993) Section 22a-134b provides that "[f]ailure of the transferor to comply with any of the provisions of sections 22a-134 to 22a-134d, inclusive, entitles the transferee to recover damages from the transferor, and renders the transferor of the establishment strictly liable, without regard to fault, for all cleanup and removal costs and for all direct and indirect damages." Holly Hill Holdings v. Lowman, 30 Conn. App. 204, 219-209 n. 21 (1993). "

The Supreme Court of Connecticut has explained that "[w]hen interpreting regulations, if the provisions are reasonably clear, [a court] need not engage in further construction to ascertain their meaning." Diamond v. Marcinek. , 226 Conn. 737, 629 A.2d 350, 355 (1993). It has also held that "[w]hen interpreting a regulation, [a court] must use common sense," Citerella v. United Illuminating Co., 158 Conn. 600, 266 A.2d 382, 387 (1969), and "must assume that a reasonable and rational result was intended and construe the regulation accordingly," Fullerton v. Dep't of Revenue Servs., 245 Conn. 601, 714 A.2d 1203, 1208 (1998) (quoting Citerella , 266 A.2d at 387 ).

The principles or rules of statutory construction apply to administrative regulations." 2 Am.Jur.2d. Administrative Law § 245 at 221 (2004); see also Arnold v. County of Nassau, 252 F.3d 599, 602 (2nd Cir. 2001) ("[W]here * * * a decision turns on the meaning of a word in a statute or regulation, the decision is one of law which must be made by the court.") (internal quotation marks omitted); Diamond v. Marcinek, 226 Conn. 737, 629 A.2d 350, 355 n. 8 (1993) ("Our rules of statutory construction apply to administrative regulations.") (internal quotation marks omitted); Vector Marketing Corp. v. New Hampshire Department of Revenue Administration, 156 N.H. 781, 942 A.2d 1261, 1263 (2008) ("We use the same principles of construction in interpreting administrative rules as we use with statutes."). By its clear and unambiguous language, Section II(O) of the South Kingstown Subdivision Regulations applied to lot No. 64 when that lot was created in 1992.

"General Statutes §§ 22a-134 through 22a-134d were enacted to protect purchasers of property from being liable for the subsequent discovery of hazardous waste on the property by requiring the transferor of property to submit a formal declaration that the property is free of pollution." Diamond v. Marcinek, 27 Conn. App. 353, 358, 606 A.2d 1001 (1992), rev'd on other grounds, 226 Conn. 737, 629 A.2d 350 (1993). B

DALY, J. This case is now before us on remand from the Supreme Court. Diamond v. Marcinek, 226 Conn. 737, 629 A.2d 350 (1993). The relevant facts are fully reported in the opinion of the Supreme Court and will not be restated here.