Opinion
Civil Action No. 05-3828.
July 17, 2006
ORDER AND OPINION
I. Introduction
This case involves damage to merchandise which Emerald Logistics Solutions, Inc., ("Emerald"), placed in the hands of Diamond Transportation Group, Inc., ("Diamond"). On June 21, 2006, I granted in part and denied in part Diamond's motion for summary judgment. Diamond now seeks reconsideration of that portion of my decision which denied summary judgment on Count I of its amended complaint. For the reasons set forth below, Diamond's motion will be denied.
II. Factual and Procedural Background
In Count I of its amended complaint, Diamond seeks a declaratory judgment that its liability to Emerald under the Carmack Amendment to the ICC Termination Act of 1995, ("ICCTA") 49 U.S.C. § 14706, is limited to $100.00 per shipment, pursuant to the "released value" shipping rate Emerald selected. I denied summary judgment on this count on the basis that Emerald had pointed to issues of material fact concerning the validity of Diamond's "released value" limitation of liability.
Under the Carmack Amendment, a limitation of liability must be "reasonable." 49 U.S.C. § 14706(c)(1)(A). Also, the written agreement with the customer or shipper must evidence an absolute, deliberate, and well-informed choice by the shipper to limit the carrier's liability. Carmana Designs, Ltd. v. North Amer. Van Lines, Inc., 943 F.2d 316, 319 (3d Cir. 1991).
In its motion for summary judgment, Diamond argues my decision in this respect was erroneous and manifestly unjust. It maintains that I overlooked undisputed material facts that establish its right to limit its liability. It cites Carmana, above, andEmerson Electric Supply Co. v. Estes Express Lines, ___ F.3d ___, 2006 WL 1660575 at n. 6 (Jun. 16, 2006).
III. Relevant Legal Standards
The standards controlling a motion for reconsideration are set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(3) and Local Rule of Civil Procedure 7.1. Kostar v. Pepsi-Cola Metropolitan Bottling Company, Inc., Civ. A. No. 96-7130, 1998 WL 848116 at *2 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 4, 1998); Vaidya v. Xerox Corporation, Civ. A. No. 97-547, 1997 WL 732464 at *1 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 25, 1997).
Generally, a motion for reconsideration will only be granted on one of the following three grounds: (1) there has been an intervening change in controlling law; (2) new evidence, which was not previously available, has become available; or (3) it is necessary to correct a clear error of law or to prevent manifest injustice. Kostar, supra; Vaidya, supra.
In order to show clear error or manifest injustice, a party must base its motion on arguments that were previously raised but were overlooked by the Court. U.S. v. Jasin, 292 F. Supp.2d 670, 676 (E.D. Pa. 2003), aff'd 191 F. 3d 446 (3d Cir. 1999), (Table, No. 98-1641), cert. denied 528 U.S. 1139 (2000). A party is not free to relitigate issues that the Court has already decided. Id., citing Smith v. City of Chester 155 F.R.D. 95, 97 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
IV. Discussion
It is evident that Diamond simply seeks to relitigate an issue already raised in its motion for summary judgment, and decided by this Court. It has pointed to the same facts that it relied upon in its motion for summary judgment, and has not even argued that the undersigned failed to address its argument that those facts mandated a ruling in its favor. As noted above, this is not a basis upon which reconsideration can be granted. U.S. v. Jasin, supra. For that reason alone, Diamond's motion for reconsideration must be denied.
Even if I were to reconsider Diamond's argument, I would not change my prior ruling. Diamond argues that Emerald's defenses to the limitation of liability are "self-serving and unsupported conclusions and arguments that are baseless under the circumstances." This is simply an argument as to the weight of the evidence. It is for a finder of fact to review the circumstances, as they are presented at trial, and to determine whether Emerald's defenses are adequately supported.
Accordingly, I enter the following:
ORDER
AND NOW, this 17th day of July, 2006, upon consideration of Diamond's Motion for Consideration, filed in this matter as Document No. 32, and the response thereto, it is hereby ORDERED that Diamond's motion is DENIED.