Opinion
C.A. No. 98C-08-150-WTQ.
Submitted: December 28, 1999.
Decided: January 18, 2000.
Letter Opinion and Order on Defendant's Motion for Reargument of Summary Judgment Denial — MOTION DENIED
David S. Lank, Esquire 1118 West Street P.O. Box 134 Wilmington, DE 19899
Teresa Z. Cheek, Esquire Scott Holt, Esquire Young, Conaway, Stargatt Taylor Rodney Square North P.O. Box 391 Wilmington, DE 19899
Dear Mr. Lank, Ms. Cheek, and Mr. Holt:
The Defendant AstroPower, Inc. filed a timely Motion for Reargument of the Court's decision of December 20, 1999 denying its Motion for Summary Judgment. Unless I am mistaken, there has been no response on behalf of Plaintiffs, notwithstanding the fact that Civil Rule 59(e) permits an "answer to each ground asserted in the motion" to be filed within 5 days after service of the Motion. I note the Rule is permissive, but I suggest to counsel it is a bad policy not to answer a Motion for Reargument unless the Motion is frivolous on its face. It does not seem fair to the Court or the client.
Two reasons are advanced for the Motion in this case. First, the Defendant says a misstatement as to the reason for termination cannot legally be a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Williams v. Caruso, D. Del., 966 F. Supp. 287 (1997). While it is hard, in any event, to look with favor on a policy permitting dishonesty, it seems to the Court there is a difference between saying termination is due to overhiring instead of retaliation for a sexual harrassment complaint, for which there is already a statutory remedy (the Williams case), and saying termination is due to the unavailability of feedstock when such is not the case. The second involves an independent market condition. While we lawyers like to create tight little legal categories, the history of equity teaches us that good faith and fair dealing are fact specific and do not lend themselves to an exclusive list at all. Remember, the much criticized New Jersey case of Leonard v. Hart, N.J. Ct. Er. App., 42 N.J. Eq. 416, 7 A. 865 (1886). The difference between the manufacturing of grounds for dismissal and the statement of a false reason for dismissal is somewhat elusive to this State Trial Judge, particularly when related to the existence of an independent market factor. It seems to me the focus should be on whether the conduct of the employer includes "an aspect of fraud, deceit or misrepresentation" and, if so, whether, under the totality of the circumstances in an employment at will context, the dishonest delinquency constitutes a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. There is no good reason for the Courts to abandon a fact specific inquiry or to help lower the morals of the market place, already common enough, by a conscious and deliberate general stroke of a policy permitting lying.
As to the second reason for the Motion, it may well be that the present pleadings and the present record do not support a claim based on a misrepresentation by the employer of an important fact, which misrepresentation induced the employee to accept a new position. All the Court said was "I decline at this time under Ebersole standards to foreclose a claim on the `misrepresentation' category," i.e., the second category noted by Judge Robinson in Fini v. Remington Arms Co., Inc., D. Del., C.A. No. 97-12-SLR, Robinson, J. (Sept. 24, 1999) (quoting Layfield v. Beebe Med. Ctr., Inc., Del. Super., C.A. No. 95C-12-007, Graves, J. (July 18, 1997)). In short, the present record is too thin for fire, but it passes the smoke test. Presumably, the smoke will disappear or the fire will erupt during discovery.
The Motion for Reargument is DENIED. IT IS SO ORDERED.
Sincerely,
William T. Quillen