Di Giulio v. City of Buffalo

12 Citing cases

  1. Cacchillo v. Insmed Inc.

    Civil Action No. 1:10-CV-01199 (TJM/RFT) (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2013)   Cited 1 times

    [i]t is a basic principle of contract law that the unilateral understandings of one party, no matter how subjectively reasonable, are insufficient to form the basis of a contractual promise. Di Giulio v. City of Buffalo, 237 A.D.2d 938, 939, 655 N.Y.S.2d 215, 217 (4th Dep't 1997). To have a valid, enforceable contractual obligation, there must be a meeting of the minds.

  2. Suthers v. Amgen, Inc.

    372 F. Supp. 2d 416 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)   Cited 12 times   1 Legal Analyses
    In Suthers, two Parkinson's disease sufferers who participated in the Amgen study at the New York University site filed suit against Amgen in the Southern District of New York and sought a preliminary injunction requiring Amgen to provide them with GDNF. The plaintiffs in Suthers advanced nearly identical legal claims as this case: breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and breach of fiduciary duty.

    In support of their claim of an enforceable contractual promise, neither Mr. Suthers nor Ms. Martin points to any direct oral or written communications with Amgen. Rather, they rely upon a generalized understanding that they acquired from their conversations with a principal investigator, Dr. Hutchinson of NYU, and the language of the NYU consent documents that they executed. It is a basic principle of contract law that the unilateral understandings of one party, no matter how subjectively reasonable, are insufficient to form the basis of a contractual promise. Di Giulio v. City of Buffalo, 237 A.D.2d 938, 939, 655 N.Y.S.2d 215, 217 (4th Dep't 1997). To have a valid, enforceable contractual obligation, there must be a meeting of the minds.

  3. Doodnath v. Morgan Contracting Corp.

    101 A.D.3d 477 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012)   Cited 6 times

    95 N.Y.2d 883, 715 N.Y.S.2d 209, 738 N.E.2d 356 [2000];Francis v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 240 A.D.2d 985, 659 N.Y.S.2d 903 [3d Dept.1997];Basile v. ICF Kaiser Engrs. Corp., 227 A.D.2d 959, 643 N.Y.S.2d 854 [4th Dept.1996] ). Morgan/Cornell's arguments for summary judgment on their claims for contractual indemnification from Regional and AWR Group in the third-party action and second third-party action, respectively, are moot ( see generally Mayes v. UVI Holding LLC, 301 A.D.2d 409, 752 N.Y.S.2d 868 [1st Dept.2003];DiGiulio v. City of Buffalo, 237 A.D.2d 938, 940, 655 N.Y.S.2d 215 [4th Dept.1997] ).

  4. In re Town of Lancaster

    75 A.D.3d 1161 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010)

    " Nothing in the language of the CBA supports that interpretation, which was advanced by respondents. Because the CBA is a contract, the "`unilateral expression of one party's postcontractual subjective understanding of the terms of the [contract] . . . [is] not probative as an aid to the interpretation of the contract' "nor, by logical extension, does it control the interpretation of the contract ( Di Giulio v City of Buffalo, 237 AD2d 938, 939). It is undisputed that petitioner was just a week short of his 61st birthday when he resigned, his resignation letter states that he was "retiring from Town Service," and petitioner did not thereafter engage in any further employment covered by the New York State retirement system. We thus conclude that the CBA provisions concerning retirement unambiguously apply to petitioner, rendering him entitled to a credit for unused sick leave that he accrued.

  5. Corgan v. Dimarco Group

    70 A.D.3d 1410 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010)

    Here, plaintiff might have presented evidence to refute or overcome both contentions, and we thus do not consider those contentions on appeal ( see Oram v Capone, 206 AD2d 839, 840). The court properly concluded, contrary to defendants' position at trial, that nothing in the Agreement provided for its expiration upon plaintiffs employment with DiMarco Group or upon the withdrawal by GSA of its initial solicitation for offers. Although the testimony of the owner of DiMarco Group with respect to his interpretation of the Agreement was to the contrary, "the `unilateral expression of one party's postcontractual subjective understanding of the terms of [an] agreement . . . [is] not probative as an aid to the interpretation of the [agreement]'" ( Di Giulio v City of Buffalo, 237 AD2d 938, 939).

  6. Trader v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation

    294 A.D.2d 836 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002)   Cited 1 times

    Supreme Court erred in denying the motion of defendant Village of Medina (Village) for summary judgment dismissing the complaint against it. The Village established that it did not own the property upon which the attraction was situated at the time of decedent's accident, and plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Further, the Village established as a matter of law that it did not control, direct, or supervise the placement or maintenance of the rides and attractions and had no notice of a dangerous condition ( see Di Giulio v. City of Buffalo, 237 A.D.2d 938, 938). Because the actions taken by the Village in connection with the festival, such as the provision of security, involve only the exercise of its governmental rather than proprietary functions, no liability for negligence can attach absent a special relationship between the Village and decedent, and no such relationship was established here ( see Sebastian v. State of New York, 93 N.Y.2d 790, 793-794).

  7. BOGENRIEDER v. CRIPPEN HEATING AIR COND

    266 A.D.2d 885 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999)   Cited 1 times

    ant Crippen Heating Air Conditioning (Crippen), we held that Crippen was entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint against it because, inter alia, Ernest Bogenrieder (plaintiff) does not come within the special class of persons entitled to the protections of the Labor Law (Bogenrieder v. Crippen Heating Air Conditioning, 244 A.D.2d 995). Supreme Court should have granted defendant's motion for renewal and upon renewal granted prior motion of defendant for summary judgment dismissing the complaint against it. Plaintiff does not come within the special class of persons entitled to the protections of the Labor Law (see, Mordkofsky v. V.C.V. Dev. Corp., 76 N.Y.2d 573, 577; Bosse v. City of Hornell, 197 A.D.2d 893). With respect to the common-law negligence cause of action, plaintiffs failed to controvert proof submitted by defendant establishing that it had no actual or constructive notice of the alleged defect and that it did not control or supervise plaintiff's work (see, Di Giulio v. City of Buffalo, 237 A.D.2d 938; see also, Riley v. Stickl Constr. Co., 242 A.D.2d 936). The dismissal of the direct causes of action requires the dismissal of the derivative cause of action.

  8. Bogenrieder v. Crippen Heating & Air Conditioning

    244 A.D.2d 995 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997)   Cited 3 times

    Plaintiffs failed to controvert proof submitted by Crippen establishing that plaintiff does not come within the special class of persons entitled to the protections of the Labor Law (see, Mordkofsky v V.C.V. Dev. Corp., 76 N.Y.2d 573, 577; Bosse v. City of Hornell, 197 A.D.2d 893). Moreover, Crippen is not liable under Labor Law § 241 (6) because it was not an owner or general contractor and it had not been delegated the authority to supervise or control plaintiff's work (see, Grimes v. Pyramid Cos., 237 A.D.2d 940). Crippen also is entitled to summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence causes of action because plaintiffs failed to controvert proof submitted by Crippen establishing that it had no actual or constructive notice of the alleged defect and that it did not control or supervise plaintiff's work (see, Di Giulio v. City of Buffalo, 237 A.D.2d 938; see also, Riley v. Stickl Constr. Co., 242 A.D.2d 936). The court also should have dismissed the derivative cause of action against Crippen (see, Kjar v. Jordan, 217 A.D.2d 981, 982).

  9. Bonkoski v. Condos Bros. Constr. Corp.

    2020 N.Y. Slip Op. 31963 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2020)   1 Legal Analyses

    Therefore, the branches of defendants' motions seeking dismissal of plaintiff's common law negligence and Labor Law § 200 claims against them are granted. Furthermore, inasmuch as defendants have submitted evidence that they were not liable for plaintiff's injuries and did not negligently cause or contribute to the happening of the accident, the branch of the motion by BAPS and Sachi for judgment on their cross claims against Condos Bros for contribution and/or indemnification is denied, as moot (see McCarthy v Turner Constr., Inc., 17 NY3d 369, 929 NYS2d 556 [2011]; Di Giulio v City of Buffalo, 237 AD2d 938, 655 NYS2d 215 [1st Dept 1997]). Likewise, having granted defendants summary judgment dismissing the complaint against them, plaintiff's motion for summary judgment in his favor on the issue of liability is denied, as moot.

  10. Livingston v. Sahara Dreams LLC

    2019 N.Y. Slip Op. 30855 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2019)

    And, as plaintiff's claims against Dream are dismissed, there is no need to determine its cross claims against Allstar. (See Canty v 133 E. 79th St., LLC, 167 AD3d 548 [1st Dept 2018] [as defendant could not be held liable to plaintiff, its cross claims for contribution and common law denied as moot]; Di Giulio v City of Buffalo, 237 AD2d 938 [4th Dept 1997] [as complaint and cross claim dismissed against one defendant, its motion for conditional summary judgment on its cross claim against another defendant properly denied as moot]). III. CONCLUSION