Based on those facts, the Fifth Circuit held that, "the injury suffered by Lincoln is the subject matter of the contract because it involved the same transactions contemplated by the contract." Id.; see also Segars v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, Civ. A. No. 3:13-CV-4895-L, 2014 WL 50796, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 7, 2014) (citing Dhanani v. Giles, No. 10-07-00144-CV, 2008 WL 2210004, at *4-5 (Tex. App.—Waco May 28, 2008, pet. denied)) (same). Here, Plaintiff's alleged entitlement to recover money is rooted in 7901 Blvd's breach of the Agreement.
And to the extent the Felchaks' claims stem from payments required by contract under the Note and Deed of Trust, the claims are barred by the economic-loss rule. See, e.g., Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co. v. U.S. Auto Ins. Servs., Inc., 892 F. Supp. 2d 787, 799 (N.D. Tex. 2012); see also Dhanani v. Giles, 2008 WL 2210004, at *4 (Tex. App.—Waco 2008, pet.denied) (barring conversion claim where breach of contract claim and conversion claim were "based on the same factual scenario" and where the exercise of dominion over the plaintiff's property was tantamount to a breach of contract). Summary judgment is granted dismissing the Felchaks' claims for conversion and money had and received.
Accordingly, the court dismisses Roubinek's conversion claim based on the economic loss doctrine. See Castle Tex. Prod. Ltd. P'ship v. Long Trusts, 134 S.W.3d 267, 275 (Tex. App. 2003, pet. denied) (applying economic loss doctrine to conversion claim); see also Dhanani v. Giles, 2008 WL 2210004, at *4 (Tex. App. 2008, pet. denied) (barring conversion claim where breach of contract claim and conversion claim were "based on the same factual scenario" and where the exercise of dominion over plaintiff's property was tantamount to a breach of contract); Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Kinder Morgan Operating, L.P., 192 S.W.3d 120, 127-29 (Tex. App. 2006, no pet.) (barring conversion claim where the rights of the parties in regard to propane gas were governed by the contract between them, and the only loss that plaintiff complained of was of the propane). VII
In each, the court held that the claim was barred. Dhanani v. Giles, No. 10-07-00144-CV, 2008 WL 2210004 (Tex. App. — Waco, 2008) (barring conversion claim where a breach of contract claim and the conversion claim were "based on the same factual scenario" and where the exercise of dominion over the plaintiff's property was tantamount to a breach of contract); Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Kinder Morgan Operating, L.P., 192 S.W.3d 120 (Tex. App. — Houston [14th Dist.], 2006) (barring conversion claim where the rights of the parties in regard to propane gas were governed by the contract between them, and the only loss the plaintiff complained of was of the propane); Mansfield Heliflight, Inc. v. Bell/Agusta Aerospace Co., LLC, 507 F.Supp.2d 638, 648 n. 4 (N.D. Tex. 2007) (noting in dictum that the plaintiff's conversion claim "would also appear to be barred as a matter of law by the so-called 'independent injury' rule").
Therefore, the economic loss rule bars recovery for conversion. See Chapman, 445 S.W.3d at 718; ConocoPhillips Co. v. Koopmann, 542 S.W.3d 643, 666-67 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg 2016), aff'd on other grounds, 547 S.W.3d 858 (Tex. 2018); see also Rodriguez v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 7:18-CV-109, 2019 WL 528719, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 11, 2019) (concluding that the economic loss rule precluded the plaintiff from recovering in tort where the only loss was the economic injury based on the loan agreement between the parties); Dhanani v. Giles, No. 10-07-00144-CV, 2008 WL 2210004, at *4 (Tex. App.—Waco May 28, 2008, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (rejecting conversion claim where the defendant's dominion and control over the plaintiff's property was tantamount to a breach of the governing contract); Castle Tex. Prod. Ltd. P'ship v. Long Trusts, 134 S.W.3d 267, 275 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2003, pet. denied) (rejecting conversion claim where the only loss alleged was the economic loss to the subject matter of the contract); Harrison v. Bass Enters. Prod. Co., 888 S.W.2d 532, 536 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg 1994, no writ) (rejecting negligence and negligence per se claims because the plaintiff's only damage was unpaid royalties under a contract). Conducting a de novo review, we hold the trial court erred in implicitly concluding that the economic loss rule did not bar Brandon's conversion claims.
Seeid. (citing Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Sterling, 822 S.W.2d 1, 7 (Tex. 1991)); see also Dhanani v. Giles, No. 10-07-00144-CV, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 3926, at *12 (Tex. App.—Waco May 28, 2008, pet. denied) (mem. op.). "Appellate courts have applied the one satisfaction rule when the defendants commit the same act as well as when the defendants commit technically differing acts which result in a single injury."