Brief for Appellant at 18. International recognizes that we have so held in a number of decisions, including Rossitto v. City of Omaha, 199 Neb. 260, 258 N.W.2d 126 (1977), Deyle v. State, 194 Neb. 36, 229 N.W.2d 565 (1975), Verzani v. State, 188 Neb. 162, 195 N.W.2d 762 (1972), and Painter v. State, 177 Neb. 905, 131 N.W.2d 587 (1964). International, however, seeks to make a distinction by arguing that the taking did not result in a mere reduction or elimination of traffic but, rather, a denial of access to the existing traffic, and, therefore, the traffic count was relevant evidence which the district court should have permitted International to offer in arriving at International's damages.

While a landowner has a right to have his premises accessible to others, Berlinguette v. Stanton, 120 N.H. 760, 762-63, 423 A.2d 289, 290 (1980); Capitol Plumbing Heating Supply Co. v. State, 116 N.H. 513, 514, 363 A.2d 199, 200 (1976), he has no property right in the continuation of the flow of traffic past his land. Division of Administration v. Capital Plaza, 397 So.2d 682, 683 (Fla. 1981); Deyle v. State, 194 Neb. 36, 37, 229 N.W.2d 565, 566 (1975); see Annot., 73 A.L.R.2d 689, 691-98 (1960). In this case, it is readily apparent that the construction of the median strip neither deprived the plaintiff of access to the general system of highways nor physically changed the actual entranceways to the property.

A landowner has no vested interest in the flow of traffic past his property and damage caused by diversion of traffic is not normally compensable. Deyle v. State, 194 Neb. 36, 229 N.W.2d 565; Verzani v. State, 188 Neb. 162, 195 N.W.2d 762; Painter v. State, supra. AFFIRMED.