See, e.g., Ashley v. State, 850 So. 2d 1265, 1268 n.3 (Fla. 2003) ("The term scrivener's error refers to a mistake in the written sentence that is at variance with the oral pronouncement of sentence." (quoting Amendments to Fla. Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.111(e) & 3.800, 761 So. 2d 1015, 1023 (Fla. 2000) )); Devlin v. State, 224 So. 3d 803, 804 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) (affirming Devlin's convictions and sentences but remanding for correction of a scrivener's error when the oral pronouncement of sentence was for time served but the written sentencing documents reflected a ten-year prison sentence); Rivera v. State, 117 So. 3d 449, 449-50 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (affirming the revocation of probation and the sentence imposed but remanding for correction of a scrivener's error when the written sentencing documents clearly conflicted with the oral pronouncement of sentence from the trial court). In this case, as we did in Devlin and Rivera, we affirm the orally imposed sentences and remand for the trial court to correct the scrivener's error in the written sentencing documents.
The defendant's presence is not required for this ministerial act either. See Devlin v. State, 224 So.3d 803, 804 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) (where the circuit court's written judgment incorrectly reflected the defendant was convicted of the charged offense despite being found guilty on the lesser included offense, correction of the scrivener's error on remand was a ministerial act not requiring the defendant's presence).
Accordingly, we remand for correction of the written sentence to conform with the oral pronouncement. See, e.g., Devlin v. State, 224 So.3d 803, 804 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) (affirming judgment and sentences but remanding for correction of scrivener's error "to ensure that the written sentence comports with the trial court's oral pronouncement"). As this correction is a ministerial act, Ms. Galvin's presence is not required.
We acknowledge that there are cases where appellate courts have exercised their jurisdiction to include remanding with directions that the trial court correct a scrivener's error in a judgment; however, it is unclear from those cases whether a rule 3.800(b) motion had been filed below. See, e.g. , Devlin v. State , 224 So. 3d 803, 804 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) (remanding for the trial court to correct a scrivener's error in the judgment that incorrectly reflected the defendant was convicted of the wrong offense without mention of whether a rule 3.800(b) motion was filed); Willingham v. State , 48 So. 3d 173, 173 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (remanding for the trial court to correct a written judgment that erroneously indicated the defendant entered a no contest plea where the record revealed he was convicted after a jury trial); Taylor v. State , 242 So. 3d 1203, 1204 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018) (remanding to the trial court to correct a scrivener's error in the judgment, which failed to indicate the defendant was tried and found guilty by a jury); Bartee v. State , 741 So. 2d 644, 645 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (affirming the conviction and sentence but remanding for the trial court to enter a corrected judgment reflecting that the defendant was tried by a jury rather than that he "entered a plea of nolo contendere").
We acknowledge that there are cases where appellate courts have exercised their jurisdiction to include remanding with directions that the trial court correct a scrivener's error in a judgment; however, it is unclear from those cases whether a rule 3.800(b) motion had been filed below. See, e.g., Devlin v. State, 224 So.3d 803, 804 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) (remanding for trial court to correct scrivener's error in judgment that incorrectly reflected the defendant was convicted of the wrong offense without mention of whether a rule 3.800(b) motion was filed); Willingham v. State, 48 So.3d 173, 173 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (remanding for trial court to correct written judgment that erroneously indicated the defendant entered a no contest plea where the record revealed he was convicted after a jury trial); Taylor v. State, 242 So.3d 1203, 1204 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018) (remanding to the trial court to correct a scrivener's error in the judgment which failed to indicate the defendant was tried by a jury and found guilty); Bartee v. State, 741 So.2d 644, 645 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (affirming conviction and sentence but remanding for trial court to enter a correct judgment that reflects that the defendant was tried by a jury rather than that he "entered a plea of nolo contendere"). However, we distinguish those cases from the case before us where Mr. Carrio
Accordingly, we affirm Appellant's judgment and sentence, but remand for the purpose of correcting the scrivener's error on the judgment to reflect the correct statute number in count one. SeeSweeney v. State , 138 So. 3d 1095, 1095 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (per curiam) (remanding for trial court to correct statute number on defendant's sentence); Devlin v. State , 224 So. 3d 803, 804 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) (affirming defendant's convictions and sentences but remanding for correction of scrivener's error to align the written sentence with the controlling oral pronouncement). Next, Appellant argues that the trial court erred by failing to hold a proper competency hearing and failing to enter a written competency order.
Thus, we remand for the trial court to correct the written sentence of count four to comport with the oral pronouncement of eight years' imprisonment, followed by two years of probation. See Devlin v. State, 224 So. 3d 803, 804 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) (remanding for correction of scrivener's error to align the written sentence with the controlling oral pronouncement). Mr. Dozier need not be present for the correction.
Mr. Welch need not be present. See Devlin v. State, 224 So. 3d 803, 804 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) ("Because correction of these scrivener's errors is a ministerial act, Mr. Devlin's presence is not required."). Affirmed; remanded for correction of scrivener's error.
However, there is a scrivener's error in the new written sentencing document, which incorrectly reflects a sentence of twenty-five years' imprisonment with a mandatory minimum of life, rather than the orally pronounced sentence of life imprisonment with a twenty-five-year mandatory minimum. See Devlin v. State, 224 So. 3d 803, 804 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) (remanding for correction of scrivener's error to align the written sentence with the controlling oral pronouncement). Accordingly, we remand for the circuit court to correct the written sentence to comport with the oral pronouncement of life imprisonment with a twenty-five-year mandatory minimum.
Hetherington does not have to be present for this ministerial act. See Devlin v. State, 224 So. 3d 803, 804 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017). Our affirmance is without prejudice to Hetherington's right to raise his ineffective-assistance claim in a timely and facially sufficient motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850.