Opinion
J-S02032-17 No. 776 EDA 2016 No. 780 EDA 2016
06-06-2017
DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST CO. v. SAMIR HICKSON Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Order February 9, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Civil Division at No(s): 150402676 April Term 2015 Appeal from the Order February 18, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Civil Division at No(s): 130404701 April Term 2013 BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., STABILE, J., and MOULTON, J. MEMORANDUM BY MOULTON, J.:
Samir Hickson appeals, pro se, from the February 9, 2016 and February 18, 2016 orders of the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas denying his petitions to open and/or strike default judgment and set aside sheriff's sale. We quash the appeal at 776 EDA 2016 and affirm the trial court's order at 780 EDA 2016.
Hickson filed separate notices of appeal from the February 9, 2016 order entered by Judge Linda Carpenter (776 EDA 2016) and the February 18, 2016 order entered by Judge Nina Wright Padilla (780 EDA 2016). This Court consolidated the appeals for disposition because they involve related issues and the same parties. However, in his principal and reply briefs, which were filed at both dockets, Hickson only challenges Judge Padilla's February 18, 2016 order. Neither brief addresses Judge Carpenter's February 9, 2016 order. Moreover, the cover pages of both briefs identify Hickson's appeal as being from Judge Padilla's February 18, 2016 order. See also Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Stmt., 3/24/16, ¶¶ 6-7. Accordingly, because Hickson has effectively abandoned his appeal from Judge Carpenter's February 9, 2016 order, we quash the appeal at 776 EDA 2016.
Judge Nina Wright Padilla comprehensively set forth the procedural history of this case in her Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(a) opinion, which we adopt and incorporate herein. See Opinion, 8/5/16, at 1-7 ("1925(a) Op.").
Preliminarily, we must determine whether Hickson has properly preserved any claims for appellate review. First, Hickson raises 23 issues in his statement of questions involved; this violates Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 2116(a), which requires that the appellant "state concisely the issues to be resolved" on appeal. See Hickson's Br. at 16-19. Second, Hickson's Rule 1925(b) statement is four pages long and contains 45 separately numbered sentences in violation of Rule 1925(b)(4), which provides that the statement "shall concisely identify each ruling or error" and "should not be redundant or provide lengthy explanations as to any error." Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(ii), (iv).
Our Court has explained the requirements of Rule 1925(b) as follows:
[Rule] 1925(b) is not satisfied by simply filing any statement. Rather, the statement must be "concise" and coherent as to permit the trial court to understand the specific issues being raised on appeal. . . . [W]hen appellants raise an "outrageous" number of issues in their 1925(b) statement, the appellants have "deliberately circumvented the meaning and purpose of Rule 1925(b) and ha[ve] thereby effectively precluded appellate review of the issues [they] now seek to raise." We have further noted that such "voluminous" statements do not identify the issues that appellants actually intend to raise on appeal because the briefing limitations contained in Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a) makes the raising of so many issues impossible. "Further, this type of extravagant 1925(b) statement makes it all but impossible for the trial court to provide a comprehensive analysis of the issues."Tucker v. R.M. Tours , 939 A.2d 343, 346 (Pa.Super. 2007) (alterations in original; citations omitted), aff'd, 977 A.2d 1170 (Pa. 2009).
While we could find all of Hickson's claims waived for his filing of a lengthy, disjointed Rule 1925(b) statement, Judge Padilla was able to discern the following issues from Hickson's statement: (1) whether the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the mortgage foreclosure action; and (2) whether the trial court erred in denying the petition to open and/or strike default judgment and set aside sheriff's sale. See 1925(a) Op. at 8-12. Because Judge Padilla has addressed these issues, our ability to conduct meaningful appellate review has not been completely hindered by Hickson's deficient filings. See Kern v. Kern , 892 A.2d 1, 6 (Pa.Super. 2005) (stating that appellate court may address issues when appellant's failure to follow Rules of Appellate Procedure does not hamper review). Thus, we limit our review to the issues identified and addressed by Judge Padilla.
Hickson's pro se status does not excuse him from complying with the requirements of Rule 1925(b). See Commonwealth v. Schofield , 888 A.2d 771, 773-75 (Pa. 2005) (rejecting more lenient application of Rule 1925(b)'s requirements in pro se cases).
Hickson also addresses these issues in his brief, albeit circuitously. --------
Based on our review of the certified record, the parties' briefs, and the relevant law, we conclude that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over the mortgage foreclosure action and did not err in denying Hickson's petition to open and/or strike default judgment and set aside sheriff's sale. We reach these conclusions for the reasons stated in Judge Padilla's well-reasoned opinion, which we adopt and incorporate herein. See 1925(a) Op. at 7-12.
Appeal quashed at 776 EDA 2016. Order affirmed at 780 EDA 2016. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 6/6/2017
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