Opinion
21-P-464
11-16-2022
DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY [1] v. STEVE OKANLAWON.
Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass.App.Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass.App.Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass.App.Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The defendant, Steve Okanlawon, appeals from an order of a Housing Court judge dismissing both the summary process complaint of the plaintiff, Deutsche Bank National Trust Company (bank), and the defendant's various counterclaims against the bank. Concluding that the judge erred in dismissing the defendant's counterclaims simply because the bank had unilaterally mooted its claims, we reverse the dismissal of the counterclaims.
1. Mootness.
The new owner of the subject property has prevailed in a separate summary process action, and the defendant has voluntarily vacated the property. Accordingly, the bank maintains that the defendant's appeal is moot. Litigation is moot "where a court can order 'no further effective relief.'" Troila v. Department of Correction, 490 Mass. 1013, 1014 (2022), quoting Lynn v. Murrell, 489 Mass. 579, 582 (2022). The defendant, however, seeks "money damages, costs, [and] attorney's fees" in his counterclaims. At the very least, the defendant's counterclaim under G. L. c. 93A could entitle him to "monetary damages, attorney's fees, and costs." Bank of Am., N.A. v. Rosa, 466 Mass. 613, 625 (2013). Claims for monetary damages are not rendered moot by the unavailability of injunctive relief. See Shedlock v. Department of Correction, 442 Mass. 844, 845 n.2 (2004). Accordingly, the appeal is not moot.
2. Dismissal of the counterclaims.
After the bank sold the subject property, its summary process claim for possession became moot, and the bank properly informed the court and moved to dismiss the "Plaintiff's claims for possession and use and occupancy against Defendant." See Rental Property Mgt. Servs. v. Hatcher, 479 Mass. 542, 547 (2018) (Hatcher). Also quite properly, the bank did not request that the defendant's counterclaims be dismissed; rather the bank stated that it "remains able to defend against Defendant's counterclaims should Defendant refuse to dismiss the same." Nonetheless, without hearing from the parties, the judge dismissed the counterclaims as well as the bank's claims.
A summary process defendant in Housing Court "may assert other . . . counterclaims, such as those based on violations of G. L. c. 93A or G. L. c. 151B, and may seek . . . monetary damages." Federal Nat'1 Mtge. Ass'n v. Rego, 474 Mass. 329, 339 (2016) (Rego). Such claims are not dependent on the action for possession; indeed, the Housing Court may sever the counterclaims, determine possession, and then, "pursuant to the Housing Court's general jurisdiction under G. L. c. 185C, § 3, the judge may in a separate proceeding determine whether the occupant is entitled to monetary damages, other forms of equitable relief, or attorney's fees." Rego, supra. The Housing Court, therefore, had jurisdiction over the defendant's counterclaims at the time they were filed.
Outside the realm of mootness, "[a] court is not ousted of jurisdiction by subsequent events -- jurisdiction once attached is not impaired by what happens later." 0'Pea v. J.A.L., Inc., 30 Mass.App.Ct. 449, 453 (1991). Accord Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91, 93 n.1 (1957). Indeed, in Hatcher, once the Supreme Judicial Court determined that the Housing Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's summary process claim for possession, it did not hold that the defendant's counterclaim under G. L. c. 93A had to be dismissed for want of subject matter jurisdiction. Hatcher, 479 Mass. at 543, 552. Rather, the court went on to determine whether the defendant's counterclaim failed on its merits. Id. at 552-556. Accordingly, it is evident that the dismissal of a plaintiff's claim for possession does not oust the Housing Court of subject matter jurisdiction over the defendant's counterclaims.
That the Housing Court has jurisdiction over the defendant's counterclaims does not mean that they will necessarily, or even likely, survive a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment. Such motions, however, must be brought by the bank in writing with an opportunity for the defendant to respond.
3. Conclusion.
So much of the order of the Housing Court entered on March 23, 2021, dismissing the defendant's counterclaims is reversed. In all other respects, the order is affirmed.
So ordered.
Neyman, Ditkoff & Hershfang, JJ.
The panelists are listed in order of seniority.