Opinion
570001/04.
Decided April 19, 2005.
Plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court, New York County, entered July 28, 2003 (Eileen N. Nadelson, J.) which, sua sponte, dismissed the complaint as champertous.
Order entered July 28, 2003 (Eileen N. Nadelson, J.) reversed, without costs, and complaint reinstated.
PRESENT: HON. LUCINDO SUAREZ, P.J., HON. WILLIAM P. McCOOE, HON. MARTIN SCHOENFELD, Justices.
Even assuming in defendants' favor that the affirmative defense of champerty was not waived by their failure to raise it in the answer or by way of a motion to dismiss ( compare Small Bus. Admin. v. Mills, 203 AD2d 654, 655 and Fleetwood Area School Dist. v. Berks County Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 821 A2d 1268, 1274 [Pa Commw 2003], with Turkman v. Republic of Bolivia, 193 F Supp 2d 165, 176, n. 10 [US Dist Ct, DC]), the record shows that the plaintiff law firm "had a legitimate business interest in acquiring the assignment" and that such acquisition "formed part of [the] attorney's professional services to [its] client" ( Capobianco v. Halebass Realty, 72 AD2d 804). Inasmuch as a valid purpose existed for the assignment — viz. the collection of a debt allegedly incurred by defendants, as buyers, in connection with a real estate transaction in which plaintiff represented the seller — plaintiff's claim does not fall within the narrow scope of the champerty doctrine ( see Judiciary Law § 489; Bluebird Partners, L.P. v. First Fidelity Bank, N.A., 94 NY2d 726; Fairchild Hiller Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 28 NY2d 325; see also Elliott Assocs.v Banco de la Nacion, 194 F3d 363 [2d Cir 1999]).
This constitutes the decision and order of the Court.