[282 Mich.App. 626] The Tax Tribunal first noted that the Legislature did not define the statutory terms " incorrectly reported" or " omitted," so it was permitted to construe those terms to determine whether the STC had jurisdiction under § 154. To ascertain the meaning of the term " incorrectly report," the Tax Tribunal relied primarily on Detroit v. Norman Allan & Co., 107 Mich.App. 186, 309 N.W.2d 198 (1981), and Eagle Glen Golf Course v. Surrey Twp., unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued April 19, 2002, 2002 WL 652105, (Docket No. 224810), one of several unpublished cases of this Court that have followed Norman Allan. Quoting from Eagle Glen, supra at 2, the Tax Tribunal opined that § 154 " permitted ‘ assessments to be corrected only if a property's status is misrepresented, such as when a taxpayer incorrectly claimed that the property was tax-exempt.’ " Superior Hotels, LLC v. Mackinaw Twp., 16 MTTR 119, 2007 WL 890975, (Docket No. 313228, February 23, 2007), at 123.
We disagree with both of those characterizations. Regarding MCL 211.154, the Tribunal noted that petitioner chiefly relied on this Court's decision in Detroit v Norman Allan & Co, 107 Mich App 186; 309 NW2d 198 (1981), abrogated by statute as recognized by Superior Hotels, 282 Mich App at 642, in support of its contention that the STC possesses the authority to retroactively apply an exemption to property that was listed as taxable by a taxpayer and accepted as taxable by the taxing entity, and that NormanAllan's reasoning was undermined by our Legislature's amendment of MCL 211.154 in 1982, as we noted in Superior Hotels, 282 Mich App at 642. We agree that Norman Allan does not aid petitioner.
Id. at p 3. In support, Glen Eagle relied on and quoted from Detroit v Norman Allan & Co, 107 Mich App 186, 191-192; 309 NW2d 198 (1981): "We believe that MCL 211.22; MSA 7.22 applies when the assessor petitions the tribunal to increase the value on the tax roll of personal property inadequately and improperly reported by a taxpayer but which is conceded to be taxable. MCL 211.154; MSA 7.211, on the other hand, applies when property has been incorrectly reported as exempt property but it [sic] thought to be . . . taxable property.
Relying on City of Ann Arbor v. State Tax Comm, 393 Mich 52; 223 NW2d 1 (1974), this Court has suggested that MCL 211.154 applies to this kind of case. Detroit v. Norman Allan Co, 107 Mich App 186, 191-192; 309 NW2d 198 (1981). We find this reasoning persuasive.
This Court has observed that MCL 211.154; MSA 7.211 applies where the issue is whether property thought to be taxable has been incorrectly reported or omitted. See Detroit v Norman Allan Co, 107 Mich. App. 186, 191; 309 N.W.2d 198 (1981). After thorough review, we find no merit in plaintiff's argument that the tax commission could not proceed with the audit pursuant to § 154.
The above language from the Gould decision was quoted with approval by our Supreme Court in Metzen v Dep't of Revenue, 310 Mich. 622, 627; 17 N.W.2d 860 (1945), and Standard Oil Co v Michigan, 283 Mich. 85, 88; 276 N.W. 908 (1937). More recently, this Court stated a similar rule in Detroit vNorman Allan Co, 107 Mich. App. 186, 191; 309 N.W.2d 198 (1981): In addition, tax statutes are strictly construed.
Such laws may be made plain, and the language thereof, if dubious, is not resolved against the taxpayer." See also Detroit v NormanAllan Co, 107 Mich. App. 186, 191; 309 N.W.2d 198 (1981) ("[T]ax statutes are strictly construed."). Second, tax exemptions are strictly construed against the taxpayer and in favor of the taxing authority.
I take this position despite the fact that the provisions distinguishing "tangible" from "intangible" property create an ambiguity which, according to established rules of statutory construction, must be resolved in favor of the taxpayer. Detroit v Norman Allan Co, 107 Mich. App. 186, 191; 309 N.W.2d 198 (1981); In re Dodge Bros, 241 Mich. 665, 669; 217 N.W. 777 (1928). The ambiguity is created by the fact that "tangible" property, left undefined by the General Sales Tax Act, supra, is defined by administrative rule as including "all * * * commodities * * * and substances capable of being exchanged", yet "intangible property" is expressly defined by the intangibles tax act, MCL 205.131 et seq.; MSA 7.556(1) et seq. as "monies on hand or on deposit", arguably including foreign currency.
" Michigan National Bank, Lansing v City of Lansing, 96 Mich. App. 551, 553; 293 N.W.2d 626 (1980). See also Detroit v Norman Allan Co, 107 Mich. App. 186, 189; 309 N.W.2d 198 (1981). The tests to be applied to ascertain whether property is real property or personal property are: