Detroit Trust Co. v. Blakely

9 Citing cases

  1. In re Messer Trust

    457 Mich. 371 (Mich. 1998)   Cited 23 times
    Addressing whether trustee's prudence regarding the sale of trust property was a matter for the circuit or probate court

    MCL 600.601(2); MSA 27A.601(2). See, e.g., Detroit Trust Co v. Blakely, 359 Mich. 621; 103 N.W.2d 413 (1960). Moreover, inter vivos trust instruments were not recognized and governed by statutes, but were equitable instruments created by the common law.

  2. Gherardini v. Ford Motor Co.

    394 Mich. 430 (Mich. 1975)   Cited 11 times
    In Gherardini v Ford Motor Co, 394 Mich 430, 431; 231 NW2d 643 (1975), the Supreme Court held that a postjudgment order awarding attorney fees and costs was a final judgment appealable as of right because the order "affected with finality rights of the parties."

    The post-judgment order affected with finality rights of the parties and was, therefore, appealable as of right. Equitable Trust Co v Bankers Trust Co, 268 Mich. 394, 397-398; 256 N.W. 460 (1934). See Detroit Trust Co v Blakely, 359 Mich. 621, 628-634; 103 N.W.2d 413 (1960), where an order allowing attorney fees, entered after the entry of an order disposing of the meritorious question, was held to be appealable as of right on authority of Equitable Trust. See, also, People v Pickett, 391 Mich. 305; 215 N.W.2d 695 (1974), where this Court recognized that more than one "final" judgment could be entered in a criminal prosecution and an appeal as of right could be obtained from each final judgment; in that case, the first from a judgment of conviction and sentence to probation, the second from a judgment finding that a condition of probation was violated and sentence to prison. T.G. KAVANAGH, C.J., and WILLIAMS, LEVIN, J.W. FITZGERALD, and LINDEMER, JJ., concurred.

  3. Taxpayers v. L'Anse Creuse Schools

    213 Mich. App. 71 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995)   Cited 5 times

    The post-judgment order affected with finality rights of the parties and was, therefore, appealable as of right. Equitable Trust Co v Bankers Trust Co, 268 Mich. 394, 397-398; 256 N.W. 460 (1934). See Detroit Trust Co v Blakely, 359 Mich. 621, 628-634; 103 N.W.2d 413 (1960), where an order allowing attorney fees, entered after the entry of an order disposing of the meritorious question, was held to be appealable as of right on authority of Equitable Trust. See, also, People v Pickett, 391 Mich. 305; 215 N.W.2d 695 (1974), where this Court recognized that more than one "final" judgment could be entered in a criminal prosecution and an appeal as of right could be obtained from each final judgment; in that case, the first from a judgment or conviction and sentence to probation, the second from a judgment finding that a condition of probation was violated and sentence to prison.

  4. In re Gerber Trust

    117 Mich. App. 1 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982)   Cited 13 times
    Allowing "the reimbursement of attorney fees and expenses from the trust fund where the trustee has successfully defended its own conduct"

    5809]; In re Eddy Estate, 354 Mich. 334 [ 92 N.W.2d 458] (1958); In re Baldwin's Estate, 311 Mich. 288, 314 [ 18 N.W.2d 827] (1945); Detroit Trust Co v Blakely, 359 Mich. 621, 630 [ 103 N.W.2d 413] (1960); In re Grover's Estate, 233 Mich. 467, 473 [ 206 N.W. 988] (1926); Mann v Day, 199 Mich. 88, 97 [165 N.W. 643] (1917); 31 Am Jur 2d, Executors and Administrators, § 534, p 237. "Ms. James argues that attorney fees and expenses may not be awarded in the absence of express authorization by statute or court rule.

  5. Barnes v. District of Columbia

    91 U.S. 540 (1875)   Cited 104 times
    Holding that the board of public works for the District of Columbia was a part of the municipal government. Although its members were "nominated by the President" with the "advice and consent of the Senate," the Court held that "it is quite immaterial, on the question whether board is a municipal agency, from what source the power comes to these officers,—whether by appointment of the President, or by the legislative assembly, or by election."

    Therefore the liability for injury resulting from neglect of duty, if it exists at all, must appear, upon a fair review of the charter or statutes, to rest upon the municipal corporation as such, and not upon it as an agency of the State, nor upon its officers as independent public officers. Dill. on Munic. Corp., sects. 772, 789; Child v. City of Boston, 4 Allen, 41; Walcott v. Swampscott, 1 id. 101; Martin v. Mayor of Brooklyn, 1 Hill, 550; Detroit v. Blakely, 21 Mich. 84; 9 Am. Law Reg. 680, n. Mr. W.D. Davidge and Mr. R.K. Elliot, contra.

  6. Belcher v. Conway

    179 Conn. 198 (Conn. 1979)   Cited 12 times
    Recognizing trust principle that trustee may bring action against cotrustees to enjoin breach of trust or compel performance of duty, based on fiduciary duty owed to beneficiaries by each trustee

    Such a situation is similar to a case where trustees seek instructions from a court as to the proper administration of the trust, where all parties acting primarily for the benefit of the estate may properly employ counsel of their choice. Detroit Trust Co. v. Blakely, 359 Mich. 621, 103 N.W.2d 413; see In Re Estate of Kelley, 126 N.J. Super. 376, 314 A.2d 614; see, generally, annot., "Right of coexecutor or cotrustee to retain independent legal counsel," 66 A.L.R.2d 1169. In fact, some courts have allowed charges against the trust for the fees of counsel employed by the cotrustees.

  7. Eberts Cadillac Co. v. Miller

    125 N.W.2d 306 (Mich. 1963)   Cited 5 times

    The practice of appeal to this Court, upon claim of right when there is no such right, has become habit. Why? Because this Court by its own slovenly wont continues to encourage such habit (see In re Fitch Drain No. 129, 346 Mich. 81, 90, 95; Lee v. Employment Security Commission, 346 Mich. 171, 179; Detroit Trust Co. v. Blakely, 359 Mich. 621; Rowe v. State Highway Commissioner, supra). This comfortable pick-and-choose indulgence of certain appellants breeds sloppy practice and, on too many occasions, wholly insufficient presentations on appeal. Too, it constitutes a standing suggestion for agreeing counsel that the defeated party may proceed to claim an appeal of right with understanding that the prevailing party will refrain from motion; all with expectation that the Court will fail to perceive and act until a majority of its members deem themselves "duty-bound to decide" because the Court has "accepted and maintained jurisdiction" (the expressions are taken from the separate opinion of Justices SMITH and O'HARA in Superx Drugs Corporation v. State Board of Pharmacy, 372 Mich. 22 at 61).

  8. Harvey v. Lewis

    112 N.W.2d 73 (Mich. 1961)   Cited 1 times

    All such motions have assigned want of application and grant of leave. In each instance I have agreed with the moving party or parties. My reasons appear in Detroit Trust Co. v. Blakely, 359 Mich. 621, in which some of the above-mentioned appeals — and dismissals thereof — were considered. That was in June of 1960. Now we have more — many more. Here is the record of what counsel have persisted in bringing to this Court, since Harvey v. Lewis came to decree above, without submission of 1 or more applications for leave:

  9. Ball v. Mills

    376 So. 2d 1174 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979)   Cited 15 times

    The court determined that expenses incident to the preservation or benefit of a trust are properly chargeable against the trust estate, and the award of such costs and attorney's fees is not conditioned upon the outcome of the litigation. In Detroit Trust Co. v. Blakely, 359 Mich. 621, 103 N.W.2d 413 (1960), the Supreme Court of Michigan found, in a case involving litigation between co-trustees, that the circumstances of the case, in which the trustees sought instructions from the court on the propriety of an investment, justified the award of attorney's fees. A similar rule has been followed by the Supreme Court of our sister state of Alabama in Dent v. Foye, 214 Ala. 243, 107 So. 210 (1925), where the court recognized that an administrator or other trustee, charged with the legal duty to faithfully execute a trust, may be allowed his attorney's fees in litigation brought in good faith, although he failed to prevail therein. Further, said the court: