115 F.2d 721-722. In an annotation to Detroit, Grand Haven Milwaukee R. Co. v. Howland, 246 Mich. 318, 224 N.W. 366, at page 38 of 68 A.L.R., this statement appears: "Where the calls as specified in the instrument fail to close, parol evidence is usually allowed to explain the ambiguity and to identify the land intended to be conveyed." In the opinion rendered by this court on the first appeal ( 256 Ala. 349, 54 So.2d 611, 613), we rejected the contention then made by the Blalocks that the description in their deed contained a patent ambiguity.

The law in other jurisdictions appears to be the same as is reflected in our decisions which have been cited. Detroit,Grand Haven Milwaukee R. Co. v. Howland, 246 Mich. 318, 224 N.W. 366, 68 A.L.R. 1, and appended annotation, 68 A.L.R. 4. In the subject case there was an error in the plat of a subdivision and when a twenty-foot strip was conveyed off the rear of some of the lots to the railroad company to increase the width of its right-of-way a substantial overlap of the original right-of-way was discovered. In the report it is stated that the action was to correct the deed. It was held by the lower court that the deed estopped the parties, which was reversed on appeal. It was held unnecessary to correct the deed in a court of equity and parol testimony was admissible.

The law is clear that when there is no inconsistency on the face of a deed and, on application of the description to the ground, no inconsistency appears, parol evidence is not admissible to show that the parties intended to convey either more or less or different ground from that described. But where there are conflicting calls in a deed, or the description may be made to apply to two or more parcels, and there is nothing in the deed to show which is meant, then parol evidence is admissible to show the true meaning of the words used. Meinhardt v. White, 341 Mo. 446, 107 S.W.2d 1061, 1064 [4, 5]; Detroit, Grand Haven Milwaukee R. Co. v. Howland, 246 Mich. 318, 224 N.W. 366, 68 A.L.R. 1, and annotation; 16 Am.Jur., Deeds, §§ 412-414, pp. 673-674; Thompson on Real Property, Vol. 6, §§ 3280-3287, pp. 454-468. "The office of extrinsic evidence as applied to the description of a parcel is to explain the latent ambiguity or to point out the property described on the ground.

Clearly, appellant has failed to show mutual mistake of the parties by that degree of proof required by the stated rule, and is not entitled to reformation of the deed. [4] Respondent, on the other hand, we think, is entitled to the relief which the trial court granted him under a different rule, which is stated in paragraph IV, p. 15, of an annotation to Detroit, Grand Haven Mil. R. Co. v. Howland, 246 Mich. 318, 224 N.W. 366, 68 A.L.R. 1, as follows: "Where the description of land in a deed or mortgage is vague, uncertain, or indefinite, parol evidence is admissible to explain and remove the uncertainty, and to identify the property intended to be conveyed, thus giving effect to the intention of the parties to the instrument.

We are of the opinion that the description in the assessment list and tax deed did not furnish data pointing to facts provable by extrinsic evidence that would identify the land in suit as the land described in the tax deed. See the following authorities: Armijo v. New Mexico Town Co., 3 N.M. 427, 5 P. 709; N.H. Ranch Co. v. Gann, 42 N.M. 530, 82 P.2d 632 (on rehearing); Foster v. Bennett, 44 N.M. 618, 107 P.2d 321; De Gutierrez v. Brady, 43 N.M. 197, 88 P.2d 281; Dickerson v. Montoya, 44 N.M. 207, 100 P.2d 904; State v. Board of Trustees of Las Vegas, 32 N.M. 182, 253 P. 22; Lawson v. Hedges, supra; Eaves v. Lowe, supra; Detroit, etc., Ry. Co. v. Howland, 246 Mich. 318, 224 N.W. 366, 68 A.L.R. 1, and annotations at page 4 et seq., entitled "Admissibility of parole evidence to explain ambiguity in description of land in deed or mortgage," and particularly see annotation at page 65 et seq., entitled "Ambiguous description in deed executed at judicial sale." And see the following cases construing a prior governing statute: Manby v. Voorhees, 27 N.M. 511, 203 P. 543; King v. Doherty, 32 N.M. 431, 258 P. 569.

Evidence aliunde is not admissible under these circumstances to determine the intent of the grantor, assuming his intent to have been other than that which is derived from inspection of the deeds as executed and delivered. 16 Am. Jur. Deeds, p. 673, § 412. As to what constitutes a latent ambiguity existing in a description contained in a deed, see 16 Am. Jur. Deeds, p. 674, § 414; Detroit, G. H. M. R. Co. v. Howland, 246 Mich. 318 (68 A.L.R. 1). The descriptions in the Orr deeds present no latent ambiguity. Each deed describes a part of lot 8, including the disputed strip of land.

] In Hardy v. Matthews, 38 Mo. 121, this court points out that a latent ambiguity arises where the language used in the description of the land, appearing certain on its face, is shown to apply to different pieces of land and extrinsic or parol evidence is then necessary to show which tract or parcel of land "was intended." As to the latent ambiguity rule as applied to the description of land in deeds, or written instruments affecting land, and the admissibility of parol evidence to explain and remove such ambiguity see, also, Detroit, Grand Haven Milwaukee Railroad Co. v. Howland, 246 Mich. 318, 224 N.W. 366, 68 A.L.R. 1; Putnam v. Bond, 100 Mass. 58; North Carolina Institute v. Norwood, 45 N.C. 65; Schreiber v. Osten, 50 Mo. 513; Gitt v. Eppler, 56 Mo. 138, 145; Charles v. Patch, 87 Mo. 450; Coe v. Ritter, 86 Mo. 277; Blumenthal v. Blumenthal, 251 Mo. 693, 158 S.W. 648; Lauderdale v. King, 130 Mo. App. 236, 109 S.W. 852; and Thornell v. Brockton, 141 Mass. 151, 152, 6 N.E. 74, 76, where one of the calls in a deed was described as a lane running in a certain direction. It appeared there were two lanes running in that direction, each of which was consistent with some parts of the description in the deed. It was held that parol evidence was admissible to show which lane was intended, the ambiguity being latent.

(Italics ours.) Maxwell, at 596 (quoting Detroit, G.H.M.R.R. v. Howland, 246 Mich. 318, 224 N.W. 366, 68 A.L.R. 1 (1929)). This quote, however, is taken out of context.