Desiderio v. Iadonisi

48 Citing cases

  1. JPMorgan Chase Bank v. Essaghof

    336 Conn. 633 (Conn. 2020)   Cited 9 times

    tle to it to a purchaser, and pay the proceeds to the plaintiff ... is very obviously to do a fundamentally different thing from ordering the defendant to do an act and putting him in jail for contempt if he does not obey; and the phrases in rem and in personam probably express this as well as any others. ... [A]s a punishment for not doing something and for the purpose of persuading him to do it, the court deals directly with the physical person of the defendant, as distinguished from dealing with his property."). Furthermore, as the plaintiff advances the taxes and insurance premiums, the payments become part of the mortgage debt; see General Statutes § 49-2 (a) ("[p]remiums of insurance, taxes and assessments paid by the mortgagee ... are a part of the debt due the mortgagee or lienor"); Lewis v. Culbertson , 124 Conn. 333, 336, 199 A. 642 (1938) ("[mortgage debt includes] ... [p]remiums of insurance, taxes and assessments paid by the mortgagee" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Desiderio v. Iadonisi , 115 Conn. 652, 654–55, 163 A. 254 (1932) ("[the mortgagee] is entitled to have the security for the debt preserved against loss or diminution in value by reason of obligations owed by the mortgagor ... for taxes and the like ... and if [the mortgagee] discharges such obligations [itself], [it] may tack them to the mortgage debt"); and, as discussed, the mortgagee in a strict foreclosure may recover mortgage debt only in the context of a deficiency judgment. See General Statutes §§ 49-1 and 49-14.

  2. Sargent v. Smith

    78 Conn. App. 691 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003)   Cited 6 times

    The mortgagor continues to be regarded as the owner of the property during the term of the mortgage. Desiderio v. Iadonisi, 115 Conn. 652, 654, 163 A. 254 (1932). Thus, in this case, on the signing of the mortgage deed, the plaintiff held equitable title and Gateway held legal title to the property.

  3. Matter of Coniam

    9 B.R. 306 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981)   Cited 7 times

    Id. at 56, 99 S.Ct. at 918. The question then becomes, under the facts of this proceeding, what would Connecticut law afford Society in its status as mortgagee and assignee of rents? The following concise statement of mortgagor-mortgagee law appears in Desiderio v. Iadonisi, 115 Conn. 652, 163 A. 254 (1932), a case which I feel is ultimately dispositive of the issue herein. A written authority to collect rents is not necessary for the right of a mortgagee to such rents.

  4. Hartford Realization Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co.

    167 A. 728 (Conn. 1933)   Cited 30 times

    The complaint alleges that the defendant by its servants and agents has established offices in, and assumed entire control of the employees and the maintenance of, the building and that its acts have resulted in the plaintiff being ousted of possession. Under these allegations we must regard the defendant as having ousted the plaintiff from the premises and itself taken possession of them. Under the theory of mortgages which we have always followed in this State a mortgagee gets the legal title to the property and in the absence of an agreement or other circumstances debarring him from so doing, is entitled to possession. Desiderio v. Iadonisi, 115 Conn. 652, 654, 163 A. 254. He may assert this right against a mortgagor in possession by an action of ejectment. Chamberlain v. Thompson, 10 Conn. 243, 251.

  5. Prusaczyk v. Kulo

    17 Conn. Supp. 348 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1951)   Cited 1 times

    The defendant did not make the payments called for by the note and mortgage on October 1 and November 1, 1950, and this action was started by complaint dated November 4, 1950. The plaintiff had the right to enter into possession of the property in order to protect his security so long as he could do so peaceably. Struzinski v. Struzinsky, 133 Conn. 424, 429; Hartford Realization Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 117 Conn. 218, 224; Desiderio v. Iadonisi, 115 Conn. 652, 654. His entry was undeniably peaceable. Having taken possession, he had the right to collect the rents.

  6. Found. Capital Res. v. Prayer Tabernacle Church of Love, Inc.

    Civ. 3:17-cv-00135 (JAM) (D. Conn. Sep. 2, 2021)

    E.g., Wells Fargo Bank, 2013 WL 5614447, at *3. And courts have also allowed a foreclosing mortgagee to “tack onto the mortgage debt” sums that it advanced to “preserve[] against loss or diminution in value, ” such as real estate taxes and property insurance premiums, Desiderio v. Iadonisi, 115 Conn. 652, 163 A. 254, 255 (1932), but typically only through the date that title passed. See Am. Mortg. Corp. v. Hope, 41 Conn.App. 324, 331 (1996) (stating that “the only allowable deductions from [the value of the property] are for prior encumbrances in effect on the date title vests” and, therefore expenses incurred after title passes are not properly chargeable to the mortgagor).

  7. Edwards v. CBD & Sons

    No. 3:17-cv-00466 (SRU) (D. Conn. May. 21, 2018)   Cited 4 times

    Furthermore, under Connecticut law, the lender "is not bound to . . . offer a release of the mortgage until the debt is satisfied," which occurs "when the mortgagee has appropriated to it the property mortgaged, and the value of that property exceeds the mortgage debt." Hartford Fed. Savs. & Loan Ass'n v. Tucker, 196 Conn. 172, 181 (1985); Desiderio v. Iadonisi, 115 Conn. 652, 652 (1932) (emphasis added). After Edwards failed to fulfill the conditions for CBD's acceptance of the discounted payoff, CBD did not breach any duty to Edwards by "fail[ing] to release [his] mortgage for substantially less than it was owed."

  8. In re Spano

    161 B.R. 880 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1993)   Cited 23 times

    Further, at least in the absence of a superseding agreement, a mortgagee has the right to rents upon taking actual possession, or constructive possession through a court appointed receiver. See New Haven Sav. Bank v. Gen'l Fin. Mortgage Co., 174 Conn. 268, 270-71, 386 A.2d 230 (1978); Desiderio v. Iadonisi, 115 Conn. 652, 654-56, 163 A. 254 (1932); In re Gaslight Village, Inc., 6 B.R. 871, 874 (Bankr.D.Conn. 1980).

  9. Sargent v. Smith

    272 Conn. 722 (Conn. 2005)   Cited 12 times
    Denying plaintiff's claim in second appeal that he would have been entitled to money collected by receiver during pendency of first appeal, and noting that "no equitable considerations warrant a contrary result" because same parties were involved in both actions, that plaintiff could have alerted trial court in first action to his claim, and that plaintiff could have taken appeal challenging actions of receiver when actions actually occurred

    It is well established that, "[a]lthough a receivership takes designated funds out of the control of the mortgagor, it does not vest their control in the foreclosing mortgagee, who `has no claim upon the income and profit in [the receiver's] hands as such'; since the funds are legally in the possession of the court subject to whatever disposition it may order. Desiderio v. Iadonisi, 115 Conn. 652, 655, 163 A. 254 (1932)." Hartford Federal Savings Loan Assn. v. Tucker, 192 Conn. 1, 7, 469 A.2d 778 (1984).

  10. First Federal Bank v. Whitney Devel. Corp.

    237 Conn. 679 (Conn. 1996)   Cited 23 times
    Reversing judgment granting execution of judgment of ejectment rendered against party tenant in possession of mortgaged property following judgment of strict foreclosure

    See City Lumber Co. of Bridgeport, Inc. v. Murphy, supra, 25. Because it is unnecessary for us to do so, we do not determine, in this case, whether a mortgagee is an "owner" pursuant to § 47a-23c prior to the confirmation of title after foreclosure. Cf. Red Rooster Construction Co. v. River Associates, Inc., 224 Conn. 563, 568-74, 620 A.2d 118 (1993) (mortgagee is not owner for purpose of statute relating to notice of filing of mechanic's lien); State v. Stonybrook, Inc., supra, 496 (mortgagee holds technical legal title only for purpose of enforcing payment of debt); Desiderio v. Iadonisi, 115 Conn. 652, 654, 163 A. 254 (1932) (same); Savage v. Dooley, 28 Conn. 411, 413 (1859) (same). Berkeley next claims that a motion for an execution of the judgment of ejectment, pursuant to an action for foreclosure, is not an "action," as that term is used in § 47a-23c and defined in General Statutes § 47a-1 (a). Specifically, Berkeley contends that the codification of § 47a-23c in the summary process chapter of the landlord and tenant title implies a corresponding limitation in the scope of the phrases "other action to dispossess a tenant" in § 47a-23c(b)(1) and "any other proceeding in which rights are determined" in the definition of "action."