Dismissed. See Deshotels v. Stewart, 346 So. 3d 717, 718–19 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022) (Tanenbaum, J., dissenting). B.L. Thomas, M.K. Thomas, and Tanenbaum, JJ., concur.

The order did not mark the end of "judicial labor" as to a substantive claim—say, the fee motion—because there was no judicial labor to be had: Progressive acknowledged that its claim already was barred and would remain barred un- less the trial court re-opened the time window. See Deshotels v. Stewart, 346 So. 3d 717, 718 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022) (Tanenbaum, J., dissenting) (explaining why judicial labor could not be said to have come to an end if "there has been no judicial labor at all to adjudicate the rights of the parties … [b]ecause [if] there has not been a start to the judicial labor in the case, there could be no end"). Per the Florida Constitution, we have the authority "to hear appeals, that may be taken as a matter of right, from final judgments or orders of trial courts."

At all events, in the context of family law matters like this one, we have the constitutional authority to review on direct appeal only final adjudications of the parents' or spouses' rights on discrete matters in controversy, plus non-final orders made appealable by rule adopted by the supreme court. See Art. V, § 4(b)(1); see also S. L. T. Warehouse Co. v. Webb, 304 So.2d 97, 99 (Fla. 1974) (explaining that "to be appealable as final, an order or decree must dispose of all the issues or causes in the case, but this general rule is relaxed where the judgment, order or decree adjudicates a distinct and severable cause of action, not interrelated with remaining claims pending in the trial court"); cf. Deshotels v. Stewart, 346 So.3d 717, 718 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022) (Tanenbaum, J., dissenting) (discussing the nature of a final order in terms of adjudication). The trial court's final paternity judgment does operate as an adjudication of the father's and mother's rights to the child with respect to timesharing, child support, and childcare expenses.