Derzavis v. Bepko

14 Citing cases

  1. Giordano v. Sherwood

    968 A.2d 494 (D.C. 2009)   Cited 18 times
    Noting that in expert testimony “certainty is not required”; rather, the testimony need only be “based on fact or adequate data”

    "In a medical malpractice case, the plaintiff has the burden of proving the applicable standard of care, a deviation from that standard by the defendant, and a causal relationship between that deviation and the plaintiff's injury." Derzavis v. Bepko, 766 A.2d 514, 519 (D.C. 2000). "Due to the `great variety of infections and complications which, despite all precautions and skill, sometimes follow accepted and standard medical treatment,' an inference of negligence in a malpractice suit cannot be based solely on the fact that an adverse result follows treatment."

  2. Snyder v. George Washington University

    890 A.2d 237 (D.C. 2006)   Cited 19 times
    Finding that expert testimony was required in a medical malpractice case, the principal theory of which was that the hospital "failed to timely diagnose and treat [the decedent's] internal bleeding, resulting in a hematoma (or pooling of blood) around his spinal cord that damaged his spinal tissue, causing his paralysis and subsequent loss of limbs"

    Expert testimony is typically required to establish each of the three elements "`except where proof is so obvious as to lie within the ken of the average lay juror.'" Derzavis v. Bepko, 766 A.2d 514, 519 (D.C. 2000) (quoting Washington Hosp. Ctr., 579 A.2d at 181). One of Saunders' claims — and the primary theory advanced on appeal — is that GWU failed to timely diagnose and treat his internal bleeding, resulting in a hematoma (or pooling of blood) around his spinal cord that damaged his spinal tissue, causing his paralysis and subsequent loss of limbs. "Because the present case `involve[d] . . . the exercise of professional skill and judgment,' expert testimony was required to make a prima facie showing of negligence."

  3. Nichols v. Greater Southeast Community Hosp

    382 F. Supp. 2d 109 (D.D.C. 2005)   Cited 4 times

    Thus, typically, in a medical malpractice case a plaintiff must generally present the testimony of medical experts to establish a prima facie case. See Derzavis v. Bepko, 766 A.2d 514, 523 (D.C. 2000); Riddick, 183 F.R.D. at 329 (medical expert needed to establish all elements of a medical malpractice claim). This case was removed from the District of Columbia Superior Court by Kaiser pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441, as an action over which this Court has federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

  4. Gubbins v. Hurson

    885 A.2d 269 (D.C. 2005)   Cited 14 times
    Discussing need for expert report from treating physician under D.C. Superior Court rule that predates Rule 26(C)

    "In a medical malpractice case, the plaintiff has the burden of proving the applicable standard of care, a deviation from that standard by the defendant, and a causal relationship between that deviation and the plaintiff's injury." Derzavis v. Bepko, 766 A.2d 514, 519 (D.C. 2000). Expert testimony is required to establish each of these elements unless the "proof is so obvious as to lie within the ken of the average lay juror."

  5. Providence Hosp., Inc. v. Willis

    103 A.3d 533 (D.C. 2014)   Cited 2 times

    The Hospital thus argues that Willis had to prove a negative: It was not enough for him to show that the DVT more likely than not became well-established in the ten days after the negligence; he also had to disprove—to rule out—that it did so in the five-day interval between the two surgeries. But while the Hospital cites unassailable legal principles such as that a medical expert's opinion must be formed “with sufficient certainty so as to make a medical judgment,” Lasley v. Georgetown Univ., 688 A.2d 1381, 1388 (D.C.1997), and that more than a temporal relationship—“contemporaneity”—between a medical procedure and an injury must have existed to prove causation, Derzavis v. Bepko, 766 A.2d 514, 522 (D.C.2000), it points to no case law or other authority requiring Willis to negate a possibility ( i.e., that the DVT became established too early for the ordered prophylaxis to be effective) and show by a preponderance of the evidence, as he did, that timely placement of the SCDs would have kept the DVT from becoming well-established. Requiring Willis to do both, in our judgment, would amount to increasing his burden of proof to something akin to the standard in criminal cases.

  6. Hussung v. Patel

    369 Ill. App. 3d 924 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007)   Cited 32 times
    Holding that "[w]hile a plaintiff need not prove her case at the summary judgment stage, she must present enough evidence to create a genuine issue of fact"

    And while it appears that no Illinois case has said so explicitly, other jurisdictions have held that a "`temporal association alone does not suffice to show a causal link' because a mere temporal coincidence between two events does not necessarily entail a substantial causal relation between them." Lasley v. Georgetown University, 688 A.2d 1381, 1387 (D.C. App. 1997), quoting Hodges v. Secretary of the Department of Health Human Services, 9 F.3d 958, 960 (Fed. Cir. 1993), quoting Grant v. Secretary of the Department of Health Human Services, 956 F.2d 1144, 1148 (Fed. Cir. 1992); see also Derzavis v. Bepko, 766 A.2d 514, 521-22 (D.C. App. 2000) (rejecting the plaintiff's argument that the jury could infer causation where the plaintiff's injury occurred contemporaneously with the defendant doctor's performance of a Pap smear); Hosier v. United States, 718 F.2d 202, 206 (6th Cir. 1983) (rejecting as "merely conjectural" the plaintiffs argument that causation could be inferred between a swine flu vaccination received by the plaintiff and the sudden onset of her rheumatoid arthritis). In Lasley, the plaintiff brought a malpractice action against his doctor for damages sustained as a result of blood vessels that ruptured during an embolization procedure.

  7. Calhoun v. United States

    22-cv-1338 (CRC) (D.D.C. Sep. 27, 2024)

    Rhodes, 967 F.Supp.2d at 289. Each element “usually must be proven by expert testimony,” which is required if “a case involves the merits and performance of scientific treatment, complex medical procedures, or the exercise of professional skill and judgment, [because] a jury will not be qualified to determine whether there was unskillful or negligent treatment without the aid of expert testimony.” Id.; Derzavis v. Bepko, 766 A.2d 514, 523 (D.C. 2000); see Messina v. District of Columbia, 663 A.2d 535, 538 (D.C. 1995) (plaintiff must “put on expert testimony to establish what th[e] standard of care is if the subject in question is so distinctly related to some science, profession, or occupation as to be beyond the ken of the average layperson.”) (citation omitted). Although the expert-testimony requirement does not apply “[w]here laymen can say, as a matter of common knowledge and observation, that the type of harm would not ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence

  8. Bradley v. United States

    619 F. Supp. 3d 141 (D.D.C. 2022)   Cited 1 times

    Under District of Columbia law, "[t]he causal relationship between [a] breach and [an] injury is established through expert testimony[,] 'based on a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that the defendant's negligence is more likely than anything else to have been the cause (or a cause) of [the] plaintiff's injuries.' " Perkins v. Hansen, 79 A.3d 342, 344 (D.C. 2013) (quoting Derzavis v. Bepko, 766 A.2d 514, 522 (D.C. 2000)). For the following reasons, the Court concludes that the plaintiff has met her burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Dr. Williams's failure to diagnose a concussion and remove her from practice and participating in games resulted in her injuries.

  9. Flavell v. Collier

    20-cv-0959 (DLF) (D.D.C. Aug. 30, 2021)   Cited 2 times

    “In a medical malpractice case, the plaintiff has the burden of proving the applicable standard of care, a deviation from that standard by the defendant, and a causal relationship between that deviation and the plaintiff's injury.” Giordano v. Sherwood, 968 A.2d 494, 498 (D.C. 2009) (quoting Derzavis v. Bepko, 766 A.2d 514, 519 (D.C. 2000)).

  10. Burton v. U.S.

    668 F. Supp. 2d 86 (D.D.C. 2009)   Cited 17 times
    Finding exhaustion of remedies in FTCA case consisting of Survival Act and Wrongful Death Act claims

    Expert testimony is required to prove the elements of negligence, "except where proof is so obvious as to lie within the ken of the lay" finder of fact. Derzavis v. Bepko, 766 A.2d 514, 519 (D.C. 2000) (quoting Washington v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 579 A.2d 177, 181 (D.C. 1990) (citations and quotation marks omitted)). Proof concerning "the exercise of professional skill and judgment" is beyond the ken the Court, absent expert testimony.