School property may be disposed of only in the manner prescribed by statute. The purported sale or disposition of the school property by indirection was in violation of the provisions of section 887 of the Compiled Statutes of Idaho. Compiled Statutes of Idaho § 887; Rose v. Board of Directors of School District 94, 162 Kan. 720, 179 P.2d 181; Caldwell v. Bauer, 179 Ind. 146, 99 N.E. 117; Schwing v. McClure, 120 Ohio St. 335, 166 N.E. 230; Derieg v. Board of Education, 202 Okl. 577, 216 P.2d 307. GIVENS, Chief Justice.

We will continue our reference to both parties by their trial court designations. Defendant's position, as revealed in his brief, is not that he became the owner of the school building by reason of his claimed purchase of its site at the tax sale, for, from said argument and the authorities he cites, including Derieg v. Board of Education, 202 Okla. 577, 216 P.2d 307, he apparently concedes that said building remained "school district" property even after said purchase. He still maintains, however, in his effort to show the correctness of the trial court's ruling on his demurrer, that the school district to which the materials in controversy belong is School District No. 33; and, that plaintiff not only could not, for this reason, obtain title thereto from School District No. 28, but that if the latter had the right to sell it, statutory requirements were not complied with in said sale.

The school buildings built by the school district did not, the parties agree, become part of the realty. Derieg v. Board of Education, 202 Okla. 577, 216 P.2d 307 (1950). But, once the buildings are abandoned what is supposed to happen?

Their first obligation is to act in the public interest and within the limitations prescribed by law. See Derieg v. Board of Education of Carnegie, 216 P.2d 307, 309 (Okla. 1950). ¶ 7 The fact that some employees' benefits may be dependent on the outcome of an election which affects funding is merely a side effect of prudent budget balancing.

HOWEVER, THIS LEGAL PRINCIPLE HAS BEEN HELD NOT TO APPLY TO A GOVERNMENTAL TENANT BECAUSE SUCH WOULD CONSTITUTE AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL GIFT TO A PRIVATE PERSON. DERIEA V. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE TOWN OF CARNEAIE, 216 P.2D 307 (OKLA. 1950). THE COURT FOUND THAT IT WOULD BE UNLAWFUL FOR A SCHOOL DISTRICT TO GRATUITOUSLY TRANSFER ASSETS TO THE PRIVATE PROPERTY OWNER AND THEREFORE THE GENERAL STATUTORY PRESUMPTION IN SECTION 334 WOULD NOT APPLY TO A GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY.

THE COURT REASONED IN THE SEWELL CASE THAT ALLOWING THE BUILDING TO BECOME A FIXTURE AND REVERT TO THE GRANTOR WOULD VIOLATE THE OKLAHOMA STATUTES WHICH GAVE THE SCHOOL BOARD AUTHORITY TO SELL AND DISPOSE OF PROPERTY. THE COURT CITED AND FOLLOWED THE CASE OF DERIEG V. BOARD OF EDUCATION, 216 P.2D 307 (OKLA. 1950). THE DERIEQ CASE, ALSO INVOLVING A SCHOOL BUILDING, LEANED HEAVILY ON THE PREMISE THAT FUNDS OF THE SCHOOL DISTRICT ARE DERIVED FROM TAXATION, AND THE PROPERTY IN WHICH THOSE FUNDS ARE INVESTED IS A PUBLIC TRUST. THE COURT RULED THAT THE PROVISIONS OF 60 O.S. 334 COULD NOT BE INVOKED TO — DESTROY SUCH TRUSTS, SAYING THAT TO APPLY 60 O.S. 334 WOULD REQUIRE THE SCHOOL BOARD TO VIOLATE ITS TRUST AND EXCEED ITS AUTHORITY.