Opinion
3:21-cv-1030-HL
11-14-2022
MICHELLE DERBY, as legal guardian for William Derby, an individual, Plaintiff, v. COLUMBIA COUNTY, an Oregon municipality; CORRECT CARE SOLUTIONS, LLC, d/b/a/ Wellpath, LLC; JEFFREY DICKERSON, in his official capacity; CHRIS HOOVER, in his official capacity; JUSTIN HECHT, in his official capacity; VIVIK SHAH, in his official capacity; JULIE WEIGAND, in her official capacity; NANCY RONAN, in her individual capacity; COLUMBIA COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH, an Oregon non-profit corporation; and KAREN FORTLANDER, in her official capacity, Defendants.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMEDNATION
ANDREW HALLMAN, United States Magistrate Judge
Plaintiff Michelle Derby, the legal guardian for William Derby (“Derby”), brings this action against multiple Defendants stemming from Derby's treatment while he was incarcerated at Columbia County Jail (the “Jail”). This matter comes before the Court on Defendants Correct Care Solutions, LLC, d/b/a/ Wellpath, LLC (“Wellpath”), Vivik Shah, Julie Weigand, and Nancy Ronan's (“Wellpath Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss the claims against them in Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint. ECF 44. For the reasons explained below, Wellpath Defendants' motion should be GRANTED as to Shah and Weigand and DENIED as to Wellpath and Ronan. Further, the claims against Shah and Weigand should be dismissed without prejudice, with an opportunity for Plaintiff to replead. Finally, Weigand's Motion to Dismiss for untimely service should be DENIED.
This Court concludes that this motion can be resolved without oral argument.
SUPPLEMENTAL BACKGROUND
This Court previously provided a detailed background of Plaintiff's claims, as alleged in the initial Complaint. Findings and Recommendation 2-7, ECF 35. The following background specifically addresses Plaintiff's claims against the Wellpath Defendants, as set forth in Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), ECF 40.
Wellpath was a corporation contracted by Columbia County to provide medical services at the Jail. FAC ¶ 8. Shah was the Medical Director for Wellpath covering the Jail and, in that capacity, was the doctor ultimately responsible for the inmates' medical care. FAC ¶ 10. Weigand was a behavioral health manager for Wellpath at the Jail and, in that capacity, “was the mental health professional responsible for ensuring that inmates of the Jail received adequate mental health care.” FAC ¶ 11. Ronan was a nurse for Wellpath who worked at the Jail and, in that capacity, “was the person on the ground responsible for providing medical care to inmates at the Jail. FAC ¶ 12. Plaintiff sued Shah and Weigand in their official capacity and Ronan in her individual capacity. FAC ¶¶ 10-12.
Plaintiff alleges that while Derby was in the Jail in 2016 and 2017, he was denied adequate medical and mental health care in many ways. But Plaintiff still does not allege any specific allegations against Shah and Weigand beyond their organizational roles. FAC ¶¶ 15-16.
Plaintiff does include specific allegations against Ronan, stating in February 2017, Ronan discontinued Derby's medications without trying to persuade him to continue taking them. FAC ¶ 47. Plaintiff also alleges that Ronan was personally aware of Derby's extreme weight loss and lack of food intake but failed to take sufficient action in response. FAC ¶ 99(c).
Plaintiff alleges three claims for relief against various Wellpath Defendants.
Claim I, Count 3 alleges Wellpath, Shah, and Weigand have “supervisory liability” for the deliberate indifference to Derby's serious medical needs. FAC ¶ 79. Plaintiff alleges that these Defendants were all deliberately indifferent because of five inadequacies or failures related to Derby's care: (1) inadequate mental health screenings, (2) inadequate procedures for administering anti-psychotic medications, (3) failing to have qualified mental health professionals on staff, (4) failing to implement a policy to transfer inmates to a mental health facility, and (5) inadequate mental health interventions. FAC ¶¶ 83-87.
Claim I, Count 6 alleges that Ronan was deliberately indifferent to Derby's medical needs by discontinuing his medications, failing to make reasonable efforts to persuade him to take his medications, and failing to address his extreme weight loss or mental health conditions. FAC ¶ 98.
Claim V alleges that Wellpath was negligent in eight separate respects based on failures to provide adequate medical and mental health treatment to Derby. FAC ¶ 117.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under Rule 12(b)(6), a party may move to dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[.]” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). A court may dismiss “based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged” to support a cognizable legal theory. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Cap. Partners, LLC, 718 F.3d 1006, 1014 (9th Cir. 2013) (quotations omitted).
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); see also CallerID4u, Inc. v. MCI Commc'ns Servs. Inc., 880 F.3d 1048, 1061 (9th Cir. 2018). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Teixeira v. Cty. of Alameda, 873 F.3d 670, 678 (9th Cir. 2017). The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. When a plaintiff's complaint pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” a defendant's liability, the plaintiff's complaint “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Id. at 557 (quotations omitted).
The court must accept as true the allegations in the complaint and construe them in favor of the plaintiff. Teixeira, 873 F.3d at 678; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; Kwan v. SanMedica Int'l, 854 F.3d 1088, 1096 (9th Cir. 2017). The pleading standard under Rule 8 “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,' but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). “A pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citations omitted); Kwan, 854 F.3d at 1096. A complaint also does not suffice if it tenders “naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557. “Rule 8 does not empower [the] respondent to plead the bare elements of his cause of action . . . and expect his complaint to survive a motion to dismiss.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 687.
DISCUSSION
The Wellpath Defendants assert that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against each Defendant. Mot. Dismiss 2-4, ECF 44. They argue that Plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts to demonstrate any Defendant's involvement in the alleged denial of Derby's constitutional rights. Id. Although the Wellpath Defendants bring this motion as to each Defendant, they focus on the allegations-or lack thereof-against Shah and Weigand. Reply in Supp. of Mot. Dismiss 2-3, ECF 50. They request that all claims against the Wellpath Defendants be dismissed with prejudice. Mot. Dismiss 6.
Further, Weigand asserts that the claims against her should be dismissed because- despite this Court's Order extending the time for service-Plaintiff failed to serve her within the time specified in Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m). Mot. Dismiss 5-6; Order, Jan. 31, 2022, ECF 33.
I. Personal Involvement Under § 1983
“[S]tating a claim against a government official in his or her individual capacity for purposeful discrimination requires pleading that ‘each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.'” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1206 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). To state a claim for relief, “[a] plaintiff must allege facts, not simply conclusions, that show that an individual was personally involved in the deprivation of his civil rights.” Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998).
Section 1983 suits do not allow for the imposition of vicarious liability. Starr, 652 F.3d at 1206. However, “[a] defendant may be held liable as a supervisor under § 1983 ‘if there exists either (1) his or her personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor's wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.'” Id. at 1207. “The requisite causal connection can be established by setting in motion a series of acts by others, or by knowingly refusing to terminate a series of acts by others, which the supervisor knew or reasonably should have known would cause others to inflict a constitutional injury ....” Id. (citation and quotations omitted).
II. Application
Plaintiff's Complaint names Shah and Weigand in their official, not individual, capacities. FAC ¶¶ 10-11. However, the parties' briefing on this Motion to Dismiss and the prior motion assumed that Shah and Weigand were named in their individual capacities and assessed their potential liability as individually named Defendants. Accordingly, this Court presumes that Plaintiff intended to name Shah and Weigand in their individual, not official capacity. If, however, Plaintiff intended to bring claims against Shah and Weigand in their official capacities, then those claims would be evaluated under a different standard. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985) (explaining that a claim for damages against an officer in his official capacity is treated as a claim against the municipality, subject to the requirements of Monell v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690, n.55 (1978)); Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1139 (9th Cir. 2012) (applying Monell to private entities acting under color of law).
Shah and Weigand argue Plaintiff has failed to plead any facts linking their actions to the alleged deprivations of Derby's constitutional rights. Mot. Dismiss 2-4. Plaintiff responds that her allegations against Shah and Weigand are sufficient because the alleged violations resulted from “administrative decisions and failures, which the corporation (Wellpath, LLC), corporate medical director ([] Shah), and corporate behavioral health manager ([] Weigand) are alleged to have had direct responsibility over.” Pl.'s Resp. to Mot. Dismiss 3, ECF 46.
This Court agrees that Plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts to support Shah and Weigand's liability. Once again, “Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts regarding [Defendants Shah and Weigand] apart from their organizational roles.” Findings and Recommendation 1415. Instead, Plaintiff's Complaint continues to allege “supervisory liability” claims against these Defendants. FAC ¶ 79. To be sure, the Amended Complaint now alleges that “administrative decisions and policy failures” by the Wellpath Defendants, as a whole, contributed to the inadequate care Derby received. FAC ¶¶ 79-82. But there are no allegations about the respective roles Shah and Weigand played in those administrative decisions and policy failures. There are also no allegations as to whether Shah and Weigand had any policy-making roles within Wellpath in general.
These allegations are insufficient to demonstrate Shah or Weigand's personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation or that there was a causal connection between their alleged wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation. See Starr, 652 F.3d at 1206. Plaintiff's “conclusory allegations and generalities, without any allegation of the specific wrongdoing by each Defendant” are insufficient to demonstrate personal liability under § 1983. Hydrick v. Hunter, 669 F.3d 937, 942 (9th Cir. 2012). Plaintiff's § 1983 claims against Shah and Weigand should therefore be dismissed.
B. Wellpath
Wellpath also asserts that the claims against it should be dismissed. Mot. Dismiss 4. However, the basis for that motion is unclear. Although Wellpath seeks dismissal of all claims against it with prejudice, Mot. Dismiss 6, it fails to address whether the negligence claims Plaintiff raises should also be dismissed. FAC ¶ 117.
Turning to the § 1983 claims, the allegations against Wellpath are virtually the same as the allegations against Shah and Weigand. See FAC ¶¶ 79-82. But this Court cannot conclude that the Wellpath claims are also subject to dismissal. As this Court noted in its prior Order, the standards for municipal liability in Monell, 436 U.S. 658, apply to private entities. See Tsao, 698 F.3d at 1139. “To create liability under § 1983, the constitutional violation must be caused by a policy, practice, or custom of the entity or be the result of an order by a policy-making officer.” Id. (citation and quotations omitted).
In its Motion to Dismiss, Wellpath fails to address whether Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that Wellpath's policies, customs, or practices resulted in the injury to Derby. This Court is not inclined to recommend dismissal of the claims against Wellpath without some specific argument on this issue. Moreover, Plaintiff has alleged that Wellpath's screening and medication practices contributed to Derby's injury. FAC ¶¶ 83-84. Although Plaintiff does not allege that Shah or Weigand had a role in implementing those policies, it is at least plausible to assume that the corporate entity was responsible for them. Accordingly, Wellpath's Motion to Dismiss should be denied.
C. Ronan
Finally, Ronan asserts that the claims against her should be dismissed, but the basis for this request is also unclear. Although each Wellpath Defendant seeks dismissal, they concede that “plaintiff did include specific allegations against . . . Ronan[.]” Mot. Dismiss 4. Further, Ronan does not argue how the specific allegations against her are insufficient under § 1983. Accordingly, Ronan's Motion to Dismiss should be denied.
III. Dismissed Without Prejudice
Shah and Weigand assert that the claims against them should be dismissed with prejudice. Defs.' Reply 4-5, ECF 50. In asserting that dismissal with prejudice is appropriate, they rely on this Court's prior Order of dismissal and the length of time this proceeding (and a related proceeding) has been pending. Id. The Court finds these facts do not justify a dismissal with prejudice at this stage of the proceedings.
Under Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, leave to amend should be freely granted “when justice so requires,” bearing in mind that “the underlying purpose of Rule 15 [is] to facilitate decision on the merits, rather than on the pleadings or technicalities.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quotations and alteration omitted). Accordingly, leave to amend should generally be given unless it would unduly prejudice the opposing party, cause undue delay, or be futile, or if the moving party has acted in bad faith. Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ'g, 512 F.3d 522, 532 (9th Cir. 2008). At the same time, a court is justified in denying leave to amend when a plaintiff “repeated[ly] fail[s] to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed.” See Carvalho v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 892 (9th Cir. 2010). Indeed, a “district court's discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad where plaintiff has previously amended the complaint.” Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1058 (9th Cir. 2011) (quotations omitted).
Dismissal with prejudice is not appropriate at this stage of the proceedings. This Court is mindful that Plaintiff was granted leave to amend and has failed to cure the deficiencies in her claims against Shah and Weigand. However, it is not clear that further amendments would be futile because Plaintiff may be able to cure the deficiencies in her Complaint. Plaintiff may be able to identify specific “administrative decisions and failures” that Shah or Weigand “had direct responsibility over” that resulted in the constitutional injury to Derby. See Pl.'s Resp. 4, ECF 46. Plaintiff also may be able to proceed with claims against Shah and Weigand in their official capacities-an issue neither party addressed. See supra note 2. Moreover, allowing Plaintiff this opportunity to replead would not prejudice defendants or delay this proceeding, which is still in the discovery phase. Thus, leave to amend should be granted “to facilitate decision on the merits, rather than on the pleadings or technicalities.” Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127.
IV. Timely Service of Weigand.
Weigand also asserts that the claims against her should be dismissed because Plaintiff failed to serve her within the time provided in Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m). Mot. Dismiss 4-5. As Weigand acknowledges, Rule 4(m) permits a district court “to grant an extension even in absence of good cause,” however, “no court has ruled that the discretion is limitless.” Efaw v. Williams, 473 F.3d 1038, 1040-41 (9th Cir. 2007). This Court granted Plaintiff an extension to serve Weigand. ECF 33. The Court allowed this extension due to confusion as to whether Weigand had previously appeared and moved to dismiss, see Notice of Clarification, ECF 27, and because any delay in service was inadvertent. Plaintiff then served Weigand within that extended time. Accordingly, this service was timely.
RECOMMENDATION
Wellpath Defendants' motion should be GRANTED as to Shah and Weigand and DENIED as to Wellpath and Ronan. Further, the claims against Shah and Weigand should be dismissed without prejudice, so Plaintiff can replead. Weigand's Motion to Dismiss based on untimely service should be DENIED.
SCHEDULING ORDER
The Findings and Recommendation will be referred to a district judge. Objections, if any, are due fourteen (14) days from service of the Findings and Recommendation. If no objections are filed, then the Findings and Recommendation will go under advisement on that date.
A party's failure to timely file objections to any of these findings will be considered a waiver of that party's right to de novo consideration of the factual issues addressed herein and will constitute a waiver of the party's right to review of the findings of fact in any order or judgment entered by a district judge. These Findings and Recommendation are not immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure should not be filed until entry of judgment.