Deras v. Myers

111 Citing cases

  1. Northwestern Pac. Indem. v. Canutt

    570 P.2d 1182 (Or. 1977)   Cited 7 times
    Noting that this court has exercised its power under Deras "very sparingly"

    We first note that we have exercised such discretion very sparingly. See, for example, Deras v. Myers, 272 Or. 47, 535 P.2d 541 (1975). In any event, our holding that this is an action at law disposes of that contention.

  2. Swett v. Bradbury

    335 Or. 378 (Or. 2003)   Cited 27 times
    Discussing the standards for awarding fees under Deras

    Plaintiffs do not claim a right to attorney fees under either of those sources of law. Instead, plaintiffs assert that they are entitled to an award of attorney fees under the rationale for such awards described in Deras v. Myers, 272 Or. 47, 66-67, 535 P.2d 541 (1975), and most recently explained by this court in Armatta v. Kitzhaber, 327 Or. 250, 287-88, 959 P.2d 49 (1998). See alsoLehman v. Bradbury, 334 Or. 579, 583, 54 P.3d 591 (2002) (applying Armatta criteria for such awards).

  3. Crandon Capital Partners v. Shelk

    342 Or. 555 (Or. 2007)   Cited 16 times
    Distinguishing substantial benefit attorney fee claims from fee claims under Deras or under statutory provisions requiring that the plaintiff be a "prevailing party"

    Defendant, like the Court of Appeals, reads Kay to mean that, if the merits of a case become moot before a judgment is entered, any dispute over attorney fees also is moot. Plaintiffs, however, argue that Kay does not foreclose their claim for fees because the legal grounds for the fee request in Kay required that the plaintiffs obtain a judgment in their favor on the merits, while the basis for plaintiffs' fee claim here — the substantial benefit theory — includes no such requirement. Plaintiffs note that the fee request in Kay was based on (1) a court's equitable authority to award fees when a plaintiff has vindicated important constitutional rights on behalf of the public, as this court articulated in Deras v. Myers, 272 Or 47, 535 P2d 541 (1975), and (2) 42 USC section 1988, which authorizes the award of fees to a plaintiff who brings a successful civil rights claim under 42 USC section 1983. Kay, 303 Or at 578 n 2 (describing those two grounds for plaintiffs' fee request). Plaintiffs assert that a party may recover fees under those two theories only if the party obtains a favorable judgment on the merits.

  4. Samuel v. Frohnmayer

    779 P.2d 1028 (Or. 1990)   Cited 19 times
    Holding that an award of attorney fees under Deras was not appropriate

    In Van Gordon v. Ore. State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 63 Or. App. 561, 568, 666 P.2d 276 (1983), we noted that `fairness' is a factor that we consider in deciding whether to assess attorney fees against a state agency pursuant to ORS 183.495, when that agency misconstrues a statute. Whether an award is proper requires a case by case consideration and depends on many factors, including benefit to the public at large, see Deras v. Myers, 272 Or. 47, 535 P.2d 541 (1975), and the reasonableness of the Attorney General's refusal to defend. See ORS 28.120 and ORS 182.090.

  5. Tanner v. Oregon Health Sciences University

    161 Or. App. 129 (Or. Ct. App. 1999)   Cited 9 times
    In Tanner v. Oregon Health Sciences University, 980 P.2d 186, 189 (Or. Ct. App. 1999), review denied, 994 P.2d 129 (Or. 1999), Oregon's Court of Appeals explained that, to obtain an award of attorneys' fees under the Supreme Court of Oregon's decision in Deras v. Myers, 535 P.2d 541 (Or. 1975), three conditions must be satisfied: (1) the proceeding must be one in equity; (2) the requesting party must have prevailed; and (3) the requesting party must have been seeking to vindicate an important constitutional right applying to all citizens without any gain peculiar to the party.

    LANDAU, J. Plaintiffs, the prevailing parties in Tanner v. OHSU, 157 Or. App. 502, 971 P.2d 435 (1998), petition for an award of attorney fees of $125,677.50. They contend that they are entitled to an award either under ORS 20.107 or under Deras v. Meyers, 272 Or. 47, 535 P.2d 541 (1975). The amount of their request is based on the number of hours of work performed by counsel multiplied by a rate of $325 per hour, which represents counsel's ordinary noncontingent hourly rate of $162.50 per hour, increased by a factor of two to reflect the complexity of the case and the extraordinary results that counsel obtained.

  6. Umrein v. Heimbigner

    53 Or. App. 871 (Or. Ct. App. 1981)   Cited 8 times
    In Umrein, we applied the Deras principle to plaintiffs who had brought a successful action to compel officers of the city of Beaverton to file and certify initiative petitions.

    We commence with the following propositions: Courts of equity have inherent power to award attorney fees, even absent a statutory or contractual provision so providing, Gilbert v. Hoisting Port. Engrs., 237 Or. 130, 138, 384 P.2d 136, 139, 390 P.2d 320 (1963), cert denied 376 U.S. 963 (1964), and "this power has frequently been exercised in cases where plaintiff brings suit in a representative capacity and succeeds in protecting the rights of others as much as his own"; a plaintiff should not be required to bear the entire cost of litigation when the benefits flow equally to all members of the public. Deras v. Myers, 272 Or. 47, 66, 535 P.2d 541 (1975); Williams v. City of Astoria, supra. The trial court's decision whether to award attorney fees in such a situation is discretionary.

  7. Marbet v. Portland Gen. Elect

    25 Or. App. 469 (Or. Ct. App. 1976)   Cited 6 times
    In Marbet v. Portland Gen. Elect., 25 Or. App. 469, 488, 550 P.2d 465 (1976), rev'd on other grounds 277 Or. 447, 561 P.2d 154 (1977), which involved no constitutional issues, we denied fees based on our observation that the Oregon Supreme Court had employed the Deras rule "only in cases of constitutional significance."

    The record does not reflect an abuse of discretion or support a conclusion that the ruling was clearly erroneous. Intervenors claim a right to attorney fees for prosecuting this appeal, relying upon Deras v. Myers, 272 Or. 47, 535 P.2d 541 (1975). Their reliance is misplaced.

  8. Armatta v. Kitzhaber

    327 Or. 250 (Or. 1998)   Cited 96 times
    Holding that provision prescribing juror qualifications "limit[ed] the legislature's ability to establish juror qualifications in criminal cases"

    10. Finally, the state assigns error to the circuit court's decision to award plaintiffs attorney fees in the amount of $23,667.50. In the state's view, plaintiffs have individualized interests in the outcome of this case that make attorney fees inappropriate under Deras v. Myers, 272 Or. 47, 65-67, 535 P.2d 541 (1975), and Vannatta v. Keisling, 324 Or. 514, 548-49, 931 P.2d 770 (1997). The state further disputes whether, in filing this action, plaintiffs sought to benefit the rights of all Oregonians.

  9. Lehman v. Bradbury

    334 Or. 579 (Or. 2002)   Cited 8 times
    Discussing sources of judicial authority to award attorney fees

    Instead of such authority, plaintiffs rely on this court's inherent power, as a court of equity, to award attorney fees on appeal in appropriate cases. See Deras v. Myers, 272 Or. 47, 535 P.2d 541 (1975) (explaining and exercising that authority). Plaintiffs argue that, like the plaintiff in Deras, they are entitled to such an award because, as described in the Deras opinion, they brought their action "in a representative capacity" and "succeed[ed] in protecting the rights of others as much as [their] own."

  10. Atiyeh v. State of Oregon

    956 P.2d 177 (Or. 1998)   Cited 4 times
    In Atiyeh, the court then determined that the appeal on the merits had become moot. 326 Or. at 535, 956 P.2d 177. The court nonetheless reversed the award of attorney fees, explaining that, because the state could not challenge the correctness of the underlying judgment, it was inequitable to allow the award of attorney fees to stand.

    This is a case in which the sole issue before us is the propriety of a trial court's award of attorney fees to plaintiffs. The award was made under the trial court's inherent equitable authority, as described by this court in Deras v. Myers, 272 Or. 47, 535 P.2d 541 (1975). We hold that, under the procedural circumstances present here, the award was inappropriate.