As Judge Mark noted in In re Hernandez, the Homestead Exemption found in Article X of the Florida Constitution only provides one benefit—it shields the home from forced judicial sale. 2008 WL 1711528, at *4. While there is a homestead tax exemption in the Florida Constitution, that provision is found in Article VII, not Article X. See id.; DeQuervain v. Desguin, 927 So.2d 232, 233 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (analyzing the requirements for a "homestead" for purposes of the constitutional homestead tax exemption found in Article VII, section 6(a) of the Florida Constitution). The general benefits of owning a home are also irrelevant to this analysis.
Crain v. Putnam, 687 So. 2d 1325, 1326 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) ; see also Phillips v. Hirshon, 958 So. 2d 425, 427 n.3 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) ("It is well appreciated in the case law concerning homestead that the definition of homestead property for Article VII, section 6 purposes is not the same as Article X, section 4 of the Florida Constitution."). Indeed, while the protections afforded by the homestead exemption in article X are liberally construed, see Taylor v. Maness, 941 So. 2d 559, 562 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006), the homestead exemption in article VII is strictly construed against the taxpayer, see Grisolia v. Pfeffer, 77 So. 3d 732, 736 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) ("The strict construction applicable to the Tax Exemption stands in contrast to the liberal construction of the homestead exemption from forced sale at issue here."); see also DeQuervain v. Desguin, 927 So. 2d 232, 236 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) ("[B]ecause the homestead exemption provides relief from an ad valorem tax, we must construe the statute strictly against [the taxpayer]."). The constitutional provision providing for a tax exemption for homestead property is found in article VII of the Florida Constitution.
Id. at 81. Likewise, in DeQuervain v. Desguin, 927 So.2d 232 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006), the court found that homeowners who held only temporary visas “could not form the requisite intent to become permanent residents for purposes of the [Tax Exemption].” Id. at 233.
It is undisputed that David and Ana Andonie are legally incapable of qualifying as "permanent residents" of Miami-Dade County. See Juarrero v. McNayr, 157 So.2d 79, 81 (Fla. 1963) (finding that a non-citizen present in the United States under a temporary visa "cannot 'legally,' 'rightfully' or in 'good faith' make or declare [himself]" a "permanent resident" of this state for purposes of article VII, section 6(a)); DeQuervain v. Desguin, 927 So.2d 232, 235 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006); Alcime v. Bystrom, 451 So.2d 1037, 1037 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). The Miami-Dade County Property Appraiser administratively denied the application, but that decision was overturned upon petition by the Andonies to the Miami-Dade County Value Adjustment Board.
The Property Appraiser further argues that the statute must be strictly construed against the taxpayer where "the homestead exemption provides relief from an ad valorem tax." DeQuervain v. Desguin, 927 So.2d 232, 236 (Fia. 2d DCA 2006). While we agree with this premise, we note that "[w]here the statute's language is clear or unambiguous, courts need not employ principles of statutory construction to determine and effectuate legislative intent."
Because the statute at issue involves a property owner's eligibility for homestead tax exemption, we note at the outset that statutes involving tax exemptions are strictly construed against the taxpayer. DeQuervain v. Desguin, 927 So.2d 232, 236 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (citing Capital City Country Club, Inc. v. Tucker, 613 So.2d 448, 452 (Fla. 1993)). In construing section 196.061, we first consider its plain meaning.
The meaning of "resident" is generally dependent upon the purposes and goals of the statute in which the term is used. The courts, however, have generally stated that a person is a resident if he or she lives in a place and has no present intention of leaving. 927 So. 2d 232 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2006). And see Juarrero v. McNayr, 157 So. 2d 79, 81 (Fla. 1963) (alien residing in the United States with a temporary visa "does not have the legal ability to determine for himself his future status and does not have the ability legally to convert a temporary residence into a permanent home" for purposes of homestead exemption).
We conclude, as did the Third District in Nicolas and Perez, that Cooke and Juarrero are distinguishable and based upon considerations not present here. Like the Third District, we conclude that a person's nonimmigrant status does not bar his or her ability to establish residency under section 61.021, although that status may be a factor in determining whether the person has a bona fide intent to remain in the state indefinitely. See also DeQuervain v. Desguin, 927 So.2d 232 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006). In 1963, the Florida Supreme Court decided Juarrero.