Opinion
March 8, 1996
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Monroe County, Cornelius, J.
Present — Lawton, J.P., Fallon, Doerr, Balio and Davis, JJ.
Order unanimously modified on the law and as modified affirmed without costs in accordance with the following Memorandum: Supreme Court should have granted in part defendants' cross motions for summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law § 240 (1) cause of action. David E. DePuy (plaintiff), an employee of Opico Interior Contractors, Ltd., was injured while removing cabinets from a truck owned by defendant Coleman's Van Storage, Ltd. (Coleman's). The driver had opened the rear of the truck and placed ramps from the truck bed to the pavement of the parking lot so that the cabinets could be removed from the truck. One of the ramps collapsed while plaintiff was removing a cabinet, causing plaintiff to fall approximately three or four feet to the pavement. That fall "`is not the kind of fall from an elevated work site intended to be covered by' [Labor Law § 240 (1)]" ( Colopy v William C. McCombs, Inc., 203 A.D.2d 920, 921, quoting Cipolla v Flickinger Co., 172 A.D.2d 1064, 1065). Plaintiff's activities did not involve "the extraordinary elevation risks" envisioned by the statute ( Rodriguez v Tietz Ctr. for Nursing Care, 84 N.Y.2d 841, 844).
Additionally, that part of the cross motion of defendants Mackies Van Storage, Ltd., Coleman's and North American Van Lines for summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law § 240 (1) cause of action should have been granted because they were subcontractors with no authority to direct, supervise or control plaintiff's work ( see, Russin v Picciano Son, 54 N.Y.2d 311, 316-318; Terranova v City of New York, 197 A.D.2d 402; Smith v Cassadaga Val. Cent. School Dist., 178 A.D.2d 955, 956-957). The fact that Coleman's owned the ramps and its employee placed them does not, by itself, establish supervision and control of plaintiff's work ( see, Terranova v City of New York, supra, at 403; Smith v Cassadaga Val. Cent. School Dist., supra, at 956-957).
The court, however, properly denied that part of the cross motion of defendant Sibley, Lindsay Curr Company, Inc. (Sibley) for summary judgment on common-law indemnification against the remaining defendants. The submissions by Sibley fail to establish as a matter of law that plaintiff's injuries were solely the result of the negligence of those defendants ( see generally, Gillmore v Duke/Fluor Daniel, 221 A.D.2d 938). Consequently, we modify the order on appeal by granting that part of defendants' cross motions seeking summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs' second cause of action.