Summary
granting transfer to district where both plaintiff and her treating doctors were located
Summary of this case from Bohara v. Backus Hosp. Medical Benefit PlanOpinion
NO. C02-2010 TEH
November 21, 2002
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS AND GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR TRANSFER OF VENUE
This matter came before the Court on November 4, 2002, on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or, in the alternative, for Transfer of Venue. After hearing oral argument and considering the parties' written submissions, the Court DENIES Defendants' motion to dismiss and GRANTS Defendants' motion for transfer of venue. The Court further orders that this case be transferred to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This is an Employee Retirement Income Savings Act ("ERISA") action arising out of Plaintiff Gail Deputy's claim for disability benefits under the Disability Plan of her employer, Aventis Pharmaceuticals ("Aventis"). The Disability Plan is administered and insured by Defendant UNUM Life Insurance Company of America ("UNUM").
Plaintiff was employed by Rhone-Poulec Rorer Pharmaceuticals, Inc., now known as Aventis, between 1980 and 2000. She occupied various job positions and was fully vested in all employee benefits. In 2000 she was diagnosed with fibromyalgia syndrome, myofascial pain syndrome, and chronic fatigue immune deficiency syndrome. As a result of these syndromes, she seeks disability benefits. Plaintiff resides in or near Dallas, Texas. Her counsel is located in San Diego, California.
Plaintiff claims she was unable to find competent counsel in Texas.
Defendant UNUM is a national insurance company employing approximately 13,000 individuals. It is headquartered in Maine, and important decisions regarding Plaintiff's disability benefits were made by UNUM personnel in that state. Other decisions appear to have been made by UNUM personnel in Massachusetts. No decisions related to Plaintiff's disability plan were made in this District. UNUM has extensive contacts with this District, including an office in Walnut Creek, California. BenefitAmerica, a member of the UNUM "family of companies," is headquartered in Mountain View, California. Defendant Long-Term Disability Plan of Sponsor Aventis Pharmaceuticals, Inc. ("Disability Plan") is located in New Jersey. Pennsylvania law governs the Disability Plan.
Aventis, which has not been named as a defendant in this case, is a Delaware corporation headquartered in New Jersey. It is a national corporation with over ten thousand employees in the United States and Puerto Rico. Approximately 112 of these employees are located in Northern California and, presumably, some or all are covered by the Disability Plan.
LEGAL STANDARD
Dismissal for Improper Venue
When venue in a particular judicial district is improper, the court "shall dismiss, or if it be in the interests of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1406 (a). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3) provides for the dismissal of an action for improper venue. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(3). Once a defendant has raised an objection to venue, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the venue he selected is proper. Bartholomew v. Virginia Chiropractors Association, 612 F.2d 812, 816 (4th Cir. 1979). See also 5A Wright Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1352 (1990) (stating that placing the burden on the plaintiff "seems correct inasmuch as it is plaintiffs obligation to institute his action in a permissible forum, both in terms of jurisdiction and venue"). Objections to venue may be waived if not timely filed or if not included in the first responsive pleading or motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules. 28 U.S.C. § 1406 (b); Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(g)-(h); see Stjerholm v. Peterson, 83 F.3d 347, 349 (10th Cir. 1996).
A determination of improper venue does not go to the merits of the case, and therefore must be without prejudice. In re Hall, 939 F.2d 802, 804 (9th Cir. 1991). Orders respecting venue are interlocutory in nature and cannot be appealed prior to final judgment. Pacific Car Foundry Co. v. Pence, 403 F.2d 949, 951 (9th Cir. 1968).
Discretionary Transfer
If it serves the convenience of the parties and witnesses, and if it is consistent with the interests of justice, a court may, in its discretion, transfer an action to any district where the case could have originally been filed. 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (a). The moving party bears the burden of showing that jurisdiction and proper venue would exist in the district to which a transfer is requested. Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Savage, 611 F.2d 270, 278-279 (9th Cir. 1979). The decision of whether to transfer "involves subtle considerations and is best left to the discretion of the trial judge." Id. at 279. The district court has broad discretion to consider case-specific circumstances. Chrysler Credit Corp. v. County Chrysler, Inc., 928 F.2d 1509, 1516 (10th Cir. 1991).
In ruling on a motion to transfer, a district court must consider each of the factors enumerated in § 1404(a): convenience of the parties, convenience of the witnesses, and the interests of justice. Los Angeles v. National Football League, 89 F.R.D. 497, 499 (C.D. Cal. 1981), aff'd, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984). The Court may also apply some of the traditional forum non conveniens factors, as § 1404(a) was intended to enlarge, not simply codify, the doctrine of forum non conveniens. 15 Wright, Miller Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 3847 at 372 (1986). These additional factors include: (1) the plaintiffs choice of forum; (2) the relative ease of access to proof; (3) the availability of compulsory process for unwilling witnesses and the cost involved in securing willing witnesses; (4) the practical problems that make a case easier or more difficult to try in a given forum; and (5) the local interest in the issue. Decker Coal Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 805 F.2d 834, 843 (9th Cir. 1986). The defendant has the burden of demonstrating that these factors warrant transfer in a particular case.Id.
DISCUSSION
Defendants make two arguments in their motion to dismiss or transfer. First, they argue that because venue in this district is improper under the relevant ERISA provisions, this case should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3). Second, Defendants contend that the convenience of the and witnesses and the interests of justice will be better served by transferring this case to another district. The Court will address each of these arguments in turn.
Venue Under ERISA
The ERISA venue provisions are expansive. An action "may be brought in the district where the plan is administered, where the breach took place, or where a defendant resides or may be found." 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (e)(2).
Under ERISA's liberal venue provisions, the Court finds that venue in this case is proper within the Northern District of California. Defendant UNUM had and has "substantial" and "continuous and systematic" contacts with this District. These contacts are more than sufficient to satisfy the requirements for personal jurisdiction. Data Disc, Inc. v. stems Technology Assocs., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1287 (9th Cir. 1977); Varsic v. U.S. District Ct., 607 F.2d 245, 249 (9th Cir. 1979). UNUM is "found" within this District because personal jurisdiction is properly asserted over it. Varsic, 607 F.2d at 248. Venue is proper in a district in which "a" defendant in an ERISA action is "found." 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (e)(2).
This conclusion is reached independent of the UNUM job posting documents that Plaintiff's counsel provided to the Court at the hearing on November 4, 2002, but the Court notes that these untimely documents support its conclusion regarding the propriety of venue in this District under the ERISA statute.
Venue is proper in the Northern District, and Defendants' motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(3) is accordingly denied.
Discretionary Transfer
An action in a district court is also subject to the discretionary venue statute. Even if venue is proper in a particular district, a court may, at its discretion, transfer a case "to any other district or division where it might have been brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (a). After evaluating the relevant factors, the Court concludes that a discretionary transfer of this action is appropriate.
Plaintiffs claim is unrelated to the Northern District of California and this District lacks an interest in it. See Chrysler Capital Corp. v. Woehling, 663 F. Supp. 478, 482 (D. Del. 1987). Plaintiff resides in or near Dallas, Texas. Defendant UNUM is headquartered in Maine, and important decisions regarding Plaintiff's disability benefits were made by UNUM personnel there. Other decisions appear to have been made by UNUM personnel in Massachusetts. No such decisions were made in this District. Defendant Disability Plan is located in New Jersey, and Pennsylvania law governs the Plan.
A plaintiffs choice of forum is typically given considerable weight in the venue analysis, but this fact is not significant in this matter, as Plaintiff is not a resident of this District (or even of this Circuit or this state). See Bryant v. ITT Corp., 48 F. Supp.2d 829, 832 (N.D. Ill. 1999); Reiffin v. Microsoft Corp., 104 F. Supp.2d 48, 54, n. 12 (D.D.C. 2000).
None of the parties reside in this District, so arguments for the convenience of parties are unavailing. It is also true that none of the witnesses reside here, so arguments as to their convenience are similarly unavailing. Plaintiff and her treating doctors and other medical professionals are in Texas, and most of the UNUM personnel who evaluated Plaintiff's claim are in Maine. Even if discovery does not involve live testimony and does not go beyond the administrative record (as is typical in ERISA cases), these individuals would have to travel great distances to testify at a trial in this District. Plaintiff has also brought state law claims over which this Court has supplemental jurisdiction, and discovery concerning these causes of action could involve live deposition testimony. The discovery process, if based in California, would inconvenience all witnesses, whereas if the case is transferred to Texas it will inconvenience only the UNUM and Disability Plan witnesses located in Maine, Massachusetts and New Jersey.
Defendants request in their moving papers that this case be transferred to Texas. The Court has taken note of this request and of the fact that Defendants are large corporations with adequate means to transport their witnesses to Texas.
The fact that Plaintiff has named expert witnesses in southern California is not a significant factor in favor of this Court retaining jurisdiction over this matter. First, none of these witnesses reside in this District. Second, the convenience of expert witnesses is given little See Promuto v. Waste Management, Inc., 44 F. Supp.2d 628, 639-640 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
Access to proof will be considerably easier in Texas than in this District, as Plaintiff and her treating doctors and other medical professionals are located in that state. A related issue is the unavailability of compulsory process, which could arise if the case remains in this District. Although Plaintiff's counsel assured the Court that Plaintiff's treating doctors are likely to be cooperative witnesses, he also made it clear that he cannot guarantee their appearance in this District. Transferring this case to Texas will alleviate this concern.
Plaintiff argues that the relative means of the parties are highly disproportionate. While the Court does not disagree with this point, its significance is negated by the fact that Plaintiff chose to litigate in a distant forum. The financial consequences of this decision are of Plaintiff's own creation, as is the economic burden of her retaining counsel in California rather than in Texas.
The Court notes that Plaintiff does not argue that her state law claims are barred, for instance, by the statute of limitations in Texas. Thus, the "interest of justice" will not be disturbed by this transfer. 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (a).
During oral argument, Plaintiff's counsel stated that he filed this case in this District because of "force of habit." Counsel's habits, however, are not considered in the venue analysis. Moreover, counsel's statement does nothing to explain why he chose to file this action in the Northern District when his office is located in the Southern District of California.
For all of the above reasons, the Court concludes that a discretionary transfer of this case from the Northern District of California to the Northern District of Texas will promote the statutory purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (a). Defendants' motion to transfer is accordingly GRANTED.
CONCLUSION
In sum, the Court DENIES Defendants' Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3) and GRANTS Defendants' Motion for Transfer of Venue. The Court orders that this case be transferred to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. The clerk shall close the file.