Dept. of Transportation v. Simon

18 Citing cases

  1. Dept. of Transp. v. Acree Oil Co.

    266 Ga. 336 (Ga. 1996)   Cited 22 times
    In Acree, the Court held that business loss evidence may be relevant to determining the value of the property even though there was no business in operation on the property on the date of the taking.

    This Court in Dept. of Transp. v. Simon, 245 Ga. 478 ( 265 S.E.2d 777) (1980) affirmed the opinion of the Court of Appeals, which recognized that while the possibility a private right-of-way would be sought over the condemnee's property might be a "circumstance" to be considered in arriving at the fair market value of a condemned property, economic harm resulting from that possibility was not a compensable item a condemnee could recover in a condemnation action from a condemnor. Dept. of Transp. v. Simon, 151 Ga. App. 807, 811 ( 261 S.E.2d 710) (1979). Thus, evidence that a delay in a condemnor's project is the result of matters beyond the condemnor's control may be admissible only as a relevant factor an ordinary buyer would take into consideration on the date of the taking when purchasing condemnee's property.

  2. White v. Dep't of Transp.

    806 S.E.2d 860 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017)

    (Emphasis in original.) Dept. of Transp. v. Simon, 151 Ga. App. 807, 810 (1), 261 S.E.2d 710 (1979), quoting Ga. Power Co. v. Bray, 232 Ga. 558, 560, 207 S.E.2d 442 (1974), and citing Southwire Co. v. Dept. of Transp., 147 Ga. App. 606, 607 (1), 249 S.E.2d 650 (1978).Despite his arguments otherwise, White presented no evidence of common ownership of Tract A and Parcel 32. Tract A, although landlocked, is a contiguous parcel for the purposes of condemnation.

  3. Simon v. Department of Transportation

    245 Ga. 478 (Ga. 1980)   Cited 29 times

    DECIDED FEBRUARY 27, 1980. REHEARING DENIED MARCH 18, 1980. Certiorari to the Court of Appeals of Georgia — 151 Ga. App. 807. Patrick J. Rice, for appellant.

  4. Fountain v. Dekalb County

    267 S.E.2d 903 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980)   Cited 14 times

    Pretermitting any issue as to "law of the case" (see Lee v. Warren, 231 Ga. 129 ( 200 S.E.2d 270); Bullock v. Grogan, 141 Ga. App. 40 (1) ( 232 S.E.2d 605)), we again find that the trial court's refusal to consider the counterclaim and exclusion of evidence relating thereto was proper. "`There are only two elements of damages to be considered in a condemnation proceeding: first, the market value of the property actually taken; second, the consequential damages that will naturally and proximately arise to the remainder of the owner's property from the taking of the part which is taken and the devoting of it to the purposes for which it is condemned,... and the measure of these consequential damages is the diminution in the market value of the remainder of the property proximately arising from these causes...'" Dept. of Transportation v. Simon, 151 Ga. App. 807, 810 ( 261 S.E.2d 710). Accord, Reed v. City of Atlanta, 136 Ga. App. 193, 195 ( 220 S.E.2d 492).

  5. Dept. of Transp. v. Taylor

    264 Ga. 18 (Ga. 1994)   Cited 18 times
    Reversing Court of Appeals decision allowing introduction of evidence of inconvenience by landowner whose access to Moreland Avenue in Atlanta was negatively affected by Department of Transportation project that changed circuitry, volume, and flow of traffic, because changes also affected the general public and were not special to the landowner

    damage that will naturally and proximately arise to the remainder of the owner's property from the taking of the part which is taken and the devoting of it to the purposes for which it is condemned, including its proper maintenance and operation, and the measure of these consequential damages is the diminution in the market value of the remainder of the property proximately arising from these causes.Dept. of Transp. v. Simon, 151 Ga. App. 807, 810 ( 261 S.E.2d 710) (1979). Therefore, Taylor's recoverable consequential damages are limited to those damages naturally and proximately arising from the taking of the 0.076-acre tract and devoting it to the public purpose for which it is condemned. Mason v. Dept. of Transp., 159 Ga. App. 471 ( 283 S.E.2d 690) (1981).

  6. Mauldin v. Housing Auth. of the City of Marietta

    477 S.E.2d 317 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996)   Cited 1 times

    And its probative value is further diminished by the fact that the subject of the agreement was nearby property rather than the property at issue in this case. Cf. Dept. of Transp. v. Simon, 151 Ga. App. 807 (3) ( 261 S.E.2d 710) (1979) (distinguishing subject property from nearby property for purpose of analyzing admissibility of unaccepted offers). Accordingly, condemnees' first enumeration of error is without merit.

  7. Acree Oil Co. v. Dept. of Transp

    216 Ga. App. 586 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994)   Cited 4 times

    Both the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court perceived Simon's claim as being a claim for damages "based not only on the `taking' of her property . . . but also in part on the taking of the property of her adjoining landowner." Dept. of Transp. v. Simon, 151 Ga. App. 807, 811 ( 261 S.E.2d 710); see Simon, supra at 479. We have held only that Acree Oil may show any element which affected the value of its property on the date of taking, including that the unusual delay and uncertainty of this project affected the value of the remaining property.

  8. McConnell Drum Service v. DeKalb County

    205 Ga. App. 234 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992)   Cited 2 times

    Plaintiffs argue, however, that the alleged consequential damages do not arise out of the aerial easement at issue in the condemnation action and therefore must be brought in a separate inverse condemnation action. See Fountain v. DeKalb County, 154 Ga. App. 302 (1) ( 267 S.E.2d 903) (1980); Department of Transp. v. Simon, 151 Ga. App. 807, 810-811 ( 261 S.E.2d 710), aff'd, 245 Ga. 478 ( 265 S.E.2d 777) (1980). In fact, such a separate action for inverse condemnation has been brought by the defendants and, at the time judgment was rendered in this condemnation case, the action was still pending in the trial court, alleging not only consequential damages for loss of access to the adjoining railroad line but also pre-condemnation damages for the denial of the building permit, which were dismissed earlier from this action.

  9. Cox Communications, Inc. v. Department of Transportation

    178 Ga. App. 499 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986)   Cited 7 times

    "`There are only two elements of damages to be considered in a condemnation proceeding: first, the market value of the property actually taken; second, the consequential damage that will naturally and proximately arise to the remainder of the owner's property from the taking of the part which is taken and the devoting of it to the purposes for which it is condemned. . . .' [Cit.] Consideration of damages which arise from devoting the part of the land taken to the use for which it was taken is not the same as consideration of damages which arise from the entire `project.' " Simon v. Dept. of Transp., 245 Ga. 478 ( 265 S.E.2d 777) (1980), affirming 151 Ga. App. 807 ( 261 S.E.2d 710) (1979). See also Riviera Assoc. v. Dept. of Transp., 174 Ga. App. 29, 30 ( 329 S.E.2d 221) (1985); Fountain v. DeKalb County, 154 Ga. App. 302 ( 267 S.E.2d 903) (1980).

  10. Herron v. Marta

    177 Ga. App. 201 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985)   Cited 6 times

    Fountain v. Dekalb County, 154 Ga. App. 302, 303 ( 267 S.E.2d 903) (1980). See also Department of Transp. v. Simon, 151 Ga. App. 807 ( 261 S.E.2d 710) (1979), aff'd 245 Ga. 478 ( 265 S.E.2d 777) (1980). The expert witness acknowledged on cross-examination that his testimony regarding consequential damages was not predicated upon the taking of the three easements as to appellant's property but upon the ultimate proximity of the entire project to appellant's home.