Opinion
D082468
03-11-2024
In re C.A. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. v. J.A., Defendant and Appellant. DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES OF IMPERIAL COUNTY, Plaintiff and Respondent,
Valerie N. Lankford, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Eric R. Havens, County Counsel and Kyle C. Weber, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Imperial County, Super. Ct. Nos. JJP000872/873 Marco D. Nunez, Judge. Affirmed.
Valerie N. Lankford, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Eric R. Havens, County Counsel and Kyle C. Weber, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
DATO, Acting P. J.
J.A. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court's July 2023 order terminating parental rights to her six-year-old daughter C.A. and her four-year-old son P.A. (collectively, the Children). Mother contends the court erred in finding the parental-benefit exception to the statutory preference for adoption did not apply. (See Welf. &Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) She claims the evidence of her relationship with the Children compels a finding the Children would suffer detriment if severed. She further claims the court, in the "complex task" of weighing the benefits and burdens of continuing the natural parental relationship (see In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 634 (Caden C.)), erroneously compared her attributes as custodial caregiver to those of the prospective adoptive parents. She therefore seeks reversal of the July 2023 order and the less permanent plan of legal guardianship for the Children.
All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the juvenile court's order, we conclude substantial evidence supports the finding the Children repeatedly exhibited regressive behaviors after visits with Mother. This evidence, and the inferences to be drawn from it, also supports the finding the Children would not be deprived of a substantial, positive emotional attachment if the parental relationship was severed.
We also conclude the juvenile court acted within the bounds of its legal discretion when, in weighing the benefit of a permanent plan of adoption against any purported detriment to the Children from severance of the parental relationship, it found the Children were bonded to their prospective adoptive parents and thriving in that placement. We therefore affirm the July 2023 order terminating Mother's parental rights.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Events Leading Up to Detention
In late September 2020, respondent Department of Social Services of Imperial County (Department) received a report that the Children were at risk because the family home was unsafe, they were not being properly cared for and supervised, and Mother and presumed father Patrick A. (Father)(collectively, Parents) were engaging in illicit activity in the Children's presence. A Department social worker accompanied by law enforcement contacted the family at their residence. Mother denied the report, refused to allow the social worker and officer access to the inside of the home, but agreed to submit to drug testing, including for the Children. Mother and the Children subsequently failed to appear for their tests.
Mother acknowledged and Father confirmed he was the biological father of the Children. Father is not a party in this appeal.
The Department in early November 2020 received a report that the Children were being cared for by the maternal grandmother in a home that was in a "hazardous" condition, and that the Children were "filthy." A Department social worker and law enforcement contacted Mother and the Children at the maternal grandmother's home. Mother claimed the family lived nearby in a separate residence, and agreed to allow the social worker to assess that home.
During this contact, the social worker noticed C.A. walked "with her legs open to prevent her thighs from touching." The social worker observed C.A. wore a sagging diaper and had a "severe" rash on her inner thigh, which appeared "infected, displayed redness, minor bleeding, and scabbing." She also observed the Children were "severely unkempt and exhibited layers of grunge on their soles of their feet, dirt stains on their legs and arms, and matted hair."
The social worker found the inside of the family home in a "deplorable and unsanitary condition." Mother declined to be interviewed. When the social worker asked Mother to open her bedroom door, she refused and became agitated. There was no fresh food for the Children to eat. The social worker informed Mother that the Department would be taking the Children into protective custody. The Children were removed from Parents' care, medically evaluated, and admitted to a local receiving home.
Both Mother and Father denied having any criminal or mental health history. Mother admitted past use of methamphetamine, but claimed she had been sober for about five years. They both agreed to take a drug test, but Mother refused the Department's request to test the Children.
Mother disclosed that C.A. was diagnosed with autism when she was three years old, "display[ed] developmental delays, and [was] not potty-trained." She did not believe, however, that C.A. needed any "professional services." Mother added that, although P.A. had not been officially diagnosed, she believed he also was autistic.
Mother's legal history showed she failed to reunify with the Children's two half-siblings, both of whom were subject to dependency and adopted in separate proceedings in 2016. The Department also received multiple referrals concerning the Children for neglect.
B. The Petition, Detention, and Jurisdiction
In early November 2020 the Department filed a petition on behalf of the Children under section 300, subdivision (b)(1) (Petition). It alleged the Children have suffered, or there is a substantial risk they will suffer, "serious physical harm or illness" as a result of the Parents' (1) "failure or inability . . . to supervise or protect the child[ren] adequately"; (2) "willful or negligent failure . . . to supervise or protect the child[ren] adequately"; and (3) "willful or negligent failure . . . to provide the child[ren] with adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment." At the detention hearing, the juvenile court found the Children came within section 300, subdivision (b)(1), removed them from Parents' custody, and placed them in the temporary care and control of the Department. The court also ordered Parents to submit to random drug testing, and the Department to provide reasonable visitation.
The Department's jurisdiction report recommended the juvenile court find the Children to be persons described in section 300, subdivision (b). It noted that Mother continued to refuse to drug test, including via hair strand.
During an interview with a Department social worker, Mother disputed the family home was in an unsafe condition when the Children were removed. She also claimed C.A.'s "severe rash" had started just two days before her removal, and was the result of C.A. urinating on herself "due to autism."
A day after their removal, the Children completed toxicology screening via hair strand analysis and both tested positive for methamphetamine. Father completed a toxicology screening via urinalysis and was positive for methamphetamine, amphetamine, and marijuana. Mother denied that she, Father, or the maternal grandmother exposed the Children to methamphetamine. In the Department's view, Mother was in denial and demonstrated little willingness to change.
At the contested jurisdiction hearing, the juvenile court found the allegations in the Petition true.
C. Disposition
In its February 2021 disposition report, the Department recommended that the Children be declared dependents of the juvenile court, and that Parents receive reunification services. It noted that since the court took jurisdiction over the Children in late January 2021, Mother had declined to participate in parenting classes, an outpatient substance abuse program, mental health services, and drug testing. The Department concluded the Children remained in "substantial danger to the[ir] physical health, safety, protection or physical or emotional wellbeing" if returned to Parents' care.
The Department reported Mother participated in weekly remote visits that the Children appeared to "enthusiastically enjoy." It commended her for engaging the Children in a "loving manner" during visits, and recommended continued supervised visits.
At the contested disposition hearing, the juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that it would be detrimental to place the Children in the physical custody of Parents, and therefore that it was necessary to remove them pursuant to section 361, subdivision (c).
D. Six-Month Review
The Department's September 2021 status review report recommended termination of Parents' reunification services. It assessed the risk of returning the Children to Parents' care as "very high," noting they lacked insight into the issues that led to dependency and had made little if any effort to complete their case plans. As to Mother, it was the Department's view that she had not met her service objectives including (1) staying free from illegal drugs and compliance with all required drug tests; (2) maintaining a stable and suitable residence for herself and the Children; and (3) complying with all court orders. During this reporting period, Mother continued to have appropriate, weekly supervised visits with the Children that they appeared to enjoy.
As of May 2021, Mother still had not submitted to court-ordered drug testing. Thereafter, she was a no-show for testing on numerous dates in July and August 2021. It appears Mother never drug tested during dependency, despite court orders and multiple requests by the Department that she do so.
The juvenile court terminated Parents' reunification services at the sixmonth review hearing after finding their progress in such services was "insufficient." The court also found there was clear and convincing evidence that the return of the Children to Parents' care would create a "substantial risk" of detriment to the Children's physical and emotional well-being, and that it was in the Children's best interest to set a section 366.26 hearing to select and implement a permanent plan.
E. Section 366.26 Report and Follow-up Reports
In its January 2022 section 366.26 report, the Department recommended a long-term plan of placement for the Children with a fit and willing relative, if and when identified.
Regarding C.A., she was receiving speech services and was a client of Imperial County Behavioral Health Services-Mental Health Services (MHS), where she was diagnosed with "Adjustment Disorder with a Disturbance of Conduct." During emotional outbursts, C.A.'s behavior included "hitting, kicking, biting, and yelling." It was also reported that C.A. wets the bed at night after visits with Mother.
As to P.A., he was in services due to "developmental delays," receiving therapy three times a week for two hours per day, and was set to receive speech therapy services as he presented with a "significant delay in communication." Like C.A., he was a client of MHS and also diagnosed with "Adjustment Disorder with a Disturbance of Conduct," exhibiting behaviors such as "hitting, kicking, biting, yelling, and spitting" during emotional outbursts.
In early January 2022 the Children were placed in the foster home of Lisa B. and Fredrik P., their current caregivers and the Children's prospective adoptive parents (Caregivers). This was the Children's sixth placement during dependency.
Mother continued to have supervised visits with the Children. The Department noted they "usually appear very excited to see [her] during visitation," and that C.A. appeared to have a "strong bond towards [Mother]." However, it was also reported that during the month of December 2021, C.A. wet her bed after visits with Mother.
At the January 2022 hearing, the juvenile court adopted the findings and proposed order contained in the Department's section 366.26 report and set a permanency review hearing.
In its March 2022 status review report, the Department recommended the Children remain placed with the Caregivers with the goal of adoption. It reported that the Children were "developing a strong bond" with their Caregivers, were receiving appropriate services to help meet their special needs, and had shown progress in reducing their regressive behaviors.
C.A.'s behavior had shown "great improvement" during the reporting period. Shortly after this placement, she had daily, "high intensity" temper tantrums that would last up to an hour. However, as time went on her tantrums were less frequent, as were their duration and intensity. C.A. expressed "loving" her new home and her Caregivers.
P.A. continued to suffer a delay in communication, although he now was able to say two- and three-word sentences. The Caregivers were seeking in-person speech services. After settling into his new placement, P.A.'s behavior was "gradually . . . improv[ing]."
Just before a visit with Mother on January 21, 2022, C.A. stated she was "very itchy." C.A.'s scratching caused her arms and cheeks to become red with some "small abrasions." A Department social worker ended the visit early. On the ride home, C.A. confided that she was no longer itchy, adding," 'I got itchy when I saw my mom.'" After this visit, the Caregivers reported the Children displayed regressive behaviors for "days." As a result, the Department reduced Mother's visits with the Children to one hour every other week.
In February 2022, Mother invited" 'family friends'" from Arkansas to accompany her on a visit with the Children. Afterwards, C.A. informed her Caregivers that during the visit, Mother said C.A. would be moving to Arkansas to live with Mother's friends and Mother. C.A. "expressed worry and sadness" about the move, and her Caregivers reported that after this visit the Children displayed negative behaviors for "many days" including "separation anxiety, worry, temper tantrums, clinginess, teeth grinding, difficulty sleeping, and [C.A.] urinating her clothes[.]"
The Department's reports in late 2022 and early 2023 continued to recommend termination of parental rights and adoption as the permanent plan for the Children.
The Department's September 1, 2022 status review report noted that visitation between Mother and the Children had been reduced to one hour per month at the recommendation of C.A.'s psychiatrist, in an attempt to minimize her regressive behavior following visits with Mother.
At an October 2022 hearing, at Mother's request the juvenile court ordered a bonding study. The court continued the section 366.26 hearing multiple times due to Mother's difficulty in locating an expert to perform the study.
In its February 10, 2023 report, the Department noted the Children "become physically aggressive with the caregivers and have behavioral outburst[s] and nightmares" after visits with Mother. Following an October 27, 2022 visit, C.A. began scratching, pinching, and biting one of her Caregivers, then kicked her Caregiver in the stomach. C.A. also became physical with P.A. On November 29, C.A. urinated on herself at school following a visit with Mother. In mid-January 2023, C.A. had a temper tantrum that lasted for about 45 minutes when she learned of a scheduled visit with Mother; C.A. threw herself on the floor, slammed doors, screamed, and scratched P.A.
The Department's recommendations did not change in its March 2023 report. It noted the Children continued to suffer regressive behaviors after visits with Mother (and occasionally Father), including becoming "physically aggressive, defiant, [having] behavioral outburst[s], bathroom accidents and waking up in the middle of the night with nightmares."
F. Bonding Study
The bonding study report was completed in April 2023. It found the interaction between Mother and the Children was "positive, reciprocal, and appropriate." It added, "Considering the relationship that exists between Mother and the children, severing contact could be detrimental. Even if not immediately destabilizing, there may be challenges related to negotiating the ambiguous loss that can result when there is a healthy parent-child relationship that is severed without significant reason (e.g., an unhealthy or unsafe parent)." (Italics added.) The report recommended that the "positive relationship observed between each of the children and their mother" be "consider[ed]" "when making any determinations regarding the future of all parties."
Father did not participate in the bonding study. During the July 2023 section 366.26 hearing, his counsel informed the juvenile court that there had been no communication between them since detention.
During hearings in May 2023, the juvenile court commented that the bonding study report was "not the most detailed," as it was based on a single observation period lasting only four hours; and that what stood out from the report was its use of the word" 'could'" and not" 'would'" when discussing whether the Children would suffer detriment if the parental relationship was severed. The judge said he was inclined to receive the report into evidence and "give it its due weight."
G. The Section 366.26 Hearing
The section 366.26 hearing took place on July 10 and 12. At the outset of the July 10 proceeding, Mother's counsel noted the only issue before the juvenile court was whether terminating parental rights would be detrimental to the Children. The court inquired of counsel about the use of the word" 'could'" in the bonding study report when referring to detriment. Mother's counsel acknowledged that "would" is a "higher standard" than "could," recognized the report was "not definitive" in determining detriment, but reminded the court that during the four-hour observation period C.A. at one point stated she wanted to go home with Mother.
The Children's counsel argued the Department's reports showed that visits with Mother were having a "detrimental" effect on the Children, which led C.A.'s psychiatrist to recommend such visits be limited to one hour per month. Counsel also noted that the bonding study report provided little, if any, guidance to the juvenile court, as it was "equivocal" and based on a single, four-hour visit.
At the July 12 hearing, the juvenile court admitted without objection all of the Department's reports and the bonding study report. After hearing the arguments of counsel, the court found the Children were adoptable and there was no legal impediment to adoption. It also found that Mother regularly visited the Children under the terms set by the Department, and a beneficial relationship existed between Mother and the Children. However, it could not find that termination of her parental rights would be detrimental to the Children, or that the "harm of severance . . . outweigh[ed] the benefit of placement in a new adoptive home." The court noted it had concerns about the quality and nature of the Children's relationship with Mother that were not addressed by the bonding study.
The court explained: "The kids have a strong relationship . . . with the prospective adoptive parents. In fact, I believe they refer to them as mommy and daddy if I'm not mistaken.... [¶] And I believe that the bonding study that was conducted also indicates that . . . [P.A.] refers to the prospective adoptive father as daddy and the prospective adoptive mother as mommy.
"And, on the other hand, when the kids return to the prospective adoptive parents' home after visits with the mother, the prospective adoptive parents note that there are a lot of problems with the children. [C.A.] displays aggressive behavior. For example, she engages in hitting, kicking, biting, yelling, et cetera, after visits with the parent. And [P.A.] exhibits similar outbursts. [¶] So for all of those reasons, I can't make a finding that the parental[-]benefit exception applies to this case." The court terminated the parental rights of Parents and ordered adoption with the Caregivers as the permanent plan for the Children.
DISCUSSION
Mother contends the juvenile court abused its discretion when it concluded the parental-benefit exception to adoption did not apply. She claims the court ignored evidence demonstrating that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the Children. She also argues the court erroneously weighed the quality of the Children's relationship with the Caregivers against the quality of their relationship with her, in contravention of Caden C. In lieu of adoption, Mother instead seeks the less permanent plan of legal guardianship for the Children.
A. Guiding Principles
When the juvenile court sets the section 366.26 hearing, it has terminated a parent's reunification services and determined the dependent child cannot safely return to the parent's custody. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 630.) There is now an "assumption . . . that the problems that led to the court taking jurisdiction have not been resolved" (ibid.), and thus "the question before the court [at the section 366.26 hearing] is decidedly not whether the parent may resume custody of the child" (ibid.). Instead, the focus of the dependency process changes from reunification services to the child's need for permanency and stability. (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 304; accord, In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 52-53 [the section 366.26 hearing is "designed to protect children's 'compelling rights . . . to have a placement that is stable, permanent, and that allows the caretaker to make a full emotional commitment to the child' "].)
At the section 366.26 hearing, the court may order one of three alternatives for permanent placement: adoption, guardianship, or long-term foster care. (§ 366.26, subd. (b).) If the dependent child is adoptable, there is a" 'strong preference for adoption over the alternative permanency plans.' " (In re B.D. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 1218, 1224 (B.D.); accord, In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 573 (Autumn H.) ["Adoption, where possible, is the permanent plan preferred by the Legislature."].) While legal guardianship or long-term foster care leaves parental rights in place, adoption "requires terminating the natural parents' legal rights to the child." (Autumn H., at p. 574.)
Once the juvenile court finds the child is adoptable, the burden then shifts to the parent to demonstrate that a statutory exception applies. (B.D., supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1224-1225.) "One of these is the parental-benefit exception. What it requires a parent to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, is that the parent has regularly visited with the child, that the child would benefit from continuing the relationship, and that terminating the relationship would be detrimental to the child. [Citations.] The language of this exception, along with its history and place in the larger dependency scheme, show that the exception applies in situations where a child cannot be in a parent's custody but where severing the child's relationship with the parent, even when balanced against the benefits of a new adoptive home, would be harmful for the child." (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 629-630, citing § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) In those circumstances, the court should decline to terminate parental rights and select another permanent plan. (Caden C., at pp. 630-631.)
Under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1), if the juvenile court determines by clear and convincing evidence that "it is likely the child will be adopted, the court shall terminate parental rights and order the child placed for adoption.... Under these circumstances, the court shall terminate parental rights unless either of the following applies: . . . [¶] (B) The court finds a compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child due to one or more of the following circumstances: [¶] (i) The parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship." (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)
The first element of the parent's burden in establishing the parental-benefit exception-regular visitation and contact-is "straightforward" and "[t]he question is just whether 'parents visit consistently,' taking into account 'the extent permitted by court orders.'" (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632; § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)
"As to the second element, courts assess whether 'the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.'" (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632, citing § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) "[T]he relationship may be shaped by a slew of factors, such as '[t]he age of the child, the portion of the child's life spent in the parent's custody, the "positive" or "negative" effect of interaction between parent and child, and the child's particular needs.'" (Caden C., at p. 632, quoting Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 576.)
"Concerning the third element-whether 'termination would be detrimental to the child due to' the relationship-the court must decide whether it would be harmful to the child to sever the relationship and choose adoption." (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 633.) "Because terminating parental rights eliminates any legal basis for the parent or child to maintain the relationship, courts must assume that terminating parental rights terminates the relationship. [Citations.] What courts need to determine, therefore, is how the child would be affected by losing the parental relationship-in effect, what life would be like for the child in an adoptive home without the parent in the child's life." (Ibid.)" 'If severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that,' even considering the benefits of a new adoptive home, termination would 'harm[ ]' the child, the court should not terminate parental rights." (Ibid.) Determining the "harm associated with severing the relationship is a subtle enterprise" (id. at p. 634), as the parentchild relationship sometimes "involves tangled benefits and burdens" (ibid.). "In those cases, the court faces the complex task of disentangling the consequences of removing those burdens along with the benefits of the relationship." (Ibid.)
Caden C. provides guidance on the factors a juvenile court may and may not consider in deciding whether termination of parental rights is detrimental to a child. It is improper to compare a "parent's attributes as custodial caregiver relative to those of any potential adoptive parent(s)," as the section 366.26 hearing "is decidedly not a contest of who would be the better custodial caregiver." (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 634.) Because "[n]othing that happens at the section 366.26 hearing allows the child to return to live with the parent," a court also "should not look to whether the parent can provide a home for the child." (Caden C., at p. 634.) Rather, the "question is just whether losing the relationship with the parent would harm the child to an extent not outweighed, on balance, by the security of a new, adoptive home." (Ibid.) "Even where it may never make sense to permit the child to live with the parent, termination may be detrimental." (Ibid.)
In addition, a parent's "continued struggles" with the issues that led to dependency cannot, "standing alone," be a bar to the parental-benefit exception, as such a rule "would effectively write the exception out of the statute." (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 637.) However, a parent's struggles with the issues that led to dependency "often prove relevant to the application of the exception" because it "may mean that interaction between parent and child at least sometimes has a"' "negative" effect' on the child." (Ibid.) But a parent's struggles "are relevant only to the extent they inform the specific questions before the court: would the child benefit from continuing the relationship and be harmed, on balance, by losing it?" (Id. at p. 638.)
We apply a "hybrid" standard when reviewing the juvenile court's ruling on the third element of the parental-benefit exception. (In re Eli B. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1061, 1068.) Under this standard, we review the court's factual determinations concerning the detriment analysis for substantial evidence, "but its ultimate weighing of the relative harms and benefits of terminating parental rights for an abuse of discretion." (Ibid.; accord, Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 641 ["At its core, the hybrid standard . . . simply embodies the principle that '[t]he statutory scheme does not authorize a reviewing court to substitute its own judgment as to what is in the child's best interests for the trial court's determination in that regard[.]' "].) A court abuses its discretion" '"' "by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination." '" '" (Caden C., at p. 641.) B. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Declining to Apply the Parental-Benefit Exception
The juvenile court found that Mother established the first two elements of the parental-benefit exception. Because the Department does not dispute these findings and because, from our own review of the record, they are supported by substantial evidence, we shall focus our analysis on the third element, noting however, that the second and third elements of the exception "significantly overlap." (In re Katherine J. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 303, 317, fn. 7.)
Mother claims the evidence does not support the juvenile court's finding that the Children would not be harmed if the parental relationship was severed. In support, she relies on the Department's reports that commend her for her loving and nurturing behavior during visits with the Children. These reports reflect that the Children "enthusiastically enjoyed" these visits, were "very excited" to see her, and that C.A. in particular appeared to have a "strong bond" with her. In addition, Mother relies on the bonding study report in which the author observed the interaction between Mother and the Children to be "positive, reciprocal, and appropriate," with C.A. at one point stating during the four-hour observation period that she wanted to go home with Mother.
To succeed with this claim on appeal, Mother must show the evidence compels a finding that the Children would suffer detriment if the parental relationship was terminated." '[W]here the issue on appeal turns on a failure of proof at trial, the question for a reviewing court becomes whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law.'" (In re Luis H. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 1223, 1227 (Luis H.) [concluding in a dependency proceeding that children failed to meet their burden on appeal to show the evidence compelled a finding in their favor that they were at substantial risk of harm]; accord, Dreyer's Grand Ice Cream, Inc. v. County of Kern (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 828, 838 (Dreyer's) [when the factfinder rules a party has not met his or her burden of proof at trial, the standard of review is not substantial evidence, but" 'whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law' "].) Under this standard, the party with the burden of proof at trial must show on appeal that its evidence was (1)"' "uncontradicted and unimpeached" '" and (2)"' "of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it was sufficient to support a finding." '" (Dreyer's, at p. 838; accord, Luis H., at p. 1227.)
Here, the record shows that as the dependency progressed, the Children repeatedly exhibited regressive behaviors following visits with Mother, including becoming physically aggressive with each other and their Caregivers. During a visit in January 2022, C.A. became "very itchy" and started scratching herself to such a degree that she developed "small abrasions" on her arms and cheeks. After the visit was cut short, C.A. admitted to a Department social worker that she became itchy when she saw Mother, and that the itching stopped when the visit ended.
After another visit in February 2022 with Mother and her family friends from Arkansas, the Children displayed detrimental behaviors for "many days" including separation anxiety, worry, temper tantrums, clinginess, teeth grinding, difficulty sleeping, and bed wetting. C.A. expressed "worry and sadness" to her Caregivers after being informed by Mother that C.A. would be moving to Arkansas to live with Mother and her friends. In its March 2022 report, the Department noted the Children continued to exhibit negative behaviors after visits with Mother. In an effort to minimize the negative effects of these visits, C.A.'s psychiatrist recommended they be reduced to once a month for an hour.
Although Mother's visits with the Children were for the most part appropriate, after a June 2022 visit a Department social worker requested that Mother refrain from making comments to the Children suggesting they would be returning to her care. Mother rejected this request, despite the fact the social worker told her such comments were negatively affecting the Children.
After a visit in October 2022, C.A. scratched, pinched, and bit one of her Caregivers, then kicked her Caregiver in the stomach. C.A. also became physical with P.A. Following a visit with Mother in November, C.A. urinated on herself at school. Before a visit in January 2023, C.A. had a temper tantrum that lasted about 45 minutes when she learned of a scheduled visit with Mother.
Regarding the bonding study, the juvenile court noted the report was "not the most detailed" and the author's opinions were based on only a four-hour observation period. In addition, the author did not conclude the Children would suffer detriment, but merely that they could suffer such detriment if the natural parental relationship was severed. During the section 366.26 hearing, Mother's counsel acknowledged that the bonding study was "not definitive" in determining detriment, and that use of the word "would" is a "higher standard" than "could" in establishing detriment. And Mother does not dispute that as fact-finder, the juvenile court had the discretion to give the bonding report the "weight it was due," and consider the totality of the evidence in finding the Children would not be harmed if the parental relationship was severed. (See In re Richard C. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1191, 1196 [by the time of the section 366.26 hearing," 'the parent and child have been in the dependency process for 12 months or longer, during which time the nature and extent of the particular relationship should be apparent' "].)
Moreover, at the time of the section 366.26 hearing in July 2023, C.A. had been in dependency for almost three years, or nearly half of her life. P.A., who was about 16 months old at the time of removal, had been in dependency for a majority of his young life. It is reasonable to infer from the significant time the Children spent in dependency, particularly when considering the Children's regressive behaviors after limited visits with Mother, that termination of parental rights would not be detrimental. (See In re Helen W. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 71, 81 [finding the parental-benefit exception inapplicable when one of the mother's children had spent over half of her young life with the foster mother and the other child "virtually his entire life" with her, and where it was reported that the older child exhibited concerning behaviors after visits with the mother].)
While it is clear that Mother and the Children loved each other and there existed some benefit to the continuance of that relationship, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's finding that the Children's visits with Mother were becoming detrimental to their well-being. This finding supports the inference that the Children did not have a" 'significant, positive, emotional relationship'" with Mother such that they would be harmed as a matter of law if the parental relationship were severed. (See Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 633; Luis H., supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at p. 1227; Dreyer's, supra, 218 Cal.App.4th at p. 838.)
At the same time, the record also shows that the Children benefited greatly from the stability, security, and permanency provided by the Caregivers in the prospective adoptive home, the Children's sixth placement in dependency. The Department noted the Children's behavior substantially improved in this placement, as the Children received the services they needed to thrive. C.A.'s teacher and principal observed C.A. made "great strides in the classroom"; and P.A., despite his significant delay in communication, began speaking in two- and three-word sentences.
In a related argument, Mother suggests the juvenile court committed legal error in analyzing the parent-benefit exception by comparing her attributes as custodial caregiver to those of the prospective adoptive parents. The juvenile court did note that the Children had a strong bond with the Caregivers, whom they called "mommy" and "daddy." But it stopped short of improperly comparing the Caregivers' attributes as custodial caregivers relative to those of Mother. Instead, the court's focus was on the best interest of the Children, without relying on any negative attributes of Mother or the family home. (See Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 633 ["In each case . . . the court acts in the child's best interest in a specific way: it decides whether the harm of severing the relationship outweighs 'the security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer.'" (Italics added.)].) In this context, we do not find that the court acted outside the bounds of its legal discretion in the "complex task" of weighing the benefits and burdens of continuing the natural parental relationship. (See id. at p. 634.)
Based on this record, we conclude the juvenile court properly exercised its discretion, balancing the harm, if any, to the Children, against the benefits of a new adoptive home, in determining the parental-benefit exception did not apply. (See Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 640 [in weighing the harm of losing the natural parental relationship against the benefits of placement in a new, adoptive home, the juvenile court's "ultimate decision" on this issue "is discretionary and properly reviewed for abuse of discretion"].)
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court's July 2023 order terminating the parental rights of Mother is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: DO, J. RUBIN, J.