Further, the court remanded the cause for a hearing relative to Vermeil's liability for the 1981 retailers' occupation taxes. ( 124 Ill. App.3d 28.) The first district appellate court, in cause No. 60298, on the other hand, affirmed the circuit court decision in favor of individual defendants, Bernard W. Hartigan and Patrick J. Hartigan, finding no personal liability for the unpaid retailers' occupation taxes. 123 Ill. App.3d 63.

In Beverly Bank v. Alsip Bank (1982), 106 Ill. App.3d 1012, 436 N.E.2d 598, this court held that the mere filing of cross-motions for summary judgment does not establish the absence of any question of material fact and that the trial court must independently determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. A reviewing court has the power to reverse a summary judgment order if the record indicates that a material question of fact exists even where cross-motions for summary judgment were filed in the trial court ( Department of Revenue v. Heartland Investments, Inc. (1984), 124 Ill. App.3d 28, 463 N.E.2d 1079, aff'd (1985), 106 Ill.2d 19, 476 N.E.2d 413), and we therefore find that plaintiff was not precluded from argument here concerning the existence of a material question of fact. • 3, 4 With respect to the standard of review, defendants incorrectly argue that the trial court's grant of summary judgment may not be reversed unless there was an abuse of discretion such that plaintiff's right to fundamental justice was violated.