Opinion
2006-1796 K C.
Decided on February 8, 2008.
Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Cheryl J. Gonzalez, J.), entered July 28, 2006. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied a motion by Joseph Paradelo to vacate "judgments" entered pursuant to the terms of a consent order.
Order affirmed without costs.
PRESENT: WESTON PATTERSON, J.P. and RIOS, J.
Petitioner Department of Housing Preservation and Development of the City of New York and respondents Joseph Paradelo and HRC Holding Corp. (HRC) negotiated a "global settlement" of petitioner's complaint that HRC and Paradelo, among others, failed to correct numerous class "C", "B" and "A" violations at 234 Troutman Street, the premises which is the subject of the instant proceeding ( see CCA 110 [a] [1], [4], [9]), and at 12 other premises, the terms of which settlement formed the basis of a consent order. The order provided, inter alia, that upon Paradelo and HRC's payment of a $50,000 fine by a date certain, petitioner would execute a satisfaction of judgment in favor of Paradelo personally. If these respondents failed to pay the fine, a judgment would be entered "against them without further notice [in the sum of $100,000] against each property sued on and incorporated by reference in th[e] agreement." The fine was not paid, and, on March 4, 2003, a judgment was entered in the sum of $100,000 against HRC and Paradelo, to be executed against 234 Troutman Street. Thereafter, Paradelo moved to vacate the judgment and any other judgments which may have been entered, alleging that he never intended to submit to personal liability for the fines, that he was not the owner of any of the subject premises and had no personal responsibility for correcting violations, and that his parol evidence should be admitted to determine the meaning of the order's terms with respect to that liability, which, he insisted, were vague and ambiguous. The court denied the motion, and this appeal ensued.
The consent order is readily and coherently explicable by reference to its plain terms, and parol evidence is not admissible to vary those terms ( Chemical Bank v Nemeroff, 233 AD2d 239). In the order, which Paradelo executed as "C.E.O.," along with his attorney as counsel to both Paradelo and HRC, Paradelo admitted that he was an "owner" of the premises as contemplated by the Multiple Dwelling Law ( see Multiple Dwelling Law § 4) and the Housing Maintenance Code ( see Administrative Code of City of NY § 27-2004 [a] [45]) by virtue of his capacity as owner or chief executive officer of the corporate respondents, which own or manage the properties concerned in all of the 13 proceedings, and he represented that he was authorized to represent those respondents for purposes of the settlement. Paradelo also agreed that he was responsible for the removal of the violations; that, upon satisfaction of the penalty, petitioner would execute a "satisfaction of judgment" in favor of Paradelo personally; and that if the penalty were not satisfied, judgments would be entered against both him and HRC with respect to each of the properties. Thus, pursuant to the unambiguous terms of the consent order, Paradelo was personally liable for the fines imposed as a condition of the settlement.
To the extent that Paradelo (impliedly) argues in the alternative that, in the event the consent order is construed to bind him personally, it should be vacated, we find that he established no basis, such as fraud, accident, mistake, or duress, sufficient to warrant vacatur of the consent order and the underlying stipulation ( Matter of Frutiger, 29 NY2d 143, 150). Paradelo's purported proof of transfers of ownership prior to the execution of the consent order failed to demonstrate either the parties' mutual mistake as to Paradelo's ownership ( e.g. Mahon v New York City Health Hosps. Corp., 303 AD2d 725) or his unilateral mistake in conceding that status. Accordingly, the order is affirmed.
Weston Patterson, J.P. and Rios, J., concur.