Opinion
B302361
06-12-2020
In re Delaila T. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. SUSY B., Defendant and Appellant.
Megan Turkat Schirn, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, Kristine P. Miles, Assistant County Counsel and Sally Son, Deputy County Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. DK07133) APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Veronica S. McBeth, Judge. (Retired judge of the L.A. Sup. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.) Affirmed. Megan Turkat Schirn, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, Kristine P. Miles, Assistant County Counsel and Sally Son, Deputy County Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
Susy B. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court's order terminating parental rights to her children, Delaila T. and Jacob T., under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Mother contends there was substantial evidence of a strong sibling relationship between the children and their older half-sibling, Ericqa R., and the court abused its discretion in declining to apply the statutory sibling exception to termination of parental rights. We conclude that any value gained from continuing the sibling relationship did not outweigh the long-term benefits and security conferred through adoption. Thus, we affirm the order.
Although the record refers to both Delaila and Delilah, the juvenile court found the child's true name to be Delaila, as spelled in her birth certificate.
Further unspecified statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Family Background and Prior Dependency History
Mother has eight children with four different fathers: Ericqa (whose father is Buddy R.); M.C. and N.C. (whose father is Jose C.); N.T., Delaila, and Jacob (whose father is Gerardo T.); and J.C. and R.C. (whose father is unidentified). This appeal concerns only Delaila and Jacob.
J.C. and R.C. were born after these proceedings began.
At least nine referrals were made regarding mother's alleged neglect and physical abuse of Ericqa, M.C., and N.C. between 2010 and 2014. In July 2014, allegations that mother left the children alone for up to six hours at a time with no food or water were substantiated, and a voluntary family maintenance case was opened. In October 2014, the juvenile court sustained a petition alleging that Ericqa, M.C., and N.C. (who were then nine, seven, and five years old) were juvenile court dependents under section 300, subdivision (b), because mother left the children in the care of her boyfriend Gerardo, a drug user, and failed to protect them from his known physical abuse. The three children were removed from mother and placed with M.C. and N.C.'s father, Jose.
N.T. was born in October 2014. The same month, the juvenile court sustained a petition alleging that N.T. was a juvenile court dependent pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (b) and (j), because mother and Gerardo were drug users, mother and N.T. tested positive for methamphetamine at N.T.'s birth, Gerardo inappropriately disciplined N.T.'s half-siblings, and mother failed to protect the children. N.T. was removed from mother and Gerardo and placed in foster care.
Delaila was born in January 2016, and Jacob was born in December 2016. In August 2016, Ericqa and N.T. were placed with mother under the supervision of the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department). Gerardo was ordered not to have any contact with Ericqa or N.T. The juvenile court granted Jose full custody of M.C. and N.C. and terminated its jurisdiction over them.
B. Current Proceeding
In early 2017, 11-year-old Ericqa disclosed to her teacher that Gerardo was physically abusing the children. After an investigation, the Department filed petitions on behalf of Ericqa, two-year-old N.T., one-year-old Delaila, and three-month-old Jacob in March 2017. The petitions alleged the children were juvenile court dependents pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), and (j), because mother and Gerardo engaged in physical altercations in the children's presence, resulting in injury to Jacob; Gerardo physically abused Ericqa, N.T., and Delaila, including by burning N.T.'s hand and throwing her across the room by the hair; mother failed to protect the children from Gerardo's physical abuse; and both mother and Gerardo were current or recent drug users.
The children were placed in three different foster homes: Ericqa was placed with Mr. and Mrs. G., N.T. was returned to her original placement, and Delaila and Jacob were placed together in a separate foster home. Mother was permitted weekly monitored visits with the children, which also served as regular sibling visits. Gerardo was arrested and convicted of felony child abuse for his abuse of N.T.
In July 2017, the Department filed amended petitions alleging additional counts of severe physical abuse and cruelty to N.T. under section 300, subdivisions (e) and (i).
C. Subsequent Department Reports
In November 2017, the juvenile court sustained all counts of the petitions. Mother was permitted monitored visits, but she was denied reunification services (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(3), (5) and (6)). The court scheduled a permanency planning hearing pursuant to section 366.26.
The Department prepared a section 366.26 report in March 2018. Mother had made no effort to have any contact or relationship with N.T., and had not visited Ericqa, Delaila, and Jacob in over four months. She had given birth to J.C. in January 2018, and had a pending dependency case in Riverside County. Following their detention, Ericqa, Delaila, and Jacob had regular sibling visits. In March 2018, Delaila and Jacob moved into the home of Mr. and Mrs. G., where Ericqa was living.
As of October 2018, mother still had not visited N.T., and had only sporadic visits with Ericqa, Delaila, and Jacob. She failed to comply with her case plan. N.T. was thriving in her loving foster home, and Delaila and Jacob had developed a strong bond with the G.'s. Ericqa struggled in foster care, however. Although she had initially reported being happy with her foster family, as mother's visits became more infrequent, she exhibited behavioral issues and struggled with the idea of adoption. The Department recommended adoption as a permanent plan for N.T., Delaila, and Jacob, and was exploring other permanency options for Ericqa.
In December 2018, the juvenile court approved N.T.'s adoption and terminated parental rights. The same month, Ericqa was moved to a new foster placement because of her behavioral issues. The court ordered weekly sibling visits for Ericqa, Delaila, and Jacob for two hours, to be monitored by their foster parents. Sibling visits with N.T. were scheduled for once per month.
In April 2019, the Department learned that mother had given birth to her eighth child, R.C., in December 2018. R.C. was detained from mother, and a new dependency case was filed. Mother tested positive for drugs in February 2019, and her visits with the children remained inconsistent. She often failed to show up without notice, which was most hurtful to Ericqa. The Department suspected that Ericqa was having unmonitored phone calls with mother, and it observed an increase in "adverse behaviors . . . the more she has any kind of contact" with mother, appearing to intentionally sabotage her placements. Ericqa's foster parents requested her removal, and she was placed in a third foster home. The Department observed that Ericqa felt it was her responsibility to keep the family together. During visits with Delaila and Jacob in the presence of the Department, Ericqa was loving and attentive. However, Mrs. G. reported that Ericqa "often didn't want to be bothered with the kids when the Department wasn't present in the home[,] as she would tell the kids to leave her alone."
D. Combined Section 388 and Section 366.26 Hearing
In May 2019, Ericqa, through her attorney, filed a section 388 petition requesting legal guardianship as a permanent plan for Delaila and Jacob, on the basis that adoption would foreclose Ericqa's sibling relationship with them.
In response to Ericqa's petition, the Department noted in a July 2019 report that Delaila and Jacob were thriving in the home of the G.'s. They were on target with developmental milestones, and had developed a strong bond with their caregivers and each other. Jacob's vocabulary had increased and he was throwing fewer tantrums, while Delaila was learning to express her needs. Ericqa continued to struggle. The Department reiterated its concerns that mother was influencing Ericqa to intentionally sabotage her placements. Ericqa had believed that she could live with her uncle if she acted out in foster care, and "lashed out" when this did not occur. The more contact Ericqa had with mother, the more "adverse behaviors" she displayed.
In August 2019, the Department learned that Ericqa's strained relationship with Mrs. G. was negatively impacting her sibling visits. Ericqa ended visits early or canceled visits entirely, and Jacob had grown more uncomfortable when Mrs. G. was not present. Neither Delaila nor Jacob asked for Ericqa between visits. The G.'s had no interest in a legal guardianship over Delaila and Jacob, which would require them to continue monitoring visits with Ericqa, because of Ericqa's behavioral issues and mother's perceived influence over her.
In October 2019, the Department considered reducing sibling visits to three times per month or every other week because Ericqa reported the visits were interfering with her increased academic workload. No permanent placement had been identified for Ericqa.
At the combined section 388 and section 366.26 hearing in October 2019, mother joined Ericqa's petition. Counsel for Delaila and Jacob argued there had been no "quality, quantity, or consistency with visits with [Ericqa]" to demonstrate a strong sibling bond. The Department argued that application of the sibling exception must be considered from the perspective of Delaila and Jacob, who would suffer no detriment from severance of the sibling relationship with Ericqa.
The court denied Ericqa's petition, approving adoption as the permanent plan for Delaila and Jacob. The court acknowledged that Ericqa felt a close bond with her siblings, who enjoyed their visits with her. However, the evidence demonstrated that Delaila and Jacob shared a stronger bond with their caregivers, and "unfortunately, [Ericqa doesn't] get along with them." The court noted that Ericqa's sibling visits had been inconsistent, and Delaila and Jacob rarely asked for her, "probably" due to their young age. Thus, any sibling bonds that existed were not compelling enough to outweigh the security and permanence Delaila and Jacob would gain through adoption. Finding no applicable exception, the court terminated parental rights.
Mother timely appealed the order.
A parent has standing to assert the sibling exception because "an immediate and substantial consequence results to the parent's legally cognizable interest in the relationship with his or her child" when the exception is found to apply or not apply. (In re L. Y. L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 948.)
DISCUSSION
Mother argues the juvenile court erred when it terminated parental rights to Delaila and Jacob without applying the statutory sibling exception to preserve their sibling relationship with Ericqa. We find no grounds to reverse the order.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
The express purpose of section 366.26 is "to provide stable, permanent homes" for dependent children. (§ 366.26, subd. (b).) If the court has decided to end parent-child reunification services, the legislative preference is for adoption. (§ 366.26, subd. (b)(1).) When the court finds by clear and convincing evidence the child is likely to be adopted, the statute mandates termination of parental rights unless the parent opposing termination can demonstrate that one of the enumerated exceptions applies. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1); In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53 ["the court must order adoption and its necessary consequence, termination of parental rights, unless one of the specified circumstances provides a compelling reason for finding that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child"].)
Under the sibling relationship exception, parental rights will not be terminated when "[t]here would be substantial interference with a child's sibling relationship, taking into consideration the nature and extent of the relationship, including . . . whether the child was raised with a sibling in the same home, whether the child shared significant common experiences or has existing close and strong bonds with a sibling, and whether ongoing contact is in the child's best interest, including the child's long-term emotional interest, as compared to the benefit of legal permanence through adoption." (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v).) "To show a substantial interference with a sibling relationship the parent must show the existence of a significant sibling relationship, the severance of which would be detrimental to the child." (In re L. Y. L., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 952.)
In considering the sibling relationship exception, the concern is the best interest of the child being considered for adoption, not the interests of that child's siblings. "[T]he court may reject adoption under this sibling relationship provision only if it finds adoption would be detrimental to the child whose welfare is being considered. It may not prevent a child from being adopted solely because of the effect the adoption may have on a sibling." (In re Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 49-50.)
Two standards of review are relevant to our analysis. We apply the substantial evidence standard to the court's factual determination whether a significant sibling relationship exists. (In re Bailey J. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1314.) We apply the abuse of discretion standard to the court's discretionary determination whether there is a compelling reason to apply the exception, "which calls for the juvenile court to determine the importance of the relationship in terms of the detrimental impact that its severance can be expected to have on the child and to weigh that against the benefit to the child of adoption." (Id. at p. 1315; accord, In re K.P. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 614, 621-622; In re J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503, 530-531.)
B. No Error in Finding Sibling Exception Inapplicable
Mother contends that adoption would interfere with the sibling relationship and be detrimental to Delaila and Jacob. In declining to apply the sibling exception, the juvenile court concluded that Delaila and Jacob's relationship with Ericqa was not so significant or beneficial as to outweigh the long-term benefits conferred through adoption. We agree.
1. No Significant Sibling Relationship
Substantial evidence supported the court's conclusion that Delaila and Jacob's relationship with Ericqa was not as significant or beneficial as their relationship with their caregivers. Delaila and Jacob lived with Ericqa intermittently when they were less than three years old, and were not old enough to share "significant common experiences" that would cement a strong bond between them. (See § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v); In re Erik P. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 395, 404 [explaining legislature's intent to "preserv[e] long-standing relationships between siblings which serve as anchors for dependent children whose lives are in turmoil"].) Delaila was eight months old and Jacob had not yet been born when Ericqa was returned to mother's home, and the three children lived together for only six months and three months, respectively, before they were detained and separated. After Delaila and Jacob were placed with Ericqa in the home of the G.'s, the three siblings lived together for nine months before Ericqa changed placements.
Although the Department observed good relations between the siblings following their separation, Ericqa visited less regularly over time—suggesting a waning, not intensifying, sibling bond. As Ericqa's visits became inconsistent, Mrs. G. reported that Jacob grew more uncomfortable during visits, and neither Delaila nor Jacob expressed a desire to see Ericqa outside of those times. By the time of the section 366.26 hearing, Delaila and Jacob were only three and two years old. The juvenile court reasonably could infer that their memories, if any, of shared experiences with Ericqa were limited and not as meaningful as their relationship with the G.'s. Thus, there was substantial evidence that Delaila and Jacob would not suffer substantial detriment if their relationship with Ericqa was severed. (See In re L. Y. L., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 952.)
Mother's cited cases reinforce our conclusion that the sibling relationship among Ericqa, Delaila, and Jacob was too tenuous to derail adoption. In In re Naomi P., three-year-old Naomi had weekly visits with her older siblings that often lasted all day, were mutually enjoyable, and had been consistent since she was born. (In re Naomi P. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 808, pp. 811-821.) Naomi clearly loved her siblings, who were a " 'constant thread' " in her life during dependency proceedings, providing a " 'compelling reason' " for application of the statutory exception. (Id. at p. 821.) In contrast, Ericqa, Delaila, and Jacob struggled to maintain weekly visits that lasted only two hours. In In re L. Y. L., seven-year-old L. Y. and her younger sibling had jointly suffered physical abuse, "had been through the dependency process together," and "lived together most of their lives." (In re L. Y. L., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 952.) Despite the siblings' closeness, the court declined to apply the statutory exception because "there was no evidence L. Y., other than being sad, would suffer detriment if the relationship ended." (Id. at pp. 952-953.) Delaila and Jacob's relationship with Ericqa falls far short of the sibling bond that In re L. Y. L. concluded was insufficient to justify maintaining parental rights.
2. Sibling Relationship Did Not Outweigh Benefits of Adoption
Even if adoption will substantially interfere with a significant sibling relationship, the juvenile court nonetheless may terminate parental rights if it determines that a child would benefit more from adoption than from maintaining the sibling relationship. (In re L. Y. L., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at pp. 952-953; In re Naomi P., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 823 [" 'the court must nevertheless weigh the benefit to the child of continuing the sibling relationship against the benefit the child would receive by gaining a permanent home through adoption' "].) Application of the sibling relationship exception is rare, "particularly when the proceedings concern young children whose needs for a competent, caring and stable parent are paramount." (In re Valerie A. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 987, 1014; see In re L. Y. L., at p. 950.) In other words, the sibling relationship will " 'rarely be sufficiently strong to outweigh the benefits of adoption.' " (In re Daisy D. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 287, 293.)
Here, substantial evidence supported the juvenile court's conclusion that the best interests and long-term emotional needs of Delaila and Jacob would be better served by adoption than by maintaining a relationship with Ericqa in a legal guardianship or long-term foster care. The court acknowledged that Ericqa felt close to her siblings, but remarked that the sibling exception must be considered from the perspective of the child eligible for adoption. (See In re Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 55 ["the ultimate question is whether adoption would be detrimental to the adoptive child, not someone else"].) Delaila and Jacob had developed a strong bond with the G.'s, whom they referred to as " 'mom' " and " 'dad,' " and who were committed to adopting them. Both children were observed to be happy, comfortable, and thriving in their new home, and the G.'s were meeting their physical, emotional, medical, and developmental needs.
Further, the court could not ignore the practical reality that Ericqa had a strained relationship with Mrs. G., who had no interest in a legal guardianship involving continued contact with Ericqa and mother. Application of the statutory exception would deprive Delaila and Jacob of the permanent home and family that the G.'s were ready to provide, and potentially expose the young children to negative influence from mother. Thus, any tenuous benefit to Delaila and Jacob from preservation of the sibling relationship with Ericqa did not outweigh the concrete and long-term benefits of adoption by parents with whom they had already formed an attachment.
Citing In re Jacob S., mother argues that the juvenile court erred when it "discounted any detriment" due to the "young ages of [Delaila and Jacob]," who could not articulate the extent of their sadness and attachment to Ericqa. (See In re Jacob S. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1011, 1017 ["[W]e do not believe that a child's 'sadness' can never satisfy the substantial detriment test. 'Sadness' is often all a young child can express."], disapproved of on other grounds by In re S.B. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 529, 537, fn. 5.) But here, the children expressed no sadness, and the juvenile court was guided by other telling evidence: Ericqa's visits were progressively less consistent, while Jacob grew increasingly more uncomfortable around her and sought Mrs. G. for comfort. While In re Jacob S. recognized that detriment is harder to assess in young children, the court ultimately concluded that even assuming "substantial detriment" from loss of the sibling relationship, the benefits of adoption clearly outweighed such detriment. (Id. at p. 1018.)
In sum, mother has failed to meet the heavy burden of establishing that a permanent plan other than adoption would serve Delaila and Jacob's best interests. The court was entitled to conclude there was no compelling reason to apply the sibling relationship exception, and we perceive no abuse of discretion.
DISPOSITION
The order terminating parental rights is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
EDMON, P. J. We concur:
EGERTON, J.
DHANIDINA, J.